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# The Origin of the State according to Plato

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## INTRODUCTION

In two places in his works, Plato treats explicitly of the origin of the State. The first is in the *Republic*,<sup>1</sup> while the second is to be found in his work entitled *Laws*.<sup>2</sup> These expositions pose certain problems.

In the first place they differ quite markedly from each other. That in the *Republic* pictures the State as arising from the need of men for one another's assistance. Drawn by this need they come to live together and form specialised classes, each being devoted to the satisfaction of a certain need. However, the description in the *Laws* has it that the State is formed by the grouping of primitive families to form tribes, which in their turn eventually unite with one another to form the city.

These descriptions of Plato also present difficulties when compared with the agreed conclusions of historians. These consider the family, phratry and tribe to be most essential elements in the formation of the State. This agreement is evident even with two historians whose interpretations of the facts are quite diverse. On the facts themselves however, they are in accord.

Thus, Fustel de Coulanges, who attributes the formation of the first city-state to altruistic, religious motives, nevertheless admits the essential importance of the family, phratry, tribe social evolution, which preceded and led to the formation of the first city-states :

Ainsi la société humaine, dans cette race, n'a pas grandi à la façon d'un cercle qui s'élargirait peu à peu, gagnant de proche en proche. Ce sont, au contraire, de petits groupes qui, constitués longtemps à l'avance, se sont agrégés les uns aux autres. Plusieurs familles ont formé la phratricie, plusieurs phratricies la tribu, plusieurs tribus la cité.<sup>3</sup>

Likewise Gustave Glotz, who, in his book *La Cité grecque*, evidently writes without preconceptions, also emphasises the great role played by the family, phratry and the tribe :

Enfin, le trait le plus saillant de la cité grecque, c'est la répartition des citoyens en tribus et en phratricies. Nous n'insisterons pas ici sur ces

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1. Book II, 369 b ff.

2. Book III, 767 a ff.

3. *La Cité antique*, p.143.



groupements, parce que nous avons assez longuement montré que la formation de la cité ne s'explique pas sans eux.<sup>1</sup>

When this conclusion of historians regarding the importance of the family, phratry and the tribe is compared with the two descriptions of Plato, certain difficulties arise. There is no mention of these social groupings in the description of the *Republic*, where Plato seems to substitute fabricating, and later governing classes. On the other hand, in the *Laws* he explains the origin of the State from the family and the tribe, but omits any mention of the phratry.

The question then arises as to why these two descriptions of Plato are so radically different, and why they are different from the accepted conclusions of historians.

#### HISTORY AND THE " HISTORY " OF PLATO

Firstly, from both M. Glotz and M. de Coulanges, we see the great importance of the social units of the family, phratry and tribe in the formation of the city. It would be futile to argue that Plato was ignorant of their rôles. If his examples have some historical basis, why then does he not refer to them?

This question bears more on the example in the *Republic* than in the *Laws* where there is some resemblance to these historically important institutions.

Taking the description in the *Republic* first, and remembering that Plato had in mind the nature of justice and injustice in society when he embarked on this description, we see the reason for this omission. The example is the instrument and basis for discovering the nature of justice and injustice. Does the family, or the phratry or the tribe explain why a society is just or unjust? Cannot societies be just or unjust who have never heard of a phratry or a tribe and never been constituted from anything resembling them?

Plato rightly diagnosed that it was none of these institutions as such which was at the basis of justice and injustice; they originate in a group of men having need of one another's services and products, hence the nature of the description. A description of family, phratry and tribe evolution would have been quite foreign to the purpose of his exposition and so much *poudre aux yeux* of his disciples.

What then of the example he does use? It would seem that Plato is proceeding in an historical manner which gives the impression of being rather *a priori* as if he were saying " this is how it *ought* to have all happened." To this we would say that the group of producers which he depicts as coming together from need of one

1. *La Cité grecque*, p.28.



another's products, is certainly an historical fact, though a library of history books could never prove it. The reason of this is that it is not the office of history *per se* to prove anything, but merely to record facts. Therefore history cannot prove *why* men first started coming together; the most it can do is merely to state *that* they did do this.

That the mainspring of the first formation of imperfect states was need is a philosophical principle and follows from the very nature of man. That each man is limited in his talents and needs the help and fruits of other men's labours in living in any modest comfort, is a real fact. This is so today and always has been. Therefore it is from the nature of man himself that the origin of the State is to be explained; not from the evolution of family, phratry and tribe. Hence Plato certainly cannot be accused of an *a priori* approach to history.

What has been said about the description in the *Republic* can also be applied to the origin of the State as exposed in the *Laws*. Here, however, the description approximates to the historical stages of family, phratry and tribe.

Plato does not treat of these primitive social groupings as such because what he wanted to place in bold relief was the fact that Law arises from the exigencies of society *as such*, not for as much as it is phratry, or tribe, or city. He wished to avoid the danger of his hearers' confusing the *per accidens* and the *per se*. Phratry, tribe and city each had their respective laws, yet neither one of them, nor all of them together explain the *raison d'être* of law.

Although both in the *Laws* and in the *Republic* we claim that Plato's portrayals are not unhistorical, there may however seem to be a conflict between the two. In the *Laws* the description approximates to the stages of family, phratry, tribe and city. In the *Republic* he pictures the State as arising from the needs of men.

However, it is not difficult to see that there is no conflict between the two descriptions. Thus it is to be noted well that in the *Laws* Plato merely states *how* families started living side by side, without explaining *why*, which as we have seen would have been quite beside the point. In the *Republic* however, it is the reverse. He explains the "why" of men's coming together (i.e. through need) without a detailed description of the "how."

Therefore the two examples are not mutually exclusive. The example in the *Republic* still leaves room for the description in the *Laws* and vice-versa. That men came together from need does not exclude their society from passing through the stages of phratry, tribe and city, and likewise the fact of this evolution does not exclude need as the motivating principle.



We have it from reliable authorities<sup>1</sup> that the *Republic* was written long before the *Laws*. Therefore the accord in the two portrayals which he uses shows a remarkably consistent approach of Plato to the historical. Also from the manner in which he describes these two origins we can conclude to his approach to the historical.

It is evident that Plato makes great *use* of history, yet to me he works on the facts of history not as an historian, but as a philosopher. The approaches of one and of the other are far from being identical. The historian is concerned with the essential facts, but his picture to be complete must deal exhaustively with the multitude of accidental characteristics which surround the event: the "when," the "where," the "by whom" and a host of other details. This is rightly so, for the historian is attempting to reproduce a picture of the past, and if this picture is to be a faithful reproduction then it must include, as far as possible, the multitude of details connected with the original event. The historian is concerned with depicting as accurately as possible *what* happened.

However, when the philosopher comes to working on history, his predominant interest is not in the "what," but in the "why." Therefore the philosopher will strive to disentangle the essential from the accidental, and, indeed, for the purposes of his work he will abstract entirely from many accidental details. Hence, details which would be quite important for the historian; for the philosopher, are of no consequence.

This, it seems to me, is exactly the approach of Plato to the origin of the State. We have seen that this is the reason why he abstracts from the phratry, tribe and city in the origin as described in the *Republic*; and why he does not refer to them as such in the example in the *Laws*. In both cases Plato has taken the essential facts of history, divested them of their accidentals, and worked on these facts, not as an historian, but as a philosopher.

This explains the *rapport* between the history which Plato describes and the manner in which he describes it. However, there is another aspect of the examples he uses which I consider important. We have seen that Plato works on history, not however as an historian, but as a philosopher; that he abstracts the essential and works on this, leaving aside all the accidentals.

What then is Plato's attitude to the *historical* origin of the State? To answer this question I believe that we must take some account of the historical events which preceded Plato's lifetime and of which he certainly must have been aware.

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1. See: *Plato's Republic* (Vol. 11, p.48), by JOWETT and CAMPBELL, and *Plato, the Man and his Work* (p.17), by A. E. TAYLOR.

Prior to Plato's life, Greece had passed successively through the political stages of monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny and, finally, democracy. Human suffering and the oppressive crimes of the ruling class deteriorated under the first three régimes and relief only appeared with the rise of tyranny. This régime succeeded in liberating the populace from their oppressive rulers and ushered in the promising era of democracy. However, it was not long before the people showed themselves totally incapable of preserving and using their liberty to the best advantage, with the result that once again the oppression of the poor by the rich occurred on a scale comparable with the hated days of the oligarchic régime.

It seems to me that these facts are of great importance in fully appreciating Plato's doctrine. He had seen from history that no régime could effectively control the needs of the populace. On the one hand he saw that the superior class always sought to satisfy its needs at the expense of the lower classes ; yet when the oppressed became the rulers they proved themselves even far worse than their former masters. It was always a case of might trampling upon right.

The very fact of this strife and suffering prior to, and during Plato's life-time served in the first place to focus his attention on questions which have some bearing on man's happiness in society. Then again by his search for justice and injustice in the *Republic* he shows most definitely his profound conviction that peace in the State must be preceded by the interior peace of each of its citizens. This peace is only attained by the harmony which virtue places in the soul. Hence the need for virtue is the most important of man's social needs, and at the same time, the need which he is most apt to overlook.

In this perspective, we see Plato's doctrine as elaborated on the origin of the State as a profound remedy to the political ills that had plagued Greece for centuries before his own life-time. This applies particularly to the doctrine in the *Republic* but also with some modifications to that in the *Laws*. Thus by placing his doctrine in its historical setting, we see it not only as an ideal to be set before all states in general, but especially before his own country of Greece in particular.

This historical setting of Plato's life-time also offers another and secondary reason for his abstraction from the family, phratry, tribe evolution. When put in the historial setting of Plato's era, an explanation using phratries and tribes could not but fail to have some undesirable political flavour. Men's passions would be incited and the objective light of reason would be dimmed.

For a similar reason, the thorny topic of political régimes is not placed in evident connection with the origin of the State as proposed in either work. It is Plato's sincere wish firstly to conduce men to the truth, then possessing this they can judge about such matters with reasonable impartiality. Thus, though the question of the preference



of régimes does enter into the *Republic*, it is in the *via iudicii* and not in the *via inventionis* that it finds its place.

Regarding the historical setting of Plato's own times, another interesting question poses itself. In which of the two origins which he describes is Plato nearer reality ; that is, nearer the exigencies of the sickened and disillusioned State of his own era ?

To me there is a curious but definite parallel between the answer to this question, and the manner in which Plato describes the origin of the State in the two works.

Firstly, regarding the answer to this question, I would say that we could regard the *Laws* as a concretion of the *Republic*. In the latter we see Plato as an inspired idealist who seems imbued with the conviction that knowledge is the only barrier to virtue. He thinks that the beauty of the ideal if it is clearly represented to men will inevitably attract them to imitate it. He takes little heed of the battle between good and evil that is constantly being fought within each man ; that only too often is wisdom over-ridden by passion. In short, he is pre-occupied with the ideal man, rather than with real and imperfect human beings.

In the *Laws* however, he has descended to the concrete ; he has come to grips with the complex problems posed by a wounded and weakened humanity. His answer is no longer the method of ideal representation. Law is seen as the chief instrument of promoting the good in society. Compulsion is substituted for attraction. This is more in accord with human nature as we know it.

The *Laws* also represents concretion in another way. Two kinds of States are described in the *Republic* — the frugal State, and the luxurious State. In the frugal State, men are much less prone to evil and less unruly. It is this State which seems to correspond more to the pattern of the *Republic*. However, it seems to me, that though the problem of the luxurious State is raised in the *Republic*, nevertheless we do not find a solution apportioned to it until we come to the *Laws*. It is Law which must control and channel the infinite variety of needs which arise in the luxurious State. Here again we are more in contact with reality.

Now an interesting parallel is found to exist between the two descriptions of the origin of the State, and the process of concretion which we have just remarked upon.

The portrayal of the origin in the *Republic* abstracts more from known facts of history. There seems to be even something of the *a priori* about it, though as we have had occasion to remark, men must have first come together from need ; this follows from the very nature of man. History does not and cannot have anything to say from this aspect.

However, in the *Laws* Plato has become more concrete in his source of portrayals. The picture of stages he gives corresponds to



the historical stages of family, phratry, tribe and city ; without being identically the same. Nevertheless, in this portrayal Plato is closer to the known facts of history than with the portrayal in the *Republic*.

Thus we see a definite parallel between the themes of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, on the one hand ; and on the other, between the origin of the State as described in the respective works. The portrayal in the *Republic* is more abstract in keeping with the theme of the *Republic*, while that in the *Laws* is more conformed with the facts of history and therefore more concrete, in keeping with the theme of the *Laws*. This correspondence is a result of Plato's use of these portrayals as a means, or instrument, to the establishment of a moral principle, while also, at the same time, they serve as the basis of the ensuing discussion in Plato's dialogues.

LEO FERRARI.

# La spiritualité de l'âme humaine

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On peut démontrer la spiritualité de l'âme humaine, si l'on parvient à démontrer que celle-ci a des opérations spirituelles. La spiritualité de ces dernières se déduit à la fois de la nature des choses que nous connaissons et de la manière dont nous les connaissons.

## I. LES AGENTS DE LA SPÉCIFICATION

Les facultés de l'âme sont immédiatement spécifiées par leurs actes, et médiatement par leurs objets.<sup>1</sup> Cette spécification implique donc une proportion entre objet, acte, puissance et âme.<sup>2</sup> Cette doctrine s'exprime en une brève formule : l'opération suit l'être et lui est proportionnée. Même les matérialistes, tout en niant la spiritualité de l'âme, reconnaissent la valeur de l'axiome qui établit la proportion entre l'acte et la puissance ; eux-mêmes d'ailleurs en invoquent l'autorité : « La théorie positiviste est forcée de convenir que l'effet doit répondre à la cause, et qu'ainsi des effets compliqués doivent supposer à un certain degré, des combinaisons de matière compliquées. »<sup>3</sup> « Encore faut-il pourtant que la fonction soit proportionnée à l'organisation et mesurée par elle. »<sup>4</sup>

C'est là un principe universellement admis. L'opération procède de l'être, comme l'effet de la cause, selon la proportion qui existe entre l'être et l'agir. L'opération manifeste la nature de l'être. Tel être, telle opération ; telle opération, tel objet et inversement. Donc, de la spiritualité de l'objet, on doit remonter à celle de l'opération, et ainsi de suite jusqu'à la racine première, l'âme. Selon cette méthode, nous remontons de l'objet de l'intelligence à l'acte intellectuel, puis de l'acte à la puissance ; ensuite de la puissance, nous concluons à la nature de l'âme. Par conséquent, nous étudierons tout d'abord l'objet de l'intelligence.

L'objet formel d'une puissance est l'aspect sous lequel elle peut atteindre les différentes choses, dont l'ensemble forme son objet matériel :

Proprie autem illud assignatur objectum alicujus potentiae vel habitus, sub cujus ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum : sicut

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1. S. THOMAS, *Ia Pars*, q.77, a.3, c. ; *In I de Anima*, Taurini, Marietti, 1936, lect.6.

2. *Ibid.*

3. LOUIS BÜCHNER, *Matière et Force*, dans *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique*, par A. D'ALÈS, Paris, Beauchesne, 1925, T.I, p.93.

4. KARL VOGT, *Leçons sur l'homme*, dans *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique*, T.I, p.93.

homo et lapis referuntur ad visum, inquantum sunt colorata ; unde coloratum est proprium objectum visus.<sup>1</sup>

L'âme humaine a deux facultés propres, l'intelligence et la volonté ; il y a donc deux objets formels correspondants que nous allons étudier séparément.

### 1. *L'objet formel de l'intelligence*

L'intelligence peut être considérée d'abord en tant qu'elle est une intelligence, c'est-à-dire, selon ce qui lui convient nécessairement et essentiellement, et, par conséquent, toujours et partout. À ce point de vue, l'objet formel est identique pour toutes les intelligences, divine, angélique ou humaine. Elle peut être aussi envisagée en tant qu'intelligence humaine. En effet, l'intelligence humaine peut se trouver dans un triple état : état d'union avec le corps ; état de séparation ; état d'élévation, en tant que sa capacité naturelle est surnaturellement élevée par la lumière de gloire.

À cette double considération répond le double objet formel : objet formel commun, et objet formel propre pour un état quelconque. L'objet formel commun de l'intelligence humaine considérée absolument est la *ratio*, qu'elle atteint formellement, non pas parce qu'elle est dans cet état ou dans un autre, mais en tant qu'elle est intelligence. Cet objet est essentiel à l'intelligence dans n'importe quel état, et il est la *ratio* très générale, sous laquelle l'intelligence considère les choses :

Adaequatum [commune] est omne illud intelligibile, quod finito modo attingi potest sive per elevationem, sive per connaturalem virtutem. Sub qua latitudine, non solum includitur omne ens, quatenus attingi potest sub proportionato et connaturali modo cognoscendi, sed etiam elevari potest ultra talem modum et participare modum cognoscendi superioris intellectus, etiam ipsius Dei per visionem beatam.<sup>2</sup>

L'objet formel propre ajoute à l'objet formel commun quelque chose qui le contracte et le détermine, et ne convient pas à l'intelligence considérée absolument, mais en tant qu'elle se trouve dans un état déterminé. L'objet formel propre et proportionné de l'intelligence humaine dans l'état d'union au corps est la quiddité abstraite des choses sensibles et tout ce qui est connaissable par connotation.<sup>3</sup> L'objet formel propre dans l'état de séparation est la quiddité spiri-

1. *Ia Pars*, q.1, a.7, c.

2. JEAN DE S.-THOMAS, *Cursus philosophicus*, T.III, Taurini, Marietti, 1933, p.318, a.36.

3. *Ia Pars*, q.84, a.7, c.

tuelle de sa substance propre.<sup>1</sup> L'objet formel commun de l'intelligence humaine considérée absolument est l'être en tant qu'être. C'est de l'objet formel commun de l'intelligence qu'il s'agit principalement ici, et nous disons qu'il la spécifie. Plus loin, à propos de la démonstration de la spiritualité par mode d'abstraction, nous traiterons de l'objet formel propre de l'intelligence humaine dans l'état d'union au corps.

En disant que l'objet formel commun de l'intelligence est l'être en tant qu'être, nous n'affirmons pas que notre intelligence ne connaît que l'être en général, mais qu'elle atteint toutes choses sous l'aspect de l'être. L'être ainsi atteint n'est pas limité à un être quelconque ou à un tel genre d'être ; il implique toutes les différences et déterminations de l'être : être actuel ou possible, être matériel ou immatériel, réel ou de raison, tout est inclus en cet être commun, tout comme la vue, qui se porte sur les choses sous l'aspect formel de couleur, connaît aussi toutes les différences des couleurs (bleu, rouge, ...) parce qu'elles possèdent toutes la raison de couleur : « Objectum intellectus est ens intelligibile ; quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et species entis possibilis : quidquid enim esse potest, intelligi potest. »<sup>2</sup> Le fondement de cette doctrine est insinué par Aristote, lorsqu'il dit : « Anima est quodammodo omnia. »<sup>3</sup>

Saint Thomas l'explique de la manière suivante : toutes les choses qui existent sont sensibles ou intelligibles. Or, l'âme humaine est en un sens tous les sensibles et les intelligibles, étant donné que dans l'âme il y a le sens et l'intelligence : le sens perçoit les sensibles et l'intelligence les intelligibles. Donc, l'âme est en un sens toutes choses.<sup>4</sup> Elle peut intelliger tout ce qui existe et peut exister, ce qui signifie l'être en tant qu'être.

Cette doctrine est prouvée par le principe suivant : quand la pensée s'exerce, elle se représente son objet comme quelque chose qui existe ou peut exister. De plus, l'être est le seul aspect commun à tous les objets de connaissance intellectuelle : créateur et créatures, substances et accidents, êtres spirituels et corporels, actuels et possibles, tous ont un seul caractère commun : être. Donc, l'être en tant qu'être est l'objet formel commun de l'intelligence. Et si c'est l'être, c'est aussi le vrai : *Ens et verum convertuntur*. L'être et le vrai ne diffèrent que par la raison, en ce sens que la notion de l'un n'inclut pas celle de l'autre. Le vrai est l'être, en tant qu'il dit relation à l'intelligence :

Illud autem quod primo intellectus concepit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens... Verum et ens differunt ra-

1. *Ia Pars*, q.89, aa.1, 2.

2. S. THOMAS, *Contra Gentiles*, II, c.98.

3. *De Anima*, III, c.8, 431 b 21.

4. S. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.13, nn.787-788.



tione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis ; non autem ita quod aliquid sit in ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri ; nec per essentiam differunt, nec differentiis oppositis invicem distinguuntur.<sup>1</sup>

Cela est encore manifesté par l'analyse des trois opérations intellectuelles, dans lesquelles l'intelligence humaine considère tout sous l'aspect de l'être : dans la simple appréhension, elle considère d'une manière confuse ce qu'est un objet, la quiddité des choses ; dans le jugement, elle affirme ce qu'est le sujet, le prédicat, et leur rapport entre eux ; dans le raisonnement, elle considère et affirme les rapports nécessaires, qui unissent entre elles la majeure et la mineure, les prémisses et la conclusion.

Outre l'objet formel commun qui est l'être en tant qu'être, il y a aussi des objets immatériels en soi, supérieurs à tout ordre matériel, tels que Dieu, les anges, la vertu, la liberté, la vérité, l'esprit.

## 2. L'objet formel de la volonté

L'objet formel de la volonté est corrélatif à celui de l'intelligence. La volonté est une faculté appétitive qui suit l'intelligence.<sup>2</sup> Or, l'objet formel d'un appétit est le bien : « Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. »<sup>3</sup> Donc, l'objet formel d'une faculté qui suit l'intelligence, est le bien universel abstrait, en tant que connu par l'intelligence. Dès lors, l'objet formel de la volonté est le bien abstrait et universel :

Activum oportet esse proportionatum passivo et motivum mobili. Sed in habentibus cognitionem, vis apprehensiva se habet ad appetitivam sicut motivum ad mobile : nam apprehensum per sensum vel imaginationem vel intellectum, movet appetitum intellectualem vel animale. Apprehensio autem intellectiva non determinatur ad quaedam, sed est omnium ; unde et de intellectu possibili Philosophus dicit quod est quo est omnia fieri. Appetitus igitur intellectualis substantiae est ad omnia se habens. Hoc autem est proprium voluntatis ut ad omnia se habeat ; unde . . . Philosophus dicit quod est possibile et impossibile.<sup>4</sup>

Il faut cependant remarquer cette difficulté, à savoir que la volonté choisit des biens particuliers : ce bien-ci, non pas le bien. Comment pouvons-nous vouloir ce livre, cette image ? Eh bien, c'est dans ce choix des biens particuliers qu'apparaîtra le mieux la spiritualité de la volonté. De soi, la volonté se dirige vers le bien universel ;

1. S. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Veritate*, q.1, a.1, c. et ad 6.

2. S. THOMAS, *In II de Anima*, lect.5, n.288.

3. S. THOMAS, *In I Ethic.*, Taurini, Marietti, 1934, lect.1, n.9.

4. *Contra Gentiles*, II, c.47.

si elle choisit un bien particulier, c'est donc par un mouvement d'ordre spirituel. Par réflexion, la raison compare ce bien particulier au bien universel, qui est comme son exemplaire. Elle suggère que la volonté peut vouloir ce bien, parce qu'il est un bien, mais peut ne pas le vouloir, parce qu'il n'est pas le bien.

En présence de ce double jugement, la volonté reste indéterminée. Le choix définitif de l'un ou de l'autre ne dépend pas de l'objet seul, mais de la volonté. Ce bien particulier ne peut mouvoir la volonté que si elle le veut. Au bien particulier, la volonté ajoute la bonté. Elle le considère comme bon, quand elle le choisit, ce qui indique un mouvement volontaire et spirituel.

La nature de l'objet démontre celle de l'acte, qui agit sur lui. Une opération est immatérielle, si elle a pour objet une réalité immatérielle. Supposons que l'objet et l'opération soient de différents ordres : l'objet immatériel et l'opération matérielle ; l'opération sera incapable d'atteindre l'objet ; l'immatérialité et la matérialité s'opposent l'une à l'autre.

L'objet formel commun de l'intelligence et celui de la volonté sont des réalités immatérielles : les opérations de l'intelligence et de la volonté seront donc nécessairement immatérielles.

Les puissances d'où procèdent les opérations intellectuelles, la pensée et la volition, sont manifestement de même nature que leurs opérations. Si une opération est reconnue comme spirituelle, parce qu'elle n'implique aucune matière, il est nécessaire de conclure que la faculté qui l'exerce est également spirituelle. L'intelligence et la volonté, ayant pour objets formels communs l'être en tant qu'être et le bien universel connu par l'intelligence, ces deux principes immédiats des opérations intellectuelles sont donc indépendants de la matière dans leur mode d'agir, comme dans leur mode d'être, étant donné que tout effet doit avoir sa cause proportionnée.

L'intelligence est une puissance de l'âme par laquelle l'âme connaît, comprend ;<sup>1</sup> la volonté est un appétit qui suit la connaissance intellectuelle.<sup>2</sup> Il faut donc conclure de l'immatérialité de ces puissances à la nature immatérielle de l'âme. Parce que les puissances intellectuelles sont immatérielles, l'âme humaine, premier principe des opérations intellectuelles, l'est aussi. Tout ce raisonnement est fondé sur le principe suivant : toute chose agit en fonction de ce qu'elle est, et par suite, le mode d'agir d'une chose manifeste son mode d'être. Ayant affirmé la spiritualité et l'immatérialité de l'objet, de l'opération et des facultés, on ne peut nier l'immatérialité de l'âme qui est la substance de ces facultés et le principe de ces opérations intellectuelles, qui portent sur les objets immatériels.

1. ARISTOTE, *De Anima*, III, c.4, 429 a 10-22.

2. S. THOMAS, *In II de Anima*, lect.5, n.288. ~

La spiritualité de l'âme humaine se déduit encore de la manière dont nous connaissons les choses. Deux modalités vont ici retenir notre attention : l'abstraction et la réflexion.

## II. L'ABSTRACTION

En général, l'abstraction peut désigner soit l'acte par lequel, dans un même objet, l'intelligence considère un aspect séparément des autres ; soit la séparation de la forme du sujet, comme si je considère la connaissance séparément du sujet connaissant, la vertu du vertueux ; soit enfin l'acte par lequel l'universel est déduit du singulier, comme si l'intelligence qui, de cet arbre singulier perçu par le sens, abstrait l'idée générale d'arbre.<sup>1</sup>

Eu égard à l'abstraction, deux opérations sont à distinguer : l'une, où l'intelligence ne fait qu'appréhender les choses sans en rien affirmer ou nier, et qui, par conséquent, ne comporte ni vérité ni fausseté ; l'autre, où l'intelligence compose et divise par mode d'affirmation ou de négation, où donc il y a vérité ou fausseté.

La différence de ces opérations nous indique quand et comment l'abstraction est possible. Ainsi, du fait que la vérité dépend de la conformité de l'intelligence avec la chose connue, l'abstraction ne sera possible, dans la seconde opération, que s'il y a séparation dans la réalité : on ne peut pas dire d'un homme blanc qu'il n'est pas blanc, mais on peut dire que l'homme n'est pas une pierre.

Pour ce qui est de la première opération, il faut noter qu'une chose n'est intelligible que si elle est en acte. Une quiddité peut donc être intelligée, soit parce qu'elle est elle-même un certain acte, comme il arrive dans les substances simples, soit en raison de ce qui est son acte, comme il arrive dans les substances composées, soit enfin en raison de ce qui tient lieu de forme, comme la matière première qui n'est intelligible que selon son rapport avec la forme.

Il s'ensuit que lorsqu'une nature dit essentiellement rapport à une autre chose, elle ne peut être intelligée sans cette chose. Ainsi, on ne peut abstraire le pied du concept d'animal, car le pied, par sa nature même, dépend de la raison d'animal et ne peut exister indépendamment de lui.

S'il y a indépendance, l'abstraction sera possible, comme la lettre peut être intelligée sans la syllabe, mais non inversement ; ou comme l'animal peut être intelligé sans le concept de pied, mais non inversement. Et cela nous amène à voir quand il y a abstraction au sens strict.

Dans la deuxième opération, l'intelligence compose et divise, distingue une chose d'une autre, en tant qu'elle saisit que l'une n'est

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1. S. THOMAS, *In de Trinitate*, q.5, a.3 ; *Ia Pars*, q.85, a.1, c. et ad 1-2 ; *In III de Anima*, lect.8, nn.714, 716 ; lect.12, nn.781-782.



pas incluse dans l'autre. Cette distinction est strictement appelée séparation.

Dans la première opération, l'intelligence saisit la quiddité de la chose, considérant un aspect sans considérer l'autre. Cette considération distinctive constitue strictement l'abstraction, mais il faut tenir compte qu'il y a abstraction seulement lorsque ces deux choses sont unies dans la réalité. En effet, l'animal n'est pas dit abstrait de la pierre, si l'animal est intelligé sans le concept de la pierre. Donc, l'abstraction au sens strict regarde la première opération de l'intelligence, suppose l'union dans la réalité, requiert l'indépendance de cette chose à l'égard d'une autre.

D'après les deux opérations de l'intelligence, l'abstraction est dite judicative et précise.

L'abstraction judicative (par mode de composition et de division) qui est propre à la deuxième opération de l'intelligence, a lieu lorsque nous considérons une chose comme séparée d'une autre (*considerare separata*). Cette manière de procéder est fautive quand les choses, unies entre elles, sont considérées comme séparées. Ainsi, si nous considérons la couleur comme non incluse dans le coloré, mais comme séparée de lui. L'abstraction est pourtant vraie, lorsque la raison d'une chose n'implique pas en soi l'autre :

Eorum quae sunt in rebus conjuncta, contingit unum sine altero intelligi, et vere, dummodo unum eorum non sit in ratione alterius. Si enim Socrates sit musicus et albus, possumus intelligere albedinem, nihil de musica intelligendo. Non autem possumus intelligere hominem, nihil intelligendo de animali, quia animal est in ratione hominis.<sup>1</sup>

L'abstraction précise (par simple appréhension) de la première opération de l'intelligence a lieu lorsque nous considérons séparément les caractères d'un objet (*considerare separatim*), considérant l'un sans l'autre, v.g. : nous considérons la couleur sans considérer la pomme dont elle est couleur.

Aristote a posé le fondement de l'abstraction précise, lorsqu'il distingue une chose de sa quiddité ; « Aliud est magnitudo, et magnitudini esse, et aqua, et aquae esse, et sic in multis aliis. »<sup>2</sup>

Cette distinction se réalise pour toutes les choses dont la forme est dans la matière, c'est-à-dire dont la nature ou l'espèce implique matière. Saint Thomas emploie l'une pour l'autre les expressions forme et espèce. Les deux signifient la nature spécifique.<sup>3</sup> Ainsi, la forme au sens d'espèce comprend et la forme substantielle et la matière commune, qui font partie de la quiddité. L'intelligence n'abstrait pas de la matière commune, mais de la matière individuelle.

1. S. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.12, n.781.

2. ARISTOTE, *De Anima*, III, c.4, 429 b 10.

3. S. THOMAS, *In V Metaphys.*, lect.2, n.764.



En effet, dans ces choses, outre les principes spécifiques, la nature spécifique est encore individualisée par la matière quantitative, qui, en tant que surajoutée, distingue les individus les uns des autres dans une même espèce. Ainsi, par abstraction, nous pouvons considérer dans l'homme singulier la nature humaine, élément universel commun aux autres hommes, sans considérer les notes individuant qui les distinguent des autres. Dans cette abstraction, nous considérons la nature humaine et les principes individuant séparément et non pas comme étant séparés.

Cette abstraction ne se trouve pas seulement dans les êtres naturels, mais encore dans les entités mathématiques. En effet, la matière est double : matière sensible dont font abstraction les entités mathématiques, et qu'impliquent les êtres naturels ; et matière intelligible, qu'impliquent les entités mathématiques. Pour comprendre cette abstraction, il faut savoir que la quantité est immédiatement inhérente à la substance, tandis que les qualités sensibles sont fondées sur la quantité. Par conséquent, les formes mathématiques peuvent faire abstraction des qualités sensibles, mais non de la quantité, matière intelligible.<sup>1</sup>

Cet acte d'abstraction n'entraîne pas un mensonge : « Abstractionem non est mendacium », dit l'adage. De plus, la vérité de l'appréhension n'exige pas que, pour saisir une chose, il faille concevoir tout ce qui s'y trouve.<sup>2</sup>

Parce que l'abstraction proprement dite, comme nous l'avons dit, suppose l'union des choses dans la réalité, il y a deux abstractions proprement dites de l'intelligence : l'une qui répond à l'union de la forme et de la matière, ou de l'accident et du sujet : c'est l'abstraction de la forme de la matière sensible ; l'autre qui répond à l'union du tout et de la partie : c'est l'abstraction de l'universel du particulier.

Quand on dit que la forme est abstraite de la matière, cette forme n'est pas entendue au sens de forme substantielle, car la forme substantielle et la matière correspondante dépendent l'une de l'autre, de telle sorte que l'une ne puisse être intelligée sans l'autre, parce que l'acte propre est dans la matière propre. Mais il faut l'entendre de la forme accidentelle, qui est la quantité et la figure. La quantité, en effet, peut être intelligée sans la matière sensible, mais non inversement, de même que la substance, qui est la matière intelligible, peut être intelligée sans la quantité, mais non inversement.

De même, dans l'abstraction du tout des parties, les parties ne sont pas parties de l'espèce (spécifiques), de la forme, qui entrent dans la définition des choses, mais des parties accidentelles.

1. S. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.8, nn.707-708.

2. S. THOMAS, *In II de Anima*, lect.12, n.379.

Ces deux abstractions diffèrent l'une de l'autre.<sup>1</sup> Dans l'abstraction de l'universel du particulier, il ne reste pas ce de quoi est faite l'abstraction. En effet, une fois la différence rationnelle séparée de l'homme, il ne reste plus dans l'intelligence le concept de l'homme, mais celui de l'animal.

Dans l'abstraction de la forme de la matière, toutes deux demeurent dans l'intelligence. En effet, lorsqu'on sépare la forme d'un cercle de cuivre, et le concept du cercle, et celui du cuivre demeurent séparément dans l'intelligence.

Parce que l'abstraction est un mouvement dont le terme *a quo* est matière, et le terme *ad quem* est immatérialité ou spiritualité, nous disons que plus une chose est dégagée de la matière, plus elle est intelligible. L'intelligibilité des choses correspond à leur abstraction de la matière.<sup>2</sup>

La matière dont une chose peut être épurée, est triple : individuelle, sensible et intelligible. La matière individuelle est le principe d'individuation ; par exemple : ces chairs, ces os-ci. La matière sensible est la matière corporelle, selon qu'elle est sujet des qualités sensibles, telles que le chaud, le froid, la chair, l'os. La matière intelligible est la substance, selon qu'elle est sujet de la quantité.

Selon que l'intelligence abstrait de plus en plus l'objet connu de la matière individuant, en s'élevant jusqu'à une abstraction qui conduit à l'idée la plus abstraite, on peut distinguer trois degrés d'abstraction, qui désignent la perfection de l'immatérialité de l'intelligence. En effet, d'une chose corporelle, on peut dégager soit la quiddité sensible, indépendamment de la matière individuelle : l'animal, l'homme, la brute sont considérés comme composés d'os et de chair, abstraction faite toutefois de ces os-ci, et de ces chairs-ci. C'est l'abstraction physique. On peut aussi dégager la quiddité intelligible, indépendamment de la matière sensible : le triangle est conçu séparément de toutes les conditions de la matière sensible, de lieu et de temps, mais non de la quantité, matière intelligible. Il est défini : une figure à trois angles. Cette définition du triangle abstrait convient à toutes sortes de triangles : équilatéral, isocèle, scalène ou rectangle. C'est l'abstraction mathématique. On peut dégager enfin la quiddité de l'être, indépendamment de la matière intelligible, comme l'être en tant qu'être, l'un, le vrai, le bon, la puissance, l'acte ; il y a aussi des êtres qui existent sans aucune matière, tels que les substances immatérielles. C'est l'abstraction métaphysique.

Notre intelligence est essentiellement en puissance à l'égard des objets intelligibles, comme la matière est en pure puissance dans la

1. *Ia Pars*, q.40, a.3, c.

2. ARISTOTE, *De Anima*, III, c.4, 429 b 22.

ligne de l'être.<sup>1</sup> Par elle-même, elle ne peut être en acte d'aucun objet intelligible. Elle ne peut connaître que si elle est actualisée par l'espèce intelligible, qui la fait passer de la puissance à l'acte. Une fois déterminée par l'espèce intelligible, elle peut par elle-même passer à l'acte second qu'est l'intellection, son acte propre.<sup>2</sup> Or, les objets intelligibles n'existent pas tous à l'état pur, en tant qu'intelligibles en acte, comme le voulaient les platoniciens. Dans l'état d'union, l'objet propre de notre intelligence est la quiddité des choses sensibles, qui est dans les choses mêmes, et non pas extérieure à elle.<sup>3</sup> Revêtant des notes concrètes dans la matière individuée, les objets intelligibles ne sont pas intelligibles en acte, mais seulement en puissance. Concrétisés, ils ne peuvent agir sur notre intelligence pour se faire connaître d'elle. Donc, il faut une activité intellectuelle qui les fasse passer de l'état d'intelligibilité en puissance à l'intelligibilité en acte. L'intelligence humaine, dans cet état d'union, ne peut atteindre les quiddités des choses matérielles et les autres en fonction de celles-ci qu'en les abstrayant des caractères individuels.<sup>4</sup>

En effet, les images, en tant qu'images (phantasmes) sont des réalités sensibles, déterminées dans une matière individuante. La particularisation des images par les notes concrètes les empêche de déterminer l'intelligence, puissance de l'âme. Quiconque reçoit, reçoit à sa façon. Ainsi, pour saisir les images représentatives des choses sensibles, l'intelligence doit les dégager des conditions individuanes qui tiennent à cette matière concrète. L'abstraction est donc nécessaire pour la connaissance.

Phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi, quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet ; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est representativa eorum, quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili ad modum, quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.<sup>5</sup>

La faculté abstractive est double. L'une est l'intellect agent, en tant qu'il illumine le phantasme et en dégage l'espèce intelligible. Sa fonction propre est d'abstraire : « Propria operatio intellectus

1. *Ia Pars*, q.14, a.2, ad 3.

2. ARISTOTE, *De Anima*, III, c.4, 429 b 6 ; S. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, lect.8, nn.700-701.

3. S. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, lect.8, nn.709-713.

4. *Ia Pars*, q.85, a.1, c.

5. *Ia Pars*, q.85, a.1, ad 3.



agentis est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatibus. » <sup>1</sup>

L'autre est l'intellect possible, qui, déterminé par l'espèce intelligible, considère l'universel, la quiddité des choses sensibles à part des conditions individuanes.

La première est la vraie production de l'espèce intelligible. La deuxième suppose l'espèce intelligible déjà abstraite : « Intellectus possibilis est virtus receptiva specierum ab intellectu agente abstractarum. » <sup>2</sup> La première est effective de l'objet, et non pas cognoscitive ; la deuxième est cognoscitive de l'objet, et non pas effective. La première est donc la cause de la deuxième. En effet, si l'intellect possible peut considérer l'universel dans le sensible individuel, c'est parce qu'il est déterminé par l'espèce intelligible. Or, l'intelligible ne peut actuer l'intellect possible que s'il est en acte, c'est-à-dire après avoir été dégagé des notes matérielles par l'intellect agent.

L'objet formel propre de l'intelligence humaine dans l'état d'union est la quiddité des choses sensibles, et les autres en fonction de celle-ci.<sup>3</sup> Mais que signifie ici exactement le mot quiddité ? Il signifie toute chose intelligée, qui possède un certain degré d'être, soit une chose complète ou incomplète, c'est-à-dire, tout ce qui peut être conçu par mode de nature ou d'essence, même les parties et les accidents :

Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars, vel accidens.<sup>4</sup>

En considérant l'état abstrait où elle est conçue par l'intelligence, la quiddité revêt à la réflexion certains caractères dont le premier est l'universalité. Dégagé de toutes notes individuanes, l'objet matériel n'exprime plus les déterminations concrètes. Son caractère abstrait le reporte réflexivement à n'importe quel sujet singulier : l'homme composé d'os et de chair, parce qu'il est défini en faisant abstraction de ces os-ci et de cette chair-ci, donne lieu à un concept applicable à tout homme de n'importe quel lieu de l'espace, et de n'importe quel moment du temps. Le triangle défini par la géométrie, parce qu'il est abstrait de toutes les déterminations particulières de forme, de figure, de dimensions, de matière sensible, donne lieu à un concept attribuable au triangle isocèle, équilatéral, scalène ou rectangle, à ce scalène-ci, ou à ce scalène-là. L'être en tant qu'être, parce que dégagé de toutes les concrétisations possibles, est identi-

1. *IIIa*, q.9, a.4, c. ; *Contra Gentiles*, II, c.96.

2. *Ia Pars*, q.79, a.4, ad 4.

3. *Ia Pars*, q.84, a.7, c.

4. S. THOMAS, *In de Trinitate*, q.5, a.3.



fiable à tout ce qui existe ou qui peut exister : être réel ou de raison, actuel ou possible, nécessaire ou contingent, substance ou accident ; tout est compris dans son extension.

L'applicabilité d'un objet abstrait à une multitude indéfinie de sujets particuliers constitue son universalité :

Dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de intellectu nostro, qui non intelligit res nisi abstrahendo ; et per ipsam abstractionem a materialibus conditionibus id quod abstrahitur fit universale.<sup>1</sup>

La deuxième propriété de l'objet abstrait est la nécessité. La quiddité abstraite est nécessaire, non pas parce qu'elle doit nécessairement exister, mais en ce sens que, supposée connue dans l'intelligence, nécessairement elle doit se composer de tels principes constitutifs. Qu'un être soit dans la réalité ou dans l'intelligence, il doit nécessairement être ce qu'il est, et non pas ce qu'il n'est pas. Ainsi, la quiddité de l'homme, à supposer qu'il soit créé, doit nécessairement dans la réalité ou dans la pensée se composer de l'animalité et de la rationalité.

L'immutabilité et l'indivisibilité sont deux propriétés qui constituent des corollaires de la nécessité de l'objet abstrait. La quiddité de la chose ne comprend que ce qui est requis pour la constituer en soi. Elle ne peut donc pas recevoir une modification, une addition, une diminution essentielle sans cesser d'être elle-même. Saint Thomas illustre cette vérité par l'exemple des nombres que détruit toute variation d'unité :

Si aliquid addatur vel subtrahatur alicui numero, etiam si sit minimum, non erit id idem numerus secundum speciem. Minimum enim in numeris est unitas : quae si addatur in ternario, surgit quaternarius, quae est alia species numeri : si vero abstrahatur ab eodem, remanet binarius, qui est etiam alia species numeri et hoc ideo, quia illa ultima differentia dat speciem numero. Et similiter est in definitionibus, et in quod quid erat esse, quod significat definitio ; quia quocumque minimo addito vel ablato, est alia definitio, et alia natura speciei. Sicut enim substantia animata sensibilis tantum, est definitio animalis ; cui si addas et rationale, constituis speciem hominis, si autem subtrahas sensibile, constituis speciem plantae, quia etiam ultima differentia dat speciem.<sup>2</sup>

Le mode d'abstraction, selon lequel se forme la connaissance intellectuelle, conduit à la conclusion de la spiritualité de l'âme.

Nous connaissons les objets en les dépouillant des notes concrètes de la matière, où ils se trouvent impliqués. Nous formons donc les idées générales d'animal, d'arbre ; autrement dit, nous avons des idées, des objets abstraits.

1. *Ia Pars*, q.57, a.2, ad 1 ; q.85, a.2, ad 2 ; q.86, a.1, c.

2. S. THOMAS, *In VIII Metaphys.*, lect.3, nn.1723-1724.

Or les objets abstraits portent des caractères universels, nécessaires, immuables et indivisibles, auxquels répugnent la singularité, la contingence, la mutabilité et la divisibilité de la matière.

Donc, l'intelligence, et par conséquent, l'âme humaine, est spirituelle et incorruptible, car la faculté doit être proportionnée à son objet.

### III. LA RÉFLEXION

La connaissance directe est celle par laquelle nous connaissons un objet sans réflexion sur notre connaissance, comme lorsque nous disons que nous connaissons la pierre, l'homme.

La connaissance réflexe est celle par laquelle nous connaissons que nous connaissons. Elle a pour objet soit un certain acte ou concept, soit une puissance, soit l'âme elle-même. Le concept réflexe ne se trouve pas dans l'intelligence dont l'objet propre est sa substance propre et les accidents propres de cette substance, comme c'est le cas pour Dieu et les anges ; mais seulement dans l'intelligence humaine, dont l'objet propre dans la vie présente est la quiddité de la chose matérielle qu'elle connaît directement. Mais le concept représentant directement la quiddité des choses matérielles, représente aussi indirectement le concept lui-même et l'acte dont il est le terme, et le sujet de cet acte ou l'âme.

Ces deux concepts, direct et réflexe, sont distincts l'un de l'autre. C'est ce qu'exprime clairement saint Thomas, lorsqu'il dit :

... Quantum ad hoc differt, utrum intellectus seipsum intelligat, vel aliud a se. Sicut enim cum intelligit aliud a se, format conceptum illius rei, quod voce significatur, ita cum intelligit seipsum, format verbum sui, quod voce etiam potest exprimere.<sup>1</sup>

Seule l'intelligence humaine peut réfléchir sur elle-même, car, comme nous l'avons montré plus haut, elle est indépendante dans l'exercice de son activité de tout organe corporel, qui l'empêcherait de se replier sur elle.

Son objet formel commun, comme il est démontré plus haut, est quelque chose de commun, c'est-à-dire l'être et le vrai, qui comprend sous lui l'acte d'intelligence et l'intelligence elle-même. Toutefois, dans l'état d'union avec le corps, son objet propre immédiat est la quiddité des choses sensibles, à l'aide desquelles elle peut arriver indirectement à la connaissance des autres.<sup>2</sup>

Les sens ne peuvent se replier sur eux-mêmes, ni sur leurs actes. Le sens peut sentir selon que l'organe matériel est modifié par le sensible extérieur.<sup>3</sup> Ainsi dans ses actes, il dépend de son organe

1. S. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Potentia*, q.9, a.5, c.

2. *Ia Pars*, q. 87, a.3, ad 1.

3. *Ibid.*, ad 3.

comme d'un médium pour atteindre l'objet qu'il saisit. Donc, entre le sens connaissant et le sens connu, il faudrait interposer un organe. La vision ne possède pas en soi la couleur, et ainsi elle ne s'atteint pas. On ne peut voir avec son œil sa propre vision.

Par conséquent, l'acte du sens propre n'est pas saisi par lui, mais seulement par le sens commun,<sup>1</sup> qui le connaît par une réflexion improprement dite.<sup>2</sup>

Un corps ne peut agir sur lui-même, mais sur un autre ; ou une partie du corps ne peut agir que sur une autre partie, de sorte que l'une de ses parties est motrice, et l'autre mue.<sup>3</sup> Donc, dans l'action corporelle, un agent produit l'action et un patient différent de l'agent la reçoit. Ce qui n'arrive pas dans l'action réflexe, dans laquelle le sujet réfléchissant agit sur lui-même.<sup>4</sup>

Les sens, qui sont des facultés organiques, principes prochains d'opérations propres, dont le sujet est composé d'âme et de corps, ne pourraient donc se replier sur eux-mêmes, ni sur leurs actes.

L'intelligence humaine étant une faculté spirituelle, inorganique, est capable d'opération réflexe.

Redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est, quam rem subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim in quantum perficit materiam dando ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur : in quantum vero in seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. Virtutes igitur cognoscitivae, quae non sunt subsistentes sed actus aliquorum organorum, non cognoscunt seipsas ; sicut patet in singulis sensibus. Sed virtutes cognoscitivae per se subsistentes, cognoscunt seipsas.<sup>5</sup>

Toute la raison de la réflexion provient de ce que notre intelligence et son acte ne sont objectivement intelligibles dans la vie présente que dépendamment des sensibles. C'est ainsi que notre concept, bien que formellement présent à notre intelligence considérée en tant qu'intelligence, ne l'est cependant pas objectivement, d'autant qu'il n'est pas formé à l'instar d'une quiddité sensible, parce que l'objet propre de l'intelligence humaine dans la vie présente est la quiddité des choses sensibles.<sup>6</sup> Pour les substances séparées, ce concept réflexe n'est pas nécessaire, parce qu'elles connaissent directement leur substance, leur intellect et tout ce qui est en elles comme les accidents de leur propre substance. C'est donc au moyen de l'espèce même, par laquelle elles se connaissent, qu'elles peuvent aussi atteindre ces accidents.<sup>7</sup>

1. *Ia Pars*, q.87, a.3, ad 3.

2. JEAN DE S.-THOMAS, *Cursus philosophicus*, T.III, p.131.

3. *Contra Gentiles*, II, c.49.

4. S. THOMAS, *In II Sent.*, dist.19, q.1, a.1 ; *In III Sent.*, dist.23, q.1, a.2.

5. *Ia Pars*, q.14, a.2, ad 1.

6. JEAN DE S.-THOMAS, *op. cit.*, T.I, pp.742ss.

7. *Ia Pars*, q.87, a.3, c.



Il est donc manifeste que toute la raison de la réflexion sur l'acte et la puissance intellectuelle prend origine de la raison objective de l'intelligence. En effet, le concept et la connaissance, bien que formellement présents à la puissance, ne le sont cependant pas objectivement. La présence formelle, a bien noté Cajetan dans son commentaire, ne suffit pas pour qu'une chose soit directement connaissable, mais la présence objective est nécessairement requise.

En effet, une chose ne peut être objectivement présente que si elle revêt les conditions de l'objet de telle puissance. Or, comme l'objet propre de notre intelligence dans cette vie est la quiddité des choses sensibles, ce qui n'est pas la quiddité des choses matérielles n'est pas directement et objectivement présent. C'est donc par la réflexion que cet objet revêtira ces conditions de présence objective.

Nos concepts, bien qu'intelligibles en soi, ne sont pas cependant intelligibles en soi à la manière de la quiddité matérielle, et par conséquent ne sont présents objectivement que s'ils sont perçus à la manière de la quiddité sensible, qu'ils doivent en effet recevoir de l'objet sensible. Et parce qu'ils la reçoivent en eux de l'objet extérieur directement connu dans l'intelligence, ils sont dits être connus réflexivement, et devenir intelligibles par l'intelligibilité de l'être matériel.

Tout cela n'arrive pas chez les anges et chez Dieu, qui intelligent directement leur propre essence et tout ce qui est en elle.

Quelles sont ces choses que l'intelligence connaît ainsi d'une connaissance réflexe ?

Il y a d'abord l'intelligible saisi comme objet abstrait, en tant que déjà présent à l'intelligence.

Il y a aussi son acte propre d'intellection, dans lequel elle considère l'objet, elle-même et sa substance :

... Et ideo oportet quod in cognitionem animae procedamus ab his quae sunt magis extrinseca, a quibus abstrahantur species intelligibiles, per quas intellectus intelligit seipsum ; ut scilicet per objecta cognoscamus actus, et per actus potentias, et per potentias essentiam animae.<sup>1</sup>

L'âme connaît son existence en ses actes. Réellement, lorsque nous avons conscience d'exister, c'est dans les activités intellectuelles que nous sentons notre existence : « In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse quod percipit se sentire, et intelligere, et alia hujusmodi vitae opera exercere. »<sup>2</sup>

Enfin, il y a les singuliers matériels. Plus haut, nous avons dit que l'objet propre de l'intelligence humaine dans l'état d'union est la quiddité universelle abstraite des choses sensibles ; elle la connaît en la dégageant de la matière individuelle. Mais il est impossible

1. S. THOMAS, *In II de Anima*, lect.6, n.308.

2. S. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.10, a.8, c.

qu'elle considère l'universel directement dans l'individu sensible et concret, sans qu'elle n'appréhende à la fois indirectement, comme objet par accident, le singulier, où se trouve l'universel. De même que la vue qui perçoit la couleur dans le concret, ne peut pas ne pas percevoir indirectement et par accident le sujet dans lequel existe la couleur perçue. Il s'ensuit donc que l'intelligence humaine connaît directement l'universel, mais indirectement et par réflexion sur son acte et sur son objet, le singulier.

Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem et quasi per quamdam reflexionem potest cognoscere singulare. Quia sicut supra dictum est,<sup>1</sup> etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxerit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in II De Anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit ; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem : Socrates est homo.<sup>2</sup>

C'est donc en raison de la quiddité des choses sensibles connue d'abord et directement que notre intelligence peut ensuite, en se repliant sur elle-même, connaître non seulement son concept, son acte, mais aussi l'habitus, l'espèce, la puissance et la nature même de l'âme.

Intellectus autem, . . . sicut alia, cognoscit seipsum, quia scilicet per speciem non quidem sui, sed objecti, quae est forma ejus ; ex qua cognoscit actus sui naturam, et ex natura actus naturam potentiae cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae naturam essentiae, et per consequens aliarum potentialium. Non quod habeat de omnibus his diversas similitudines, sed quia in objecto suo non solum cognoscit rationem veri, secundum quam est ejus objectum, sed omnem rationem, quae est in eo.<sup>3</sup>

Il convient d'ajouter que l'acte réflexe s'applique aussi à la volonté. La volonté est maîtresse de ses opérations : *Hoc est proprium voluntatis ut sit domina suorum actuum*.<sup>4</sup> Si elle ne peut posséder en même temps les contraires idéalement comme l'intelligence, elle peut agir et ne pas agir. Elle s'exerce librement. La liberté d'exercice manifeste l'immatérialité de sa nature : *Spiritualis substantia domina est actus sui, quia in ea existit agere et non agere*.<sup>5</sup>

Quand l'intelligence compare un bien particulier au bien universel, elle reconnaît que ce bien peut être voulu, parce qu'il est un bien, mais peut n'être pas voulu, parce qu'il n'est pas le bien (universel). Devant ce double jugement, la volonté reste libre, indéterminée ;

1. *Ia Pars*, q.84, a.7, c.

2. *Ia Pars*, q.86, a.1, c.

3. *In III Sent.*, dist.23, q.1, a.2, ad 3.

4. *De Veritate*, q.22, a.5, ad 7.

5. *Contra Gentiles*, II, c.47.

elle peut par une volition réfléchie s'appliquer à vouloir ou à ne pas vouloir.

Par conséquent, la volonté opère librement. Or, l'acte libre exige la réflexion, qui elle-même implique l'immatérialité du sujet. Donc, la volonté douée de liberté doit se replier sur elle-même, et par conséquent, est immatérielle.

La conclusion générale est que l'âme humaine douée d'intelligence et de volonté réfléchissantes est donc elle-même immatérielle, étant donné que la réflexion répugne à la matière.

#### IV. LA CONNAISSANCE DES NATURES CORPORELLES

La spiritualité de l'âme humaine peut être encore démontrée par la connaissance que nous avons des natures corporelles.

À la question : est-ce que l'âme humaine est subsistante ou spirituelle ? saint Thomas répond : il est nécessaire de dire que le principe de l'acte intellectuel que nous appelons âme humaine, est un principe incorporel et subsistant. La raison sur laquelle il insiste pour prouver la spiritualité de l'âme humaine, est le fait qu'elle peut connaître la nature de tous les corps : les corps simples, composés, les minéraux, les plantes, les animaux. Voici la preuve qu'il formule :

Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura ; quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum. Sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi, quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicujus corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus.<sup>1</sup>

Cet argument peut être proposé en forme de syllogisme comme suit : l'âme humaine peut connaître les natures de tous les corps. Or ce qui peut connaître certaines choses, doit n'en avoir aucune dans sa nature. Donc, l'âme humaine est incorporelle et subsistante.

Arrêtons-nous à l'examen de ce texte : *Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua*. Un être peut connaître quelque chose de deux manières : ou en puissance essentielle, ou en puissance accidentelle, c'est-à-dire, en habitus.

Un être est en puissance essentielle (ou éloignée) à connaître quelque chose, lorsqu'il existe simplement dans la pure potentialité, ou lorsqu'il en est capable de par sa nature seulement ; l'homme, par exemple, selon sa nature, est en puissance à connaître, en ce sens qu'il peut posséder l'habitus de science.

1. *Ia Pars*, q.75, a.2, c.



Un être est en puissance accidentelle (ou prochaine) à connaître, quand il n'est pas simplement dans la pure potentialité, mais dans l'habitus, qui est un état intermédiaire entre la pure potentialité et l'acte parfait :

Uno modo dicitur aliquid in potentia, puta homo sciens, quia habet naturalem potentiam ad scientiam, sicut homo dicitur esse de numero scientium et habentium scientiam, inquantum habet naturam ad sciendum, et ad habendum habitum scientiae. Secundo modo dicimus aliquem esse scientem, quod aliqua sciat, sicut dicimus habentem habitum alicujus scientiae, puta grammaticae, esse jam scientem.<sup>1</sup>

Il est évident que notre âme (intellect possible) est en puissance essentielle par rapport à son objet, parce qu'elle est comme une tablette, sur laquelle rien n'est inscrit.<sup>2</sup>

Par *aliqua*, nous entendons les choses corporelles et les sensibles. La présence de ces choses dans le connaissant selon « l'esse naturel » empêche la connaissance des autres ; ce qui n'arrive pas dans les choses spirituelles.

*Nihil eorum habeat in sua natura.* Chaque chose a deux modes d'exister, ou deux « esse » tout à fait différents : l'« esse » naturel ou entitatif, qui signifie l'être de la chose dans la réalité physique ; l'« esse » intentionnel ou objectif, qui désigne l'existence de la chose dans le sujet connaissant, en tant qu'elle est connue. « Alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale ; in sensu autem habet esse intentionale. »<sup>3</sup> À ces deux modes d'exister, correspondent deux modes très distincts de recevoir les formes : entitativement et intentionnellement.

La réception entitative est propre à la matière. Elle consiste en ce que la matière, à titre de sujet, s'approprie la forme qu'elle reçoit et la rend ainsi incommunicable à un autre sujet. Dans cette réception, la matière compose avec la forme pour constituer un troisième terme : l'être de la nature.

La réception intentionnelle est propre à l'être connaissant. Recevoir intentionnellement, c'est recevoir d'une manière représentative, de telle sorte que la forme reçue demeure encore la forme de l'autre ; le sujet qui reçoit ne fait pas sienne cette forme, ne constitue pas avec elle un troisième terme :

Perfectio autem unius rei in altera esse non potest secundum determinatum esse quod habebat in re illa ; et ideo ad hoc quod nata sit esse in re altera, oportet eam considerare absque his quae nata sunt eam determinare.

Et quia formae et perfectiones rerum per materiam determinantur, inde est quod secundum hoc est aliqua res cognoscibilis secundum quod

1. S. THOMAS, *In II de Anima*, lect.11, n.359.

2. ARISTOTE, *De Anima*, III, c.4, 430 a 1.

3. S. THOMAS, *In II de Anima*, lect.24, n.553.

a materia separatur. Unde oportet quod etiam id in quo suscipitur talis rei perfectio, sit immateriale ; si enim esset materiale, perfectio recepta esset in eo secundum aliquod esse determinatum ; et ita non esset in eo secundum quod est cognoscibilis ; scilicet prout, existens perfectio unius, est nata esse in altero.<sup>1</sup>

Cela ne veut pas dire que l'âme humaine ne reçoit pas les prédicats qui lui sont communs avec les choses connues. Car les prédicats, tels que entité réelle, substance réelle, quantité réelle, peuvent être communs et au connaissant et au connu. Mais le sens de la proposition montre que l'âme humaine ne possède pas les raisons différentielles et propres de la nature des choses connues. Par conséquent, étant donné que l'âme humaine connaît des natures corporelles, il s'ensuit qu'elle ne doit posséder en elle-même aucune des propriétés différentielles et raisons propres de ces choses.<sup>2</sup>

*Habere in sua natura aliquid.* Une chose peut recevoir dans sa nature une autre entité de deux manières : soit par inhérence dans sa nature comme les formes sont dans la matière, ou l'accident dans le sujet ; la forme matérielle ne peut exister qu'unie à la matière ; l'accident ne peut exister que dans le sujet ; soit compositivement ou intrinsèquement, comme les composants sont dans le composé, et en général, comme tout ce qui est intrinsèque à l'essence de la chose, est dit être compositivement dans cette nature, comme animal dans homme, végétatif dans intellectif.<sup>3</sup>

*Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam.* La détermination est double : l'une par laquelle le genre est déterminé en plusieurs espèces spécifiquement distinctes ; l'autre qui détermine l'espèce en plusieurs individus numériquement distincts.

La première détermination convient à toutes les créatures et se fait par la forme substantielle, qui est le principe déterminant quelque chose à une espèce de l'être. La seconde détermination s'applique aux êtres corporels seuls, parce que dans tous les corps se trouve la matière signée par la quantité. Or la matière signée par la quantité est le principe d'individuation. Donc, il est propre aux corps d'avoir une nature déterminée par l'individuation numérique.

Seule la nature déterminée au deuxième sens empêche la connaissance des autres. Les êtres qui ont la seule détermination spécifique et qui sont formes seulement, ne l'empêchent pas. En effet, la forme en soi possède une certaine universalité et peut recevoir intentionnellement les natures du même genre. C'est ainsi que la forme de l'ange en vertu d'elle-même peut recevoir intentionnellement les natures d'autres choses.

1. *De Veritate*, q.2, a.2, c.

2. E. HUGON, *Philosophia naturalis*, vol.III, Paris, Lethielleux, 1922, p.91.

3. CAJETAN, *Comm. in Iam Partem*, q.75, a.2, n.xvii.

La nature déterminée par la matière signée de la quantité implique l'opposition à d'autres natures du même genre, de telle sorte qu'elle ne peut les recevoir intentionnellement.<sup>1</sup>

*Naturam determinatam.* La nature déterminée au deuxième sens que nous venons d'exposer, est celle qui n'est pas déterminable par les natures des autres objets des puissances cognitives ; par exemple, la blancheur, par rapport à d'autres couleurs, est une nature déterminée.

À la nature déterminée au sens précédent s'oppose la nature commune. La nature commune est quelque chose qui est déterminable par d'autres ; ainsi ce qui est diaphane ou transparent peut recevoir la détermination de toutes les couleurs. La nature commune est donc quelque chose par elle-même, mais peut recevoir une détermination. Loin d'être un obstacle à la connaissance, cette détermination la favorise.<sup>2</sup>

L'âme humaine, parce qu'elle peut connaître les natures de tous les corps, n'est donc pas une nature déterminée, mais une nature commune, déterminable.

Le raisonnement de saint Thomas revient à dire que ce qui est en puissance essentielle à connaître certaines choses, ne possède pas en soi intrinsèquement l'objet selon l'« esse » naturelle.

Cette proposition, dit Cajetan, est une proposition connue par soi ; autrement, il y aurait contradiction dans les termes.

*Cognoscitivum in potentia essentiali aliquorum non habet in se intrinsece objectum secundum naturale esse illius.* Et est ista propositio per se nota : quia alioquin esset simul in potentia essentiali, et non esset in potentia essentiali ; si enim haberet in se actu objectum, jam cum eo posset illud cognoscere, et sic non in potentia essentiali.<sup>3</sup>

De cette analyse, il résulte que la spiritualité de l'âme humaine peut se déduire du fait que nous sommes en puissance à connaître tous les corps. C'est une vérité d'expérience que l'âme, par son intelligence, connaît les corps. Nous connaissons telle maison, telle voiture. C'est là aussi une vérité contre les platoniciens, qui, pour échapper au matérialisme mobiliste d'Héraclite, soutiennent que nous ne connaissons que des formes séparées.<sup>4</sup>

Mais comment les corps peuvent-ils entrer dans l'âme, étant donné que la présence en elle d'un corps constituerait un obstacle à la connaissance des autres ? Tout comme dans le domaine physique, un corps n'a jamais et ne peut avoir deux natures à la fois : si une forme nouvelle s'introduit dans l'être matériel, la forme pré-existante disparaîtra nécessairement. Dans la composition naturelle, la matière

1. E. HUGON, *op. cit.*, p.92 ; CAJETAN, *op. cit.*, n.vii.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, n.iv.

4. *Ia Pars*, q.84, a.1, c.



constitue un troisième terme avec la forme, qu'elle reçoit comme sienne et rend incommunicable à un autre sujet. Elle donne ainsi à la forme un être déterminé, « coactio formae est per materiam ». <sup>1</sup>

Si donc la connaissance nécessite la présence de la chose connue dans le connaissant, l'âme humaine ne reçoit pas entitativement les corps en tant que corps. Ce qui distingue les connaissants des non-connaissants, c'est que ces derniers ne possèdent que leur forme propre, tandis que les premiers en reçoivent d'autres. <sup>2</sup> Il en résulte que la nature du non-connaissant est limitée, tandis que celle du connaissant a plus d'amplitude ; l'âme humaine n'est donc pas de même nature que le corps, elle est immatérielle, elle est de quelque façon toutes choses. <sup>3</sup> Si elle était corps, elle ne pourrait pas connaître les corps ; car connaître c'est devenir, et l'on ne devient pas ce qu'on est.

Le sens et l'intelligence ont ce caractère commun : tous les deux sont essentiellement en puissance à leurs objets respectifs. <sup>4</sup> Or, puisque la pupille est en puissance à connaître toutes les couleurs, elle est dénuée de toute couleur ; autrement, tout serait vu de la même manière ; toutes les couleurs apparaîtraient rouges, si la puissance visuelle était colorée de couleur rouge. « Si enim esset aliquis color intrinsecus pupillae, ille color interior prohiberet videri extraneum colorem, et quodammodo obstrueret oculum ne alia videret. » <sup>5</sup>

Saint Thomas cite un autre exemple : la langue du malade qui est infectée d'une saveur amère, ne peut percevoir le doux, car tout lui apparaît amer. <sup>6</sup>

Pareillement, l'âme (l'intelligence) étant en puissance à connaître tous les corps, ne doit en être déterminément aucun, car la présence en elle d'un corps empêcherait la connaissance des autres. <sup>7</sup> « Sic etiam intellectus si haberet aliquam naturam determinatam, illa natura connaturalis sibi prohiberet eum a cognitione aliarum naturarum. » <sup>8</sup>

Il faut noter cependant que, bien que le sens et l'intelligence jouissent d'une certaine immatérialité, il existe entre les deux cette différence que l'immatérialité de l'intelligence est totale, tandis que celle du sens est restreinte. Le sens ne perçoit pas tous les sensibles, mais seulement un genre déterminé d'objets, comme l'œil perçoit les couleurs, l'oreille les sons ; donc dans sa nature, le sens n'exclut que

1. *Ia Pars*, q.14, a.1, c.

2. *Ia Pars*, q.14, a.1, c.

3. ARISTOTE, *De Anima*, III, c.4, 431 b 20 ; S. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.13, nn.787-788.

4. S. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, lect.7, nn.675-676.

5. S. THOMAS, *De Unitate Intellectus*, c.I.

6. *Ia Pars*, q.75, a.2, c. ; *In III de Anima*, lect.7, n.680.

7. *Ia Pars*, q.75, a.2, c.

8. S. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.7, n.680.

quelques corps ; l'intelligence, au contraire, peut connaître tous les sensibles. Elle est donc dépourvue essentiellement de tout corps :

Est autem differentia inter sensum et intellectum : quia sensus non est cognoscitivus omnium, sed visus colorum tantum, auditus sonorum, et sic de aliis ; intellectus autem est simpliciter cognoscitivus omnium . . . Quia ergo omnia cognoscit, concludit [Aristoteles] quod « non contingit ipsum habere aliquam naturam » determinatam ex naturis sensibilibus, quas cognoscit ; « sed hanc solam naturam habet quod sit possibilis », id est in potentia ad ea quae intelligit quantum est ex sua natura ; sed fit actu illa dum ea intelligit in actu.<sup>1</sup>

Cette doctrine, Aristote l'avait déjà formulée en ces termes : « Intus apparens prohibebit cognoscere extraneum, et obstruet. »<sup>2</sup>

Selon saint Thomas,<sup>3</sup> cet « intus apparens » signifie quelque chose d'intrinsèque et de connaturel à l'intellect qui l'obstrue de quelque façon et l'empêche de connaître les autres choses.

La raison propre de cet axiome est qu'une nature n'est pas déterminable par une autre. En effet, si une forme pouvait être déterminée par d'autres formes, la matière première qui la possède ne serait pas limitée par une seule forme. Pareillement, si l'intelligence avait en elle-même un intelligible, qui serait déterminable par tous les autres intelligibles, cela ne serait pas un obstacle à l'intellection. L'axiome a donc sa valeur, lorsqu'il s'agit d'une nature qui est indéterminable par une autre ; mais il ne tient pas, quand une nature est déterminable par une autre, et par conséquent, dans les natures qui se comparent comme la puissance et l'acte.<sup>4</sup>

Les natures connaissables sont de double espèce : les unes sont connaissables seulement, comme c'est le cas des choses sensibles ; les autres sont connaissables et connaissantes, comme c'est le cas des substances séparées.<sup>5</sup>

Avec ces distinctions, nous comprenons maintenant que l'âme humaine, étant elle-même une nature commune déterminable par d'autres intelligibles, comme nous l'avons dit précédemment, ne peut être empêchée de les connaître. En effet, s'ils sont déterminables, ils ne constituent pas d'obstacle à l'intellection d'autres choses. Il en est de même pour les anges, qui ont une affinité entre eux, en ce sens qu'ils sont tous des natures spirituelles ; un ange peut connaître un autre ange, étant donné que la connaissance se fait par la similitude. L'« intus apparens » n'est pas un obstacle à leur connaissance mutuelle. Dans le cas des anges, l'axiome ne s'applique pas, parce

1. *De Unitate Intellectus*, c.1.

2. *In III de Anima*, lect.7, n.680.

3. *In III de Anima*, lect.7, n.680.

4. CAJETAN, *Comm. in Iam Partam*, q.56, a.2, n.III.

5. *Ibid.*

qu'on applique cet axiome aux natures connaissables seulement, tandis que les anges sont des natures connaissables et connaissantes.<sup>1</sup>

D'après tout ce qui précède, nous savons que l'âme humaine n'est pas, ni ne peut être un corps. Elle est d'une nature autre que le corps. Elle est spirituelle. Et cela implique aussi qu'elle est inorganique. Si l'intelligence opérait au moyen d'un organe, cet organe la limiterait, comme le ferait une couleur déterminée dans la pupille de l'œil, et comme un vase coloré teinte le liquide qu'on y verse. Il faut donc que l'âme dont l'existence ne dépend pas du corps, possède une opération qui lui convienne essentiellement, à laquelle le corps n'aie pas de part, selon le principe maintes fois énoncé plus haut : « Tel on est, tel on agit. » L'opération indépendante, à son tour, prouve la subsistance par soi de l'âme, d'où elle procède radicalement, d'après le principe : « Tel on agit, tel on est. »

Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum : quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum ; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus ejusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium . . . habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit . . . Relinquitur igitur animam humanam . . . esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.<sup>2</sup>

Le problème de la spiritualité de l'âme humaine est d'une très grande importance. Il est la racine de toutes les autres preuves de l'immortalité de l'âme. Étant donné qu'il s'agit de l'immortalité intrinsèque de l'âme, si nous ne pouvons prouver son indépendance du corps, les preuves prises, par exemple, de la simplicité, du désir naturel, de la croyance instinctive de l'homme, de la sanction, etc., perdraient leur valeur fondamentale.

En effet, une âme qui existe indépendamment du corps n'est pas corruptible, mais immortelle. Une chose ne peut être corruptible que d'une double manière : ou par accident, si elle existe dépendamment d'une autre chose ; dans ce cas, elle cesse d'exister par la corruption du sujet auquel elle est unie ; ou par soi. La corruption par soi se réalise pour le composé qui porte en lui le principe de décomposition. Or, l'âme humaine, parce qu'elle est spirituelle, existe indépendamment de la matière. Elle n'est donc pas corruptible par accident. Elle n'est pas non plus corruptible par soi, parce qu'elle n'est pas composée physiquement de matière et de forme ; elle est forme subsistante. L'âme humaine est donc immortelle.

JOSEPH PHAM-VAN-LONG.

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1. *Ibid.*, nn.v, vi.

2. *Ia Pars*, q.75, a.2, c.



# The Moral Virtues and the Speculative Life

## I. THE MORAL RECTIFICATION OF THE SPECULATIVE LIFE

Perhaps the most enigmatic feature of man is the striking dichotomy of his make-up. His ponderous and mortally fragile body is adorned with and activated by a spiritual and incorruptible soul. The human soul itself is composed of two quite different strata : one belongs to the irrational and sentient order, the other to the supra-sensible, rational and intellectual order. "... One element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle."<sup>1</sup> The irrational part of the soul has two parts, viz., the vegetative or nutritive part which is common to all living beings and therefore, is not human, nor the subject of human virtue ;<sup>2</sup> and the other part, which is capable of participating in reason and obeying its command.<sup>3</sup> Most men are acquainted at least experimentally with the sensitive part of the soul, which is common to man and animal. Thus they have sensible joys, sensible sorrows, according as the weather is pleasant or unpleasant, as their "ponies" are winners or losers. They have desires or aversions in this same sensible order.

The dichotomy is continued in the superior part of the human soul : one part is termed rational. For one part of it is essentially rational, as having reason in itself ; the other is called rational by participation, in as much as it participates in reason to the extent to which it obeys the dictate of reason.<sup>4</sup> It is this division of the human soul that engenders the twofold division of human virtues : intellectual, which perfect the part of the soul which is essentially rational by making it apt to know truth ; and moral, whose role is to perfect that part of the soul which only participates in or is obedient to reason.<sup>5</sup>

Nor does the dualism in man cease here. It continues even throughout the essentially rational part of the soul. For the rational

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1. ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, chap.13, 1102 a 27 ; also Cf. *De Anima*, III, chap.10, 433 a 12-16 ; ST. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.14, n.797.

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In I Ethicorum*, lect.20, nn.233-235.

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, nn.236-242.

4. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In I Ethic.*, lect.20, n.242 ; *In VI*, lect.1., n.1114.

5. Cf. *Ibid.*, n.243 : " Cum enim virtus humana sit per quam bene perficitur opus hominis quod est secundum rationem, necesse est quod virtus humana sit in aliquo rationali. Unde, cum rationale sit duplex, scilicet per essentiam et per participationem, consequens est quod sit duplex humana virtus. Quarum quaedam sit in eo quod est rationale per seipsum, quae vocatur *intellectualis* ; quaedam vero est in eo quod est rationale per participationem, idest in appetitiva animae parte, et haec vocatur *moralis*. Et ideo dicit quod virtutum quasdam dicimus esse intellectuales, quasdam vero morales." Also cf. *Sum. Theol.*, Ia IIae, q.56, aa. 3, c. and ad 2 ; 4, c. ; 6, c. ; q.58, aa.1-4.

soul itself comprises a scientific or speculative part by which it contemplates necessary and invariable things, and a ratiocinative or calculative part by which it deliberates and reasons about contingent things.

... And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle — one by which we contemplate the kind of thing whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things ; for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind . . . Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative ; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle.<sup>1</sup>

The bipartite character of the human soul is consummated in the distinction of the speculative and practical intellects and the virtues by which each of these is perfected for its proper work. Now the knowledge of truth is the proper work of both the speculative and practical intellects, and the intellectual virtues are the habits by which each part is perfected in reference to truth.<sup>2</sup>

The explanation of this division is obvious. Even though truth is the good of the intellect, there is, nevertheless, a vast difference between the truths of the speculative and practical orders. The good and bad of the speculative intellect is the true or false absolutely considered. For the speculative intellect does not move to action, but simply contemplates and knows the truth of necessary things.<sup>3</sup> But the good of the practical intellect is not absolute truth, but truth "confesse se habens," that is, truth in conformity with rectified appetite.<sup>4</sup> For the practical intellect is a moving principle ; and, if

1. ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, chap.1, 1139 a 1-13 ; Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethic.*, lect.1, nn.1115, 1118 : "Quia intendimus de virtutibus intellectualibus quae perficiunt partem animae rationalem, ideo ad distinguendum virtutes intellectuales oportet dividere rationem habens eodem modo quo supra divisimus partes animae . . . Supponatur ergo quod pars rationalis dividitur in duas. Una quidem est per quam speculamur illa entia, scilicet necessaria, quorum principia non possunt aliter se habere. Alia autem pars per quam speculamur contingentia."

1118 : "... Et dicit quod praedictarum partium animae rationalis, una quidem quae speculatur necessaria potest dici scientificum genus animae, quia de necessariis est scientia. Alia autem pars potest dici ratiocinativa secundum quod ratiocinari et consiliari pro eodem sumitur. Nominat enim consilium quamdam inquisitionem nondum determinatam . . . quae . . . maxime accedit circa contingentia . . ."

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethic.*, lect.1, nn.1118-23 ; lect.2, nn.1126-33 ; and esp. 1140-1141 : "Cognitio veritatis est proprium opus utriusque particulae intellectus, scilicet practici et speculativi, vel scientifici et ratiocinativi."

1141 : "... Illi habitus sunt virtutes ambobus partibus intellectus per quas contingit verum dicere quod est bonum intellectivae partis."

3. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, lect.1, nn.1115, 1116, 1118 ; lect.2, nn.1130, 1135 ; also, *In III de Anima*, lect.14, nn.812-815.

4. Cf. *Ibid.*, nn.1129, 1130.

it knows the truth, it is not for the sake of the truth but for the sake of something other to which that truth is directed or related, be that other an action such as willing, in view of which it is perfected by prudence ; or a product such as a table or a chair, for which it is perfected by art, these being the two virtues of the practical intellect.<sup>1</sup> Aristotle makes all this very clear in summary fashion when he states in the second chapter of Book VI of his *Nicomachean Ethics* :

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire ; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical ; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual) ; while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.

... Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical ; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes, makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation) — only that which is *done* is that ; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this.<sup>2</sup>

### 1. *The Speculative Life — A Thing Apart ?*

The common division of the essentially rational part of the human soul into the speculative and practical intellects, with the characteristic contemplative or speculative attitude of the former and the active and moving tendency of the latter, has led to something of a paradox. For, whereas men have some information about the active life proper to the practical intellect, they are abysmally ignorant of the speculative life. Too many seem to deny, at least interpretatively, that it is, in fact human. They seem to think it is beyond the pale of morality and coolly shrug off any responsibility for it. It seems to be a common opinion of men that their speculative life is not subject to the demands of ordinary living. They seem to fail to realize that they are morally accountable for their thoughts and thinking. Liberals, especially, disregard, even deny, and that in the name of science, any restraint on their purely intellectual activity. To us, however, the tenet that man is entirely responsible for the intellectual choices he has made in an exercise of his free will is axiomatic.

1. Cf. *Ibid.*, 1130, 1133, 1135, 1136.

2. Chap.2, 1139 a 20-b 14.



2. *Reasons for This Opinion*

The human anomaly of ignorance and disdain of the speculative life and knowledge and esteem of the active life is (*proh dolor!*) characteristic of our assembly-line age, that, oblivious of the primacy of contemplation, bestows its "Euge, serve bone et fidelis" upon the robot-minded man of action. Lamentable though this reversal of reality is, it is not without adequate explanation.

First of all, Aristotle and St. Thomas consider that the speculative life has something divine about it and, as such, is not a human possession. When discussing the nature of happiness, Aristotle has this to say about the speculative and contemplative life :

But such a life would be too high for man ; for it is not in so far as he is a man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him ; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us ; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas's commentary on this passage points out that the speculative life is "better than the life which is according to man," and that to give oneself to the purely intellectual life is proper to a more elevated being than man. For a man to live in this manner is to live, "not according as he is man, but according as something divine exists in him," for the speculative life is compared to and towers above the strictly human life much as the divine and human differ.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Op. cit.*, X, chap.7, 1177 b 25-1178 a 2.

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In X Ethic.*, lect.11, nn.2105-2110, esp. 2105, 2106 : "... Talis vita, quae vacat contemplationi veritatis, est melior quam vita quae est secundum hominem. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima et corpore, habens sensitivam naturam et intellectivam, vita homini commensurata videtur consistere in hoc, quod homo secundum rationem ordinet affectiones et operationes sensitivas et corporales. Sed vacare soli operationi intellectus videtur esse proprium superiorum substantiarum, in quibus invenitur sola natura intellectiva, quam participant secundum intellectum.

2106 : "Et ideo manifestans quod dictum est, subdit quod homo sic vivens, scilicet vacando contemplationi, non vivit secundum quod homo, qui est compositus ex diversis, sed secundum quod aliquid divinum in ipso existit, prout scilicet secundum intellectum divinam similitudinem participat. Et ideo quantum intellectus in sua puritate consideratus differt a composito ex anima et corpore, tantum distat operatio speculativa ab operatione quae fit secundum virtutem moralem, quae proprie est circa humana. Sicut ergo intellectus per comparisonem ad homines est quoddam divinum, ita et vita speculativa, quae est secundum intellectum, comparatur ad vitam moralem, sicut divina ad humanam...

2110 : "Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est, quod non est secundum hominem, sed supra hominem : non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad naturam compositam, est autem propriissime secundum hominem quantum ad id quod est principalissi-

Elsewhere St. Thomas says that by the contemplative life man is assimilated to God and the angels, for in contemplation man becomes conversant with superior beings, that is, with God and the angels, being made similar to them by happiness.<sup>1</sup> He states quite categorically that the contemplative life is not properly human, since the speculative intellect is not found to be as perfect in man as it is in the angel.<sup>2</sup>

The active life, on the other hand, is regarded by the Angelic Doctor as being most proper to man. In actual fact, this is not surprising. Man the "doer" and man the "producer" are quite familiar figures. The so-called "Existential" philosophers of our day have seized on this point and pushed it even beyond its logical conclusions. Aquinas states in no uncertain terms that the life which is most proper to man is the active life, which consists in the exercise of the moral virtues.<sup>3</sup> "Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man."<sup>4</sup>

It is thus somewhat comprehensible that the vast majority of men remain unacquainted with this divine, speculative life and its demands on the person who exercises such activity. And perhaps these Aristotelian and Thomistic comments on the two genera of activity proper to man explain the popular misconception that the speculative life is separate and apart from human endeavour.

### 3. *Orders of Specification and Exercise*

The apparent antinomy that results from associating contemplation with the active life finds its complete solution only in a

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mun in homine : quod quidem perfectissime invenitur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative."

1. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.3, a.5, c. : "In vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur."

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Virt. Card.*, q. unic., a.1, c. : "In hoc homine invenitur . . . intellectus speculativus, qui non perfecte in homine invenitur sicut invenitur in angelis, sed secundum quamdam participationem animae. Ideo vita contemplativa non est proprie humana, sed suprahumana ; . . ."

3. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Unde virtutes cardinales dicuntur in quibus fundatur vita humana, per quam in ostium introitur ; vita autem humana est quae est homini proportionata . . ."

"In hoc autem homine invenitur primo quidem natura sensitiva, in qua convenit cum brutis ; ratio practica, quae est homini propria secundum suum gradum ; et intellectus speculativus, qui non perfecte in homine invenitur sicut invenitur in angelis, sed secundum quamdam participationem animae. Ideo vita contemplativa non est proprie humana, sed suprahumana ; vita autem voluptuosa, quae inhaeret sensibilibus bonis, non est humana sed bestialis. Vita ergo proprie humana est vita activa, quae consistit in exercitio virtutum moralium."

4. ST. THOMAS, *IIa IIae*, q.51, a.1, c. : "Inter caeteros autem actus hominis proprium est ei consiliari : quia hoc importat quamdam rationis inquisitionem circa agenda, in quibus consistit vita humana ; nam vita speculativa est supra hominem . . ."

thorough study of the vast and intricate question of the relations between will and intellect in man.

The Doctor of the Schools begins his treatise on this subject in the *Summa Theologica* by asking which of the two spiritual faculties of man is the higher and nobler. "Is the will a higher faculty than the intellect?", he asks. And in reply he says that the intellect, in itself, is, absolutely speaking, a higher faculty than the will because its object, being simpler and more absolute, is nobler than the object of the will. Relatively, however, the will may sometimes be nobler than the intellect as when its object is found in a higher or nobler thing; and this is the case when the desired object is superior to the soul itself. Thus it is more noble to love God than to know Him.<sup>1</sup>

Though the intellect is nobler than the will, these two faculties, nevertheless, mutually influence each other. For they are both immaterial faculties and can reflect upon themselves and upon each other, as well as upon the soul and its powers. The intellect can know itself and the will; the will can move itself to act. The intellect can know the will and the acts of the will; the will can move the intellect to act.<sup>2</sup>

The intellect both moves the will and in turn is moved by it. A faculty is moved by another inasmuch as it is in potency; for when

1. Cf. *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.3, c. : "Eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter : uno modo, simpliciter ; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale ; secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum.

"Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis : nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis ; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilior et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum : sequitur quod, secundum se et simpliciter, intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate.

"Secundum quid autem et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior intellectu : ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus . . . Ut . . . dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente : actus vero voluntatis perficitur ex eo quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem, prout in se est . . . Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta : per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam : tunc, etiam in comparatione ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio ; e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas."

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Verit.*, q.22, a.12, c. : "Potentiis autem animae superioribus, ex hoc quod immateriales sunt, competit quod reflectantur super seipsas ; unde tam voluntas quam intellectus reflectuntur super se, et unum super alterum, et super essentiam animae, et super omnes eius vires.

"Intellectus enim intelligit se, et voluntatem, et essentiam animae, et omnes animae vires ; et similiter voluntas vult se velle et intellectum intelligere, et vult essentiam animae, et sic de aliis."

Also cf. *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.4, ad 1.



we say that one faculty acts upon another we mean that it moves the other, reducing it from potency to act. A power of the soul is in potency in two ways : first, with regard to acting and not acting ; secondly, with regard to this or that action. My eyes sometimes see actually and sometimes do not see. This is the order of exercise or use. And when they are actually seeing, they sometimes see a white object and sometimes a black one. This is the order of specification or determination. Thus a faculty of the soul may be moved in two ways, namely, as to exercise and use, and this is on the part of the subject ; or as to determination and specification. This latter motion comes from the object which specifies the act.<sup>1</sup>

The object moves the faculty by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle. And the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. In the order of specification, therefore, the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it. The will is the appetite of the intellect. And the intellect moves the will after the manner of a final cause by presenting to the will its object, the known good, which moves the will as an end desired. And so in the order of specification and determination the intellect is quite independent of any influence of the will, and rather than being moved by the will does itself move the will.<sup>2</sup>

To say that the intellect plays an important role in the movement of the will is an understatement. The rational appetite must turn to it for a knowledge of the goods which it embraces or rejects. On a hot summer day when a tired executive decides to drive into the country in search of mental relaxation from the fatiguing round of daily duties, it is his intellect which proposes to him this suitable and desirable object of the will. And in this consists the moving power of the intellect — a sort of salesman's role — a presentation of objects which the will may accept or reject.

From this short excursion into the domain of specification and determination it is evident that, if this order alone is considered, the speculative life is indeed a thing apart from any humanizing and moralizing influence. It is simply a case of the intellect's being

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1. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.9, a.1, c. : "... Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa : uno modo, quantum ad agere vel non agere ; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud : sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt ; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo ; scilicet : quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus ; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti ; quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens ; aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus."

2. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Sed obiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo, in rebus naturalibus, actio specificatur, sicut calefactio a calore. Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus. Et ideo, isto modo motionis, intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum."

determined by its proper object — a phenomenon which remains outside of and separated from the moral and active life. To see only this aspect of the intellectual activity of man, however, is to see the life of the intellect “ through a glass in a dark manner ”.

When the order of use or exercise is considered, however, we find that it is the will which moves the intellect and all the other powers of the soul, for we make use of the other powers when we will. I think because I will to do so, just as I write because my will commands me to do so. The reason for the ascendancy of the will in the order of exercise is found in the comparison of its object to the objects of the other particular powers. In the order of use and exercise the motion is from the subject as contrasted with the object, which specifies and determines. And the motion of the subject itself is from some agent. Every agent acts for an end and every end is a good. The object of the will is good and end in general, whereas each particular power is directed to some particular good suitable to it, as sight to the perception of colour and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Thus, the will, as an efficient cause, moves all the powers of the soul, except the natural powers of the vegetative soul, which are not subject to the human will. For the end and perfection of every other power is included under the object of the will as some particular good. And so the will, as an efficient cause, moves the intellect in the order of exercise to its acts of understanding and reason.

... Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul ... The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. ... Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.<sup>1</sup>

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1. ST. THOMAS, *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.4, c. : “ Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis : sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum et omnes animae vires ... Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares ... Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens : sicut visus, ad perceptionem coloris ; et intellectus, ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas, per modum agentis, movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.”

Also cf. *Ia IIae*, q.9, a.1, c. ; *Contra Gentiles*, III, cap.26, ad 5 ; *De Verit.*, q.22, a.12, c. ; *Q. D. de Malo*, q.6, a. unic. : “ Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis, movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem ; sicut militaris movet frenorum factricem ad operandum, et hoc modo voluntas

If the order of specification alone is considered, the speculative life is thought of without reference to the will and morality. But this is only one, and the less important, aspect of man's speculation and contemplation, for, as St. Thomas so well points out, when we are discussing knowledge, and therefore the life of speculation, there is a twofold good which must be assured. One of these has reference to the order of specification, and consists in man's attaining the truth of things, "*ut homo circa singula aestimet verum.*" And, since this regards the very act of knowledge, it falls to the intellectual virtues to assure this good. There is a second good which may not be neglected nor overlooked in man's intellectual pursuits, namely, that his appetite be rectified to apply his apprehensive forces in a virtuous manner. Being a question of the use and exercise of one of the faculties of the soul, this comes under the sway of the appetitive power.<sup>1</sup>

A brief discussion of the virtues of the speculative intellect will provide a clearer understanding of the realms of specification and exercise and of the two goods of knowledge.

The speculative intellect may be perfected by habits which are prior to the will or by others which follow the will. These habits perfecting the speculative intellect as preceding the will may be called virtues, but not so properly as the habits which follow the will. Understanding (*intellectus*), science and wisdom are the virtues of the speculative intellect which are prior to the will.<sup>2</sup>

*movet se ipsam et omnes alias potentias. Intellego enim quia volo ; et similiter utor omnibus potentiis et habitibus quia volo . . .*"

1. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.166, a.2, ad 2.

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Virt. in Comm.*, q. unic., a.7 : "*Intellectus tam speculativus quam practicus potest perfici dupliciter aliquo habitu. Uno modo absolute et secundum se, prout praecedit voluntatem, quasi eam movens ; alio modo prout sequitur voluntatem, quasi ad imperium actum suum eliciens : quia, ut dictum est, istae duae potentiae, scilicet intellectus et voluntas se invicem circumeunt.*"

"Illi igitur habitus qui sunt intellectu practico vel speculativo, primo modo, possunt dici aliquo modo virtutes, licet non ita secundum perfectam rationem ; et hoc modo intellectus, scientia et sapientia sunt in intellectu speculativo, ars vero in intellectu practico. Dicitur enim aliquis intelligens vel sciens secundum quod eius intellectus perfectus est ad cognoscendum verum ; quod quidem est bonum intellectus. Et licet istud verum possit esse volitum, prout homo vult intelligere verum ; non tamen quantum ad hoc perficiuntur habitus praedicti. Non enim ex hoc quod homo habet scientiam, efficitur volens considerare verum, sed solummodo potens ; unde et ipsa veri consideratio non est scientia in quantum est volita, sed secundum quod directe tendit in obiectum . . .

"Habitus vero qui sunt in intellectu speculativo vel practico secundum quod intellectus sequitur voluntatem, habent verius rationem virtutis ; in quantum per eos homo efficitur non solum potens vel sciens recte agere, sed volens . . .

"Sic igitur patet quod habitus in intellectu existentes, *diversimode* se habent ad voluntatem.

"Nam *quidam* in nullo a voluntate dependent, nisi quantum ad eorum usum ; et hoc quidem per accidens, cum huiusmodi usus habitum aliter a voluntate dependeat, et aliter ab habitibus praedictis, sicut sunt scientia, sapientia et ars. Non enim per hos



Some preliminary explanation is necessary on this point. When St. Thomas treats of the subject of virtues, he gives a very fine answer to the question, "Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?" A virtue, he says, is a good operative habit. But a habit may be referred to a good act in two ways : first, by the habit a man acquires an aptitude for a good work ; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptitude to speak correctly, though his habit of grammar does not make him always speak as he has been taught. Secondly, the habit may confer not only aptitude to act but also the right use of that aptitude or capacity ; for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. These latter habits are called and are virtuous simply because they render the work good as well as the one who performs that work. But the first kind of habit is not called virtue simply and absolutely because it does not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptitude, nor does it make its possessor good without qualification but only good in that respect. For, being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good not simply but relatively ; a good grammarian, for example, but not a good man. Hence the intellect — even the speculative intellect, without any reference to the will — may be the subject of virtue in this first sense, that is, as a habit giving only the aptitude for a good work. It is in this sense that Aristotle designates understanding, science and wisdom as virtues of the speculative intellect, and art, of the practical intellect.<sup>1</sup>

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habitus homo ad hoc perficitur, ut homo eis bene velit uti ; sed solum ut ad hoc sit potens."

1. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Ia IIae*, q.56, a.3, c. : "... Virtus est habitus quo quis bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini facultas ad bonum actum : sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo semper recte loquatur : potest enim grammaticus barbarizare, aut soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem bene agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur : sicut iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur.

"Et quia bonum, sicut et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu ; ideo ab huiusmodi habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus : puta quia est iustus vel temperatus... Et quia *virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit*, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes : quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes : quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex ; sed dicitur bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber.

"Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus absque omni ordine ad voluntatem : sic enim Philosophus... scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes."

Since the subject of a habit which is truly a virtue can be only the will or some power moved by the will,<sup>1</sup> it is obvious that any virtues which may perfect the speculative intellect as preceding the will are called virtues only in that first and limited sense. And because these virtues of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part, they may indeed be called virtues but only in the sense that they equip man with an aptitude and facility for that good work which is the consideration of truth ; and this is the good work of the intellect. For even though a man possesses a habit of speculative science, he is not thereby more inclined to use this capacity. He is merely made capable of considering the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

Once the Doctor of the Schools has made it amply clear that the virtues of the speculative intellect have nothing to do with their good use or exercise by the one who possesses them, he goes on to distinguish the virtues proper to the speculative intellect. His own analysis of the question is so acute and penetrating as to render unwarranted any sluggish commentary of ours. We shall, in consequence, quote it in its entirety.

As already stated, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth : for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration, — as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a *principle*, and is at once understood by the intellect : wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called *understanding*, which is the habit of principles.

On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a *term*. This may happen in two ways : first, so that it is the last in some particular genus ; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since *things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature* ; hence that which is

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1. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Subiectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas ; vel aliqua potentia, secundum quod est mota a voluntate. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias, quae aequaliter sunt rationales, ad suos actus . . . Et ideo, quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus, quae facit bene agere in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate, vel in aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota."

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.57, a.1, c. : "Cum igitur habitus intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam : possunt quidem dici virtutes, in quantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis quae est consideratio veri, hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus : non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum : sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam."

last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is *wisdom*, which considers the highest causes, as stated in *Meta.*, I, 1, 2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. — But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is *science* that perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge : whereas there is but one wisdom.<sup>1</sup>

In consequence of the foregoing consideration of the virtues of the speculative intellect, we are again driven to the fact of the independence of the speculative life from the humanizing control of the will. And only when one is very insistent on the distinction between the orders of specification and exercise can he correctly argue that the speculative life is in very truth a most noble human pursuit. For though the virtues of the speculative intellect are free from all interference of the will on the plane of specification, determination and definition, on the lower and human plane of use and exercise they are quite dependent upon and influenced by the will.

When there is question of man's using or exercising the virtues of understanding, science and wisdom, — that is, the whole question of man's exercising the speculative life, — then there is just no doubt about such a use and activity being a thing apart from man. For like everything else which enters the domain of use and exercise, the use and exercise of the virtues of the speculative intellect, too, come under the sway and dominion of the will. For the will moves to their acts all the other powers which are in any way rational ; and if man actually considers truth, — and the good of this consideration is assured by the intellectual virtue itself — it is because he wills to do

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1. *Ibid.*, a.2, c. : "...Sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad considerandum verum : hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est dupliciter considerabile : uno modo, sicut per se notum ; alio modo, sicut per aliud notum. — Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut principium, et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur *intellectus*, qui est habitus principiorum.

"Verum autem quod est per aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu ; sed per inquisitionem rationis. Et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter : uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere ; alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. — Et quia *ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et magis nota secundum naturam*, ut dicitur in I *Phys.* : ideo id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa huiusmodi est *sapientia*, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I *Metaph.* Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus : quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. — Ad id vero quod est ultimum in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum *scientia*. Et ideo, secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum ; cum tamen *sapientia* non sit nisi una."



so. For though a man has the habit of Geometry, he is not thereby inclined to make use of it. That he makes use of the knowledge he has is due to the motion of his will.<sup>1</sup>

Since every virtue is ordained to some good . . . , a habit . . . may be called a virtue for two reasons : first, because it confers aptness in doing good ; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition . . . belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul : since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.<sup>2</sup>

The reason for this is not far to seek. For the will is the first efficient cause, "impellens impulsum," and, because of that, the will moves the intellect and all the other powers, since its end is universal in comparison with the ends of the particular powers. The object of the will is good and end in common ; whereas the object of the other powers is some particular good. Use or exercise is from the subject as contrasted with the object, which specifies and determines. And the motion of the subject is from some agent. Every agent acts for an end. And since good in all its community is the object of the will, it is thus the role of the will to move all other powers and faculties to their respective ends.<sup>3</sup>

It is but a short and easy step to conclude that since the use and exercise of the speculative life depend on the will, the efficient cause which moves all powers, save the powers of the vegetative soul, then the good and virtuous use, application and exercise of the speculative life and virtues must depend on moral virtue, which rectifies man's will.

The Doctor of the Schools is very clear on this matter when he states unequivocally : "Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a

1. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.56, a.3, c. : "Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias, quae aliquantulum sunt rationales, ad suos actus . . . Et ideo, quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem."

2. *Ibid.*, q.57, a.1, c. : "... Alio modo, quia, cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum ; et hoc pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus."

3. Cf. *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.4, c. ; *Ia IIae*, q.9, a.1, c. : "Motio autem ipsius subiecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum omne agens agat propter finem . . . , principium huius motionis est ex fine. Et inde est quod ars ad quam pertinet finis, movet, suo imperio, artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem : sicut gubernatoria ars imperat navifactivae . . . Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo, ex hac parte, voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus : utimur enim aliis potentiis, cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona. Semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus."

habit of intellectual virtue ; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.”<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas's statement is valid. If man is to lead a good speculative life, not only must his speculative intellect be perfected for the consideration of truth by the virtues of understanding, science and wisdom, but his will must also be perfected by moral virtue so that he may use those perfections of his intellectual faculty in a good and human way. These are the two goods of knowledge to which St. Thomas referred when he stated that in reference to knowledge a double good is to be assured — one which assures a good act of knowledge, the science of Geometry, for example, for the consideration of mathematical truths relating to continuous quantity ; another which assures a good use of the act of knowledge, namely, that man's will be perfected in view of applying his apprehensive powers in a good and virtuous manner.<sup>2</sup>

In summary, it is evident that, though man's speculative life is often considered as amoral and thus quite apart from any humanizing influence, this is not the case. Despite the arguments which might seem to favor such an opinion — the “divine” aspect of contemplation ; the active life's being termed the truly human life ; the whole plan of specification, whereby the intellect and its determining object face one another without the foreign influence of the will ; and the very nature of the virtues of the speculative intellect, which do not necessarily guarantee their good use — despite these arguments, the speculative life must submit to the rule of the will, by means of which alone a good use of speculation is assured. And as a *good* use can come only from an appetite which is perfected by moral virtue, it follows that moral virtue has its role to play in assuring a good use and exercise of the intellective powers, whose good — the consideration of truth — is procured by the habits of understanding, science and wisdom. Not to leave the question only partly answered, we shall now go on to consider the nature and office of docility and studiousness ; two of the particular moral virtues which are necessary that the second — and perhaps the more important — of the goods of knowledge may not be lacking.

## II. DOCILITY

Any study on the moral virtues which regulate man's appetite for knowledge must needs treat of docility. Man has two methods of

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1. *Ibid.*, q.58, a.2, c. : “Sic igitur, ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis ; sed etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis moralis.”

2. Cf. *Ila Ilae*, q.166, a.2, ad 2.

coming to know truth ; for he may acquire knowledge by way of invention or by way of discipline and teaching.<sup>1</sup>

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research ; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns [by instruction]. For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses ; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him ; according to what the Philosopher says (*Poster. I, 1*) : *All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.*<sup>2</sup>

And just as happy conjecture (*eustochia*) and shrewdness (*solertia*) facilitate the acquisition of knowledge by way of invention,<sup>3</sup> so docility is a necessary part of the disciple's equipment in view of his learning by instruction from a teacher. For discipline is the reception of knowledge from another, as St. Thomas understands it in his exposition of the *Posterior Analytics*.<sup>4</sup> Docility, in turn, assures that the doctrine given by the teacher is properly accepted by the disciple. " Now it is

1. Cf. *De Verit.*, q.11, a.1, c. : " Sicut ergo aliquis dupliciter sanatur : uno modo per operationem naturae tantum, alio modo a natura cum adminiculo medicinae ; ita etiam est duplex modus acquirendi scientiam : unus, quando naturalis ratio per seipsam devenit in cognitionem ignotorum ; et hic modus dicitur *inventio* ; alius, quando rationi naturali aliquis exterius adminiculatur, et hic modus dicitur *disciplina*."

2. *Ia Pars.*, q.117, 1, c. : " Scientia autem acquiritur, in homine, et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui, per inventionem propriam, scientiam acquirit ; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum recipit : per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quaelibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat, secundum quod dicitur in *I Poster.*, quod *omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione*."

3. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.48, a. un. : " Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio : quae fit, vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet *docilitas* ; vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet *eustochia*, quae est bona *coniecturatio*. Huius autem pars . . . est *solertia*, quae est *velox coniecturatio medii* . . ."

4. Cf. *In I Poster. Anal.*, lect.1, n.9 : " Nomen autem doctrinae et disciplinae ad cognitionis acquisitionem pertinet. Nam doctrina est actio eius, qui aliquid cognoscere facit ; disciplina autem est receptio cognitionis ab alio. Non autem accipitur hic doctrina et disciplina secundum quod se habent ad acquisitionem scientiae tantum, sed ad acquisitionem cognitionis cuiuscumque."



a mark of docility to be ready to be taught : . . . ”<sup>1</sup> “ Now . . . docility consists in man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man . . . ”<sup>2</sup> And when one realizes the greater utility and facility which characterize teaching as a means of coming to knowledge when compared with the intrinsic and extrinsic difficulties concomitant to the method of discovery, one has no hesitation in signalling the first-ranking importance of docility in the life of the student.

The Angelic Doctor has no lengthy exposé of docility ; as a matter of fact, his mentions of it are but few and brief. And when he does treat of it both in the *Summa Theologica* and in his commentary on the *Sentences*, it is always in connection with prudence that he envisages it. However, as St. Thomas himself states, though docility is in a special way related to prudence, it does have a great utility for all the intellectual virtues.<sup>3</sup> A reason for St. Thomas’s so saying is not difficult to ascertain for, as we know, all the intellectual virtues, with the exception of understanding, are acquired through learning ; and so for these others, too, docility will have its function to discharge. We think that we may say without fear of erring that what St. Thomas says of docility in reference to prudence is valid, *mutatis mutandis*, in reference to the other intellectual virtues, and may be considered as common teaching about the acquisition of knowledge in general and not only of the acquisition of the knowledge prerequisite to prudence. After all, docility pertains to prudence inasmuch as this latter proceeds by way of knowledge.<sup>4</sup> In fact, St. Isidore, in his famous lexicon, seems to conceive of docility as extending to the whole field of learning from another, for he says that “ one is docile not because he is learned, but because he can be taught ; for he is capable and apt for learning.”<sup>5</sup>

### 1. *Docility and Prudence*

St. Thomas’s first mention of docility in the *Summa Theologica* is but a passing reference in a reply to an objection wherein he states that docility is not a virtue really distinct from prudence but rather is to be related to it as one of its integrant parts, that is, as one of the several elements prerequisite for the perfection of prudence.

1. *Ila IIae*, q.49, a.3, c. : “ Hoc autem pertinet ad docilitatem, ut aliquis sit bene disciplinae susceptivus.”

2. *Ibid.*, a.4, c. : “ Sicut autem docilitas ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habeat in acquirendo rectam opinionem ab alio ; . . . ”

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, a.3, ad 1. “ Dicendum quod, etsi docilitas utilis sit ad quamlibet virtutem intellectualem : praecipue tamen ad prudentiam pertinet, ratione iam dicta.”

4. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.48, a. un. : “ Quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam, secundum id quod est cognoscitiva ; scilicet : memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia.”

5. P. L., LXXXII, 374.

"Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence : but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence."<sup>1</sup> Later he comes back to give a more detailed explanation of this earlier notice.

Prudence, like the other cardinal virtues, has integral parts. Those elements which are prerequisite for a perfect act of the cardinal virtue are known as the integral parts of that virtue.<sup>2</sup> From all such elements previously assigned by other authors Aquinas selects eight as being necessary to the perfection of prudence, and, in consequence, lists eight integral parts of prudence, among them docility.<sup>3</sup> Of these eight, five are assigned to prudence in view of the knowing process of which prudence must acquit itself. These five are memory, reasoning, understanding, docility and shrewdness.<sup>4</sup> The Angelic Doctor gives even further clarification on the function of docility when he says that it regards neither knowledge itself nor the use of this knowledge, but rather its acquisition, and that by way of learning from a teacher.<sup>5</sup> The relation of docility to prudence is thus very clearly traced. This relationship may be summarized very well in what approximates a definition of docility as the following : docility is that integral part of prudence which perfects it by assuring to it a good acquisition of discipline. This is as close as St. Thomas ever comes to actually defining docility.

A remark of St. Thomas, contained in the commentary on the *Sentences*, merits very close attention. After he had explained what he

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1. *Ia IIae*, q.57, a.6, ad 4 : "Dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia, et providentia ; similiter etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes diversae a prudentia ; sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam, sicut partes integrales : inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem prudentiae."

2. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.48, a. un. : "Uno modo, ad similitudinem partium integralium : ut scilicet illa dicantur esse partes virtutis alicuius, quae necesse est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius." Cf. also *In III Sent.*, d.33, q.3, a.1, sol.1, n.269 : "Et secundum hunc modum tripliciter assignantur partes prudentiae et aliis virtutibus. Uno enim modo assignantur ei partes quasi integrales, cum scilicet partes virtutis alicuius ponuntur aliqua quae exiguntur ad virtutem, in quibus perfectio virtutis consistit."

3. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Et, sic, ex omnibus enumeratis possunt accipi octo partes prudentiae : scilicet : sex, quas enumerat Macrobius ; quibus addenda est septima, scilicet memoria, quam ponit Tullius ; et eustochia, sive solertia, quam ponit Aristoteles."

4. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam, secundum id quod est cognoscitiva ; scilicet : memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia."

5. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Quorum diversitatis ratio patet ex hoc quod, circa cognitionem, tria sunt consideranda. — Prima quidem, ipsa cognitio : quae, si sit praeteritorum, est memoria ; si autem praesentium, sive contingentium sive necessariorum, vocatur intellectus, sive intelligentia. — Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio : quae fit, vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet docilitas ; vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet eustochia, quae est bona coniecturatio. Huius autem pars . . . est solertia, quae est velox coniecturatio medii. — Tertio, considerandus est usus cognitionis : secundum scilicet quod, ex cognitis, aliquis procedit ad alia cognoscenda vel iudicanda. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem . . ."

meant by an integral part of a virtue, he states quite definitely that integral parts of a cardinal virtue do not designate virtues in the strict sense of the term, but rather conditions of a virtue, which must enter into its complete notion. "Et hae partes, proprie loquendo non nominant per se virtutes, sed conditiones unius virtutis integrantes ipsam."<sup>1</sup> This, of course, is in line with his other remark in the same vein.<sup>2</sup>

We feel that these latter two remarks should not be passed over lightly. And from them we conclude that docility does not, strictly speaking, designate a virtue. And if, in the course of this chapter, we refer to the virtue of docility, it will be virtue in this less exact sense.

A fuller understanding of the reason for St. Thomas's making docility an integral part of prudence will cast great illumination on docility itself and on the role it is to play in any acquisition of knowledge by way of discipline. First, we shall merely state the reason given by the Doctor of the Schools for making docility a part of prudence, and after that we shall give a more detailed analysis of prudence and its acts of counsel, for an understanding of both of these is imperative to a fuller realization of docility and its function in the disciple.

In its most fundamental expression, the necessity of docility for prudence arises from the very matter with which prudence deals. For, as Aristotle defines it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, prudence is right reason of things to be done.<sup>3</sup> Thus, prudence must treat of particular operables.<sup>4</sup> And since these are limitless in number, no man, by himself, is capable of knowing all of them. And, as a result, in the matter of prudence, man has to seek this knowledge from others, especially from old people who have, because of their long experience in practical life, a sound understanding and knowledge of these matters. Thus man must be disposed to listen to and learn from his elders; and docility is that quality of mind which makes for a proper reception of this teaching and information. Briefly, because of the insurmountable difficulty in learning by means of personal discovery and research all that prudence needs to know to act wisely, men have to resort to other men to be taught by them in this matter.

As stated above . . . prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no man can consider

1. *In III Sent.*, d.33, q.3, a.1, sol.1, n.269, p.1073.

2. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.57, a.6, ad 4.

3. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, chap.5, 1140 b 6-8. ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethic.*, lect.4, n.1166; *Ia IIae*, q.57, a.4, c.

4. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.47, a.3, c.: "Dicendum quod . . . ad prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis; sed etiam applicatio ad opus: quae est finis practicae rationis. Nullus autem potest convenienter alteri aliquid applicare, nisi utrumque cognoscat; scilicet: et id quod applicandum est; et id cui applicandum est. Operationes autem sunt in singularibus. Et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat universalia principia rationis, et cognoscat singularia, circa quae sunt operationes."



them all sufficiently : nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters . . . Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught : and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.<sup>1</sup>

The exact role of prudence in this frame of reference is better seen after a brief analysis of prudence and its acts. We now pass on to consider these.

Prudence is the virtue which perfects the practical intellect in view of operation.<sup>2</sup> It governs and directs the other virtues.<sup>3</sup> It belongs to a superior order than the moral virtues which it perfects. For, while from the point of view of its matter, human operation, to wit, prudence may be classified as a moral virtue, nevertheless, because it is subjected in and perfects an apprehensive faculty, in this case, the practical intellect, it is considered formally as an intellectual virtue and is listed with the other four intellectual virtues.<sup>4</sup> Being of a superior order, for it is in the intellect, as we have just said, prudence unites in itself what is found separately in the moral virtues which it governs. As Cajetan puts it, what exists divisively on an inferior level is to be found united on a superior plane.<sup>5</sup> It would not seem to be unreasonable to expect that the two modes of moderation, on the one hand, and firmness and stimulation, on the other, which characterize the virtues of temperance and fortitude respectively, and which are opposed on the inferior level of the sensitive appetite, will be found united on the higher level of prudence. In fact, this is just the case, for to be simply prudent, man must be regulated both from the point

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1. *Ibid.*, q.49, a.3, c. : "Dicendum quod . . . prudentia consistit circa particularia operabilia : in quibus, cum sint quasi infinitae diversitates, non possunt ab uno homine sufficienter omnia considerari, nec per modicum tempus, sed per temporis diuturnitatem. Unde, in his quae ad prudentiam pertinent, maxime indiget homo ab alio erudiri ; et praecipue ex senibus, qui sanum intellectum adepti sunt circa fines operabilium . . . Hoc autem pertinet ad docilitatem, ut aliquis sit bene disciplinae susceptivus. Et ideo convenienter docilitas ponitur pars prudentiae."

2. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.47, aa.4, 5 ; ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, chap.5 ; ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethic.*, lect.4.

3. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.47, a.7, c.

4. Cf. *Ibid.*, a.5, c. : "Sic, ergo, dicendum est quod, cum prudentia sit in ratione . . . diversificatur quidem ab aliis virtutibus intellectualibus, secundum materialem diversitatem obiectorum. Nam sapientia, scientia, et intellectus sunt circa necessaria ; ars autem et prudentia circa contingentia : sed ars, circa factibilia, quae scilicet in exteriori materia constituuntur, sicut domus, cultellus et huiusmodi ; prudentia autem est circa agibilia, quae scilicet in ipso operante consistunt . . . Sed a virtutibus moralibus distinguitur prudentia secundum formalem rationem potentiarum distinctivam ; scilicet : intellectivi, in quo est prudentia ; et appetitivi, in quo est virtus moralis."

5. Cf. CAJETAN, *In Iam IIae*, q.23, a.4, n.4 : "Et cum dicitur quod dispersa inferioris sunt unita superioris, verum est, ceteris paribus."

of view of moderation as well as from that of firmness. In other words, both moderation and firmness are required for prudence. A brief consideration of the acts of prudence will make this statement clearer.

Prudence has three acts ; or, to put it in another way, there are three steps in the prudential act. These are counsel, judgment and command.<sup>1</sup> The first act of prudence is to take counsel, that is, to inquire what means are to be taken to achieve the end desired and intended.

Having deliberated on the various means brought to his attention by either his own research or the suggestion and teaching of another, the prudent person then judges that this is the means conducive to the end he has proposed to himself. He then proceeds to the execution of the work, applying the means to the end.

Prudence must display the mode of firmness especially in commanding. Promptness is definitely needed in the execution of the work, and he who hesitates in this final stage of the prudential act is truly lost. "... And they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation..."<sup>2</sup> That the mode of firmness must characterize this final stage of the prudent action is evident upon examination of the errors or vices which militate against a proper execution of the work.

Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus by defect of *counsel* . . . *precipitation* or *temerity* is a species of imprudence ; by defect of *judgment* . . . , there is *thoughtlessness* ; while *inconstancy* and *negligence* correspond to the *command* which is the proper act of prudence.<sup>3</sup>

Inconstancy implies the abandonment of a good purpose. It has its origin in the inordinateness of the appetite, but it is consummated in the defect of reason which now falters and repudiates what it had

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1. Cf. *Ila Ilae*, q.47, a.8, c. : "Dicendum quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium . . . Unde oportet quod ille sit praecipuus actus prudentiae, qui est praecipuus actus rationis agibilium. Cuius quidem sunt tres actus. Quorum primus est consiliari ; quod pertinet ad inventionem : nam consiliari est quaerere . . . Secundus actus est iudicare de inventis ; et hic sistit speculativa ratio. Sed practica ratio, quae ordinatur ad opus, procedit ulterius ; et est tertius actus eius praecipere : qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliorum et indicatorum ad operandum. Et quia iste actus est propinquior fini rationis practicae : inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicae, et, per consequens, prudentiae."

2. ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, chap.9, 1142 b 4.

3. *Ila Ilae*, q.53, a.2, c. : "Alio modo, secundum partes quasi potentiales prudentiae, quae sunt virtutes adiunctae, et accipiuntur secundum diversos actus rationis. Et, hoc modo : quantum ad defectum consilii, circa quod est eubulia, est *praecipitatio* sive *temeritas*, imprudentiae species ; quantum vero ad defectum iudicii, circa quod sunt *synesis* et *gnome*, est *inconsideratio* ; quantum vero ad ipsum praeceptum, quod est proprius actus prudentiae, est *inconstantia* et *negligentia*."

rightly arrived at. This repudiation arises from a weakness in not firmly holding to the good in spite of the upsurge of contrary passions.<sup>1</sup> From this it is evident that the prudent person must be properly regulated as regards firmness and to prevent such faltering prudence must envelop in itself the mode of firmness. "The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary."<sup>2</sup>

Likewise negligence, being the defect of solicitude, which sees to a speedy execution of what is to be done, may from lack of firmness atrophy command. There is a slight difference between inconstancy and negligence, though both are defects opposed to a proper execution of the work. Inconstancy vitiates execution of the work because it hinders command itself, whereas negligence renders command sterile because it does not have a prompt will to execute it.<sup>3</sup> The prudent person avoids both of these defects because he is properly regulated as regards firmness in pursuing the good work.

Counsel presents a difficulty of another nature. Counsel is, as we have said, the first act of prudence and consists in a certain inquiry in view of determining means conducive to the attainment of the end desired. It is nothing more than a diligent acquisition, ordering and comparing all the various means. It is a careful study of all that one is to know in order to make a prudent choice of suitable means. Aristotle gives a fine description of counsel in the *Ethics* when he writes:

We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade,

1. Cf. *Ibid.*, a.5, c. : "Inconstantia importat recessum quemdam a bono proposito definito. Huiusmodi autem recessus principium quidem habet a vi appetitiva : non enim aliquis recedit a priori bono proposito, nisi propter aliquid quod sibi inordinate placet. Sed iste recessus non consummatur nisi per defectum rationis, quae fallitur in hoc quod repudiat id quod recte acceptaverat ; et quia, cum possit resistere impulsui passionis : si non resistat, hoc est ex debilitate ipsius, quae non tenet se firmiter in bono concepto. Et ideo inconstantia, quantum ad sui consummationem, pertinet ad defectum rationis. Sicut autem omnis rectitudo rationis practicae pertinet aliquantulum ad prudentiam ; ita omnis defectus eiusdem pertinet ad imprudentiam. Et ideo inconstantia, secundum sui consummationem, ad imprudentiam pertinet. Et sicut praecipitatio est ex defectu circa actum consilii : et inconsideratio, circa actum iudicii ; ita inconstantia, circa actum praecepti : ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis esse inconstans, quod ratio deficit in praecipiendo ea quae sunt consiliata et iudicata."

2. *Ibid.*, ad 1 : "Bonum prudentiae participatur in omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Et, secundum hoc, persistere in bono pertinet ad omnes virtutes morales ; praecipue tamen ad fortitudinem, quae patitur maiorem impulsu ad contrarium."

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.54, a.2, ad 3 : "Negligentia est circa actum praecipendi, ad quem etiam pertinet sollicitudo. Aliter tamen circa hunc actum deficit negligens, et aliter inconstans. Inconstans enim deficit, in praecipiendo, quasi ab aliquo impeditus ; negligens autem, per defectum promptae voluntatis."



nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained ; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is produced by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means *this* will be achieved, till they come to the first cause which in order of discovery is last.<sup>1</sup>

The prudent person will come by some of this knowledge through personal reflection and research, but, as St. Thomas says, because of the impossibility of learning all by this method, for much of his knowledge the prudent man must depend on teachers. Aristotle says that " we call in others to aid us in deliberating on important questions." <sup>2</sup>

Now whereas command should be prompt, counsel should proceed slowly. " Nor is it *skill in conjecture* ; for this both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly." <sup>3</sup> In commentary upon this passage, the Angelic Doctor says that prudent counselors deliberate a long time in order to diligently ascertain everything which could have an influence on the work.<sup>4</sup>

*Eubulia* is the virtue which perfects counsel. It is rectitude of counsel in view of an end which is simply good after deliberation on suitable means for a sufficient length of time.<sup>5</sup>

Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.<sup>6</sup>

The error, then, to be avoided in taking counsel is to proceed too quickly. " It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,

1. *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, chap.3, 1112 b 12-20.

2. *Op. cit.*, 1112 b 11.

3. *Ibid.*, VI, chap.9, 1142 b 3-6.

4. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethic.*, lect.8, n.1219 : "... Eubulia enim ... est cum inquisitione rationis, et ex alia parte non est velox, sed magis boni consiliatores consiliantur multo tempore, ut diligenter perquirant omnia quae pertingunt negotium. Unde, et proverbia dicunt, quod oportet ea quae sunt determinata in consilio velociter exequi, sed consiliari tarde."

5. Cf. *op. cit.*, n.1234 : " Ex omnibus ergo quae dicta sunt accipi potest quod *eubulia* est rectitudo consilii ad finem bonum simpliciter per vias congruas et tempore convenienti."

6. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, 1142 b 29-34.

which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful ; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence . . ." <sup>1</sup> Such haste is ruinous of counsel. St. Thomas names this defect precipitation and says that the name, when referring to the acts of the soul, is used metaphorically, according to a certain comparison with corporeal motion. For this latter is said to be precipitate when as the result of some impulsion a body falls at a more speedy rate than it normally would, as when someone slips at the top of a stairs, his descent is precipitate, for he does not follow the ordinary decline of each step. Likewise, reason proceeds precipitously when it moves too quickly to its conclusion, not passing through the proper gradation of middle terms. The proper progression of steps to be followed in taking counsel consists in remembrance of past events, understanding of the present, shrewd insight into future happenings, a certain process of reasoning whereby these are compared and, finally, docility in accepting the decisions of more experienced men of action. The wise counsellor pays strict attention to each of these steps ; but he who omits any of them because of impulse of the will or of passions acts in a precipitous manner.<sup>2</sup> His counsel is faulty and, as a result, his judgment will be rash. His deliberation lacks the moderation which should be the proper mark of counsel. In other words, such a one is not properly regulated from the point of view of moderation.

We are now in a position to understand the role of docility in counsel and, by extension, its role in every acquisition of knowledge through discipline. Precipitation is the ruination of counsel, which is to proceed with due reflection for a sufficient time. Thus, to take counsel properly, one must be so disposed that he will give sufficient time to properly acquiring the knowledge prerequisite to the selection of means to the end. To be so disposed, the person has to be resolved not to omit the protracted exercise of memory and reason, and also not to neglect because of pride and contempt, consulting and listening

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1. *IIa IIae*, q.127, a.1, ad 2 : " Operatio festina commendabilis est, post consilium, quod est actus rationis. Sed si quis ante consilium vellet festine agere, non esset hoc laudabile, sed vitiosum : esset enim quaedam praecipitatio actionis, quod est vitium prudentiae oppositum . . . "

2. Cf. *op. cit.*, q.53, a.3, c. : " Praecipitatio in actibus animae metaphorice dicitur, secundum similitudinem a corporali motu acceptam. Dicitur autem praecipitari, secundum corporalem motum, quod a superiori in ima pervenit secundum impetum quemdam proprii motus vel alicuius impellentis, non ordinate descendendo per gradus. Summum autem animae est ipsa ratio. Imum autem est operatio per corpus exercita. Gradus autem medii, per quos oportet ordinate descendere, sunt memoria praeteritorum, intelligentia praesentium, solertia in considerandis futuris eventibus, ratiocinatio conferens unum alteri, docilitas per quam aliquis acquiescit sententiis maiorum : per quos quidem gradus aliquis ordinate descendit, recte consiliando. Si quis autem feratur ad agendum per impetum voluntatis vel passionis, pertransitis huiusmodi gradibus, erit praecipitatio. "

to the teaching of men of experience, <sup>1</sup> for to omit any of these is to be guilty of precipitation.<sup>2</sup>

Now the two integral parts of prudence which St. Thomas assigns to perfecting the very acquisition of knowledge are docility, which makes for a good reception of teaching from others ; and shrewdness (*solertia*) which perfects discovery.<sup>3</sup> Shrewdness, by definition, is a swift conjecture of the means.<sup>4</sup> So that if one is to be properly disposed for the gradual and ordered acquisition of knowledge which counsel requires, it seems that such moderation must be given by docility. In other words, docility assures that the prudent person is so regulated from the point of view of moderation that he does not omit any of the steps in that acquisition of knowledge which wise counsel requires. Thus, we can say that docility secures for prudence the mode of moderation in acquiring the knowledge necessary for counsel, which moderation is the proper mark of counsel. In consequence, to docility itself is to be attributed the mode of moderation.

The explanation of the relationship of docility to prudence which Aquinas gives in his commentary on the *Sentences*, though much less detailed than that contained in the *Summa Theologica*, leads to this same conclusion as to the role of docility. According to the argument of the *Sentences*, docility serves to remove one of the three obstacles which could vitiate foresight. Foresight, circumspection, caution and docility are all required for prudence inasmuch as practical reason is dependent upon this virtue for its decision for the future based upon information drawn from past events, modified by present circumstances. Through foresight the prudent person not only has to find means accommodated to the end but also has to remove anything which might impede the attainment of the end. There are three possible hindrances to foresight. The first of these concerns the means itself, which may seem good but in reality is not. Caution prevents the selection of such an apparently suitable means, for it discerns between true virtues and vices which have the appearance of virtue. A second hindrance may intervene and prevent a truly suitable means

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1. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.49, a.3, ad 2 : " Docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent : secundum aptitudinem quidem, est a natura : sed, ad eius consummationem, plurimum valet studium : dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec contemnens propter superbiam."

2. Cf. *op. cit.*, q.53, a.2, c. : " Quod autem aliquis deficiat a docilitate, vel memoria, vel ratione, pertinet ad praecipitationem."

3. Cf. *op. cit.*, q.48, a. un., c. : " Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio : quae fit, vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet *docilitas* ; vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet *eustochia*, quae est *bona coniecturatio*. Huius autem pars . . . est *solertia*, quae est *velox coniecturatio medii* . . ."

4. Cf. *Ibid.*



from attaining the end. Circumspection looks after this obstacle by preventing interference from contrary vices. Finally, the prudent person may not be able to find means conducive to the end. And, in such an event, he must seek advice from others. It is docility which disposes him to a facile reception of this teaching from others.<sup>1</sup>

Docility, then, is included among the integral parts of prudence because, by reason of its mode of moderation, it rectifies man's appetite in such a way that he is disposed to make use of all the means of learning which the proper acquisition of knowledge requires ; and, in the matter of prudence, not the least of these is recourse to the teaching and advice of others. Docility renders the prudent person apt not only to receive well teaching from others but also apt to solicit frequently and carefully the aid of teachers and to reverently heed what those teachers have to say. It thus prevents the disciple's too infrequent recourse to teachers as well as moderates his pride and self-assertiveness, which would be serious obstacles to the acceptance of the doctrine given by the teachers once consulted.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. *Docility and Acquisition of Knowledge in General*

This is the only point we have been seeking to assert about docility, namely, that docility is characterized by moderation, and that the quality of docility in the student regulates, by moderating it, his appetite, making it receptive to teaching given by others. This is the

1. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In III Sent.*, d.33, q.3, a.1, sol.2, nn.274-277, pp.1074, 1075 : "Requiruntur enim ad prudentiam, secundum quod de futuris conjectat (non) ex parte praeteritorum et praesentium, ex quibus procedit. Oportet enim prudentem viam accommodam ad finem intentum invenire — quod per [*providentiam*] facit quae est praesens notio futurum pertractans eventum — et iterum prohibentia remove.

275. "Contingit autem providentiam tripliciter impediri. Uno modo ex parte ipsius viae inveniendae, quae quandoque videtur bona et non est ; et hoc impedimentum *cautio* aufert, cuius est a virtutibus vitia virtutum speciem praeferentia discernere.

276. "*Alio modo* ex ordine ipsius in finem, ne scilicet via quae de se apta est ad finem, aliquo extrinseco impediatur ne in finem ducere possit ; et hoc ad *circumspectionem* pertinet quae est cautela vitiorum contrariorum, quibus praecipue prudentia impeditur.

277. "*Tertio modo* ex parte ipsius hominis tendentis in finem qui vias accommodas ad finem intentum invenire non potest. Unde oportet quod per doctrinam ab aliis accipiat ; quia principia operabilia vel a se habere prudentem vel ab alio faciliter accipere. Qui autem neutrum habet, hic inutilis est vir . . . Et sic est *docilitas* passive dicta. Si autem docilitas accipitur *active*, tunc pertinebit ad prudentiam secundum suum perfectissimum esse, prout scilicet non solum sibi, sed etiam aliis quae sunt utilia ad finem inventi ; et sic dicitur prudentia erudiendi imperitos."

2. Cf. *Ila Ilae*, q.49, a.3, ad 2 : "Docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent : secundum aptitudinem quidem, est a natura ; sed, ad eius consummationem, plurimum valet humanum studium : dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec contemnens propter superbiam."

role of docility in prudence ; and we feel that it exercises this same role in the other intellectual virtues.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. *Growth in Docility*

That moderation is the mode which characterizes docility seems to be corroborated by a short study of two virtues which aid greatly in the acquisition of this virtue or quality of soul. In this connection it may not be out of place to note that for docility, as well as for the other parts of prudence, and, in fact, for all the moral virtues, too, nature may give man a certain aptitude and facility, which may even be designated as proximate dispositions to virtue.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, for the full flowering and perfection of docility, education and training are of great value.

Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility : and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride.<sup>3</sup>

As can be readily supposed, humility aids greatly in the acquisition of docility. Pride is a fatal obstacle to learning from another, for the proud man refuses to learn from either God or man.

Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to MATTH., XI, 25, *Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent*, i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, and *hast revealed them to little ones*, i.e. to the humble. Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (*Eccles.*, VI, 34) : *If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction*. The other knowledge of truth is affectionate, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth . . .<sup>4</sup>

1. Cf. *Ibid.*, ad 1 : " Dicendum quod, etsi docilitas utilis sit ad quamlibet virtutem intellectualem : praecipue tamen ad prudentiam pertinet . . . "

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethic.*, lect.9, nn.1250-1252 ; lect.11, nn.1275-1279.

3. *IIa IIae*, q.49, a.3, ad 2.

4. *Op. cit.*, q.162, a.3, ad 1 : " Cognitio veritatis est duplex. — Una, pure speculativa. Et hanc superbia indirecte impedit, subtrahendo causam. Superbus enim neque Deo intellectum suum subiicit, ut ab eo veritatis cognitionem percipiat, secundum illud MATTH., XI, 25 : *Abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus*, id est, superbis, qui sibi sapientes et prudentes videntur, et *revelasti ea parvulis*, id est, humilibus. Neque etiam ab hominibus addiscere dignantur : cum tamen dicatur *Eccli.*, VI, 34 : *Si inclinaveris aurem tuam, scilicet humiliter audiendo, excipies doctrinam*. — Alia autem est cognitio veritatis, scilicet affectiva. Et talem cognitionem veritatis directe impedit superbia. Quia superbi, dum delectantur in propria excellentia, excellentiam veritatis fastidiunt . . . "

Thus humility, which restrains and moderates man's pride and self-assertiveness, puts him in a favorable position to learn from teachers. It causes the disciple to distrust his own ability and makes him realize his native incapacity to master all truth by his own efforts. Such a humble attitude towards truth and its teacher makes the student docile. Docility thus would seem to have a close kinship to humility, and, in a certain sense, to follow from it.

Meekness, another potential part of temperance, which represses and moderates the passion of anger,<sup>1</sup> greatly facilitates docility. For meekness sees to it that "man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger."<sup>2</sup> Thus, the meek readily accept teaching from those who are supposed to have the truth. And by so disposing the disciple, meekness is no inconsiderable help to docility.

So closely is docility allied with the moderating virtues of humility and meekness that it, too, may be regarded as exercising a moderating role.

From our detailed analysis of the integral parts of prudence, and especially of those parts which perfect the act of counsel, the role of docility has been delineated. Docility is necessary to prudence because prudence requires wise counsel and deliberation about the means most suitable for the attainment of a desired end. That the counsel be complete and perfect, one must acquire all the knowledge he can about the various possible means. To obtain such knowledge not only must the prudent person make use of personal reflection, but, because of the vastness and uncertainty of the matter of prudence, he must have recourse to the teachings of experienced men of action. If this latter teaching is to be of any value to him, then the prudent person must be prepared and disposed to accept this teaching. This is where docility enters the picture. It will serve to moderate all haste in taking counsel, and will thus assure that sufficient consultation with others is made and that the disciple "carefully and reverently" heeds the sage advice of his elders.

Because, as St. Thomas says, docility is useful not only to prudence but to all the intellectual virtues, since they all are acquired by way of

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1. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.157, a.1, c.: "... Nam ex passione irae provocatur aliquis ad hoc quod graviorem inferat poenam. Ad clementiam autem pertinet directe quod sit diminutiva poenarum: quod quidem impediri posset per excessum irae. Et ideo mansuetudo, inquantum refrenat impetum irae, concurret in eundem effectum cum clementia. Differunt tamen ab invicem, inquantum clementia est moderativa exterioris punitionis; mansuetudo autem proprie diminuit passionem irae."

2. *Ibid.*, a.4, ad 1: "Dicendum quod mansuetudo praeeparat hominem ad Dei cognitionem, removendo impedimentum. Et, hoc, dupliciter. Primo quidem, faciendo hominem compotem sui per diminutionem irae... Alio modo, quia ad mansuetudinem pertinet quod homo non contradicat verbis veritatis; quod plerumque aliqui faciunt ex commotione irae."



learning, we concluded that docility will exercise its moderating function in every acquisition of discipline, whether that be in the matter of prudence or in the larger field of knowledge in general.

### III. STUDIOUSNESS

There is, in man, a natural desire for knowledge. This is the thought with which Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics*. "All men by nature," he says, "desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight."<sup>1</sup>

But in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the same Aristotle laid down as a condition for achieving the virtuous mean, and thereby acquiring virtues, the avoidance of those things to which we are most naturally inclined, either by our individual make-up and temperament, or in common with other men.

But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it impartially . . . ; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray.<sup>2</sup>

In commenting upon these passages, St. Thomas says that he who wishes to acquire virtue must look to that to which his appetite most naturally moves in order that he may direct himself to the contrary of that to which he is inclined by nature or custom. Furthermore, states Aquinas, since all men are naturally inclined to seek pleasure, it follows that to become virtuous men must steer clear of pleasures.<sup>3</sup>

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1. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, I, chap.1, 980 a 22-24. Cf. ST. THOMAS's commentary on this.

2. *Ethics*, II, chap.9, 1109 b 1-11.

3. Cf. *In II Ethics*, lect.11, nn.374-377: "... Et dicit quod oportet eum qui vult fieri virtuosus attendere quid sit illud ad quod magis appetitus eius natus est moveri: diversi enim ad diversa naturaliter magis inclinantur. Ad quid autem unusquisque naturaliter inclinatur, cognoscere potest ex delectatione et tristitia quae circa ipsum fit; quia unicuique est delectabile id quod est sibi conveniens secundum naturam.

375. "Unde si aliquis in aliqua actione vel passione multum delectetur, signum est quod naturaliter inclinatur in illud. Homines autem vehementer tendunt ad ea ad quae naturaliter inclinantur. Et ideo de facili circa hoc homo transcendit medium. Et propter hoc oportet quod in contrarium nos attrahamus quantum possumus . . .

376. "Et est hic considerandum quod haec via acquirendi virtutes est efficacissima; ut, scilicet homo nitatur ad contrarium eius ad quod inclinatur vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine . . .

From these two preliminaries, it is not a long step to the positing in the virtuous man of some virtue which will regulate, by moderating and checking, this natural desire for knowledge. Nor could it be considered premature were it to be stated that such a virtue will in some way be connected to temperance, for, as has been shown in an earlier part, the cardinal virtue of temperance is characterized by a mode of restraint and moderation, and any other virtue whose mode comprises a type of moderation is to be joined to temperance as one of its potential parts.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise, in view of the discussion about modesty which has just been concluded, it may also be stated that not only will such a virtue be a potential part of temperance but also that it will be such a potential part as to be at the same time one of the species of modesty. For modesty, understood as a general virtue, is that potential part of temperance which moderates those diverse matters which need to be moderated, but in which there is found only the ordinary and no special difficulty to the achievement of this moderation.<sup>2</sup> And among these matters which present but an ordinary difficulty of moderation is included the desire of things regarding knowledge, which thus gives rise to a species of modesty known as studiousness. "... And held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation . . . The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by *studiousness*, which is opposed to curiosity."<sup>3</sup>

At this point, after having studied in detailed fashion both temperance and general modesty, but not yet having considered the various species of modesty, we may claim a certain, though as yet a rudimentary and confused, knowledge of studiousness. According to this quasi-premature knowledge, studiousness is a moral virtue which moderates a matter which presents but ordinary difficulty of moderation, for it is a species of modesty, which in turn shares the mode of temperance; and it has something to do with knowledge, the desire of knowledge and whatever else may pertain to knowledge. This is but a skeleton within which a more precise and illuminating analysis of studiousness is to take form.

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377. "Et hoc etiam documentum sumitur ex parte nostri: non quidem secundum id quod est proprium unicuique, ut dictum est de secundo documento; sed secundum id quod est commune omnibus. Omnes enim naturaliter inclinantur ad delectationes. Et ideo dicit quod universaliter maxime debent tendentes in virtutem cavere sibi a delectationibus: propter hoc enim quod homines maxime inclinantur in delectationem delectabilia apprehensa de facili movent appetitum . . ."

1. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.143, a. un.

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.160, aa.1, 2.

3. *Ibid.*, a.2, c.: "... Ponens modestiam circa omnia quae relinquuntur moderanda . . . Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem; in hoc moderatur *studiositas*, quae opponitur curiositati."

It may not be out of place here to state clearly the reason for this detailed consideration of studiousness. As we have explained, wonder, the beginning of philosophy, contains both a desire to know the truth and a fear of error and falsehood in coming to that knowledge. That man's pursuit of knowledge and truth be a truly human one each of these aspects of wonder must be rectified by moral virtue. For unless man's desire for knowledge is controlled, it will become so dissolute as to defeat its very purpose. Consequently, in man there is posited a need for a moral virtue which will govern his quest for knowledge by making his natural desire to know subservient to the demands of right reason.

The study of temperance and its parts had led to the discovery of such a moral virtue. Studiousness, a species of modesty, is directed towards knowledge and the desire for knowledge as its subject-matter. A thorough consideration of studiousness will lead to an understanding of the moral rectification of this first aspect of wonder.

In our study of the virtue of studiousness, we shall treat first of all with the matter of this virtue ; secondly, with the mode of reason it introduces into this subject-matter ; thirdly, with the subject of this virtue ; fourthly, with the vices opposed to it. A fifth and last point will comprise some brief remarks on the use of the terms " studiousness " and " curiosity ".

### 1. *Subject-matter of Studiousness*

Studiousness, as we have just said, is a species of modesty and, therefore, a potential part of temperance. This means that studiousness moderates some of those matters less difficult to master and control than are the concupiscences of touch and the effervescence of anger ; for these two matters were already excluded from the matter of the general virtue of modesty.<sup>1</sup> The particular matter with which studiousness, or studious application as the French renders the Latin *studiositas*, deals is knowledge. This, of course, needs to be made more precise. Aquinas's first statement on the subject had mentioned studiousness as being the species of modesty which moderates the " desire of things pertaining to knowledge." <sup>2</sup> But when he moves on to a more thorough and, as it were, *ex officio* consideration of this virtue, he says without equivocation that knowledge is the proper matter of studiousness.<sup>3</sup> And his argument in stating this is very straightforward. Studiousness is the state of being studious, and one

1. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.160, a.2, c.

2. *Ibid.* : "... Ponens modestiam circa omnia quae relinquuntur moderanda. Quae quidem videntur esse quatuor... Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem : et in hoc moderatur *studiositas*..."

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.166, a.1, c. : " Et ideo *studiositas* proprie dicitur circa cognitionem."



is studious because he is given to study. Study is nothing more than the application of the mind to some problem or question, which application is achieved only in knowing that problem and question. The mind is, then, first concerned with knowledge before dealing with those things in which man is directed by knowledge. The direct object or proper matter of studiousness is obviously knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Sensing the evident objection that knowledge is the concern of the intellectual virtues and not of the moral virtues, thus not of temperance, and by way of further clarification, the Angel of the Schools shows how knowledge can constitute the matter of a moral virtue. In fact, all he does is point out the distinction between the orders of specification and of exercise, a distinction with which we have already treated in the first chapter.

The objection is well put. "Knowledge," it runs, "has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part... Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance."<sup>2</sup>

The reply of the Common Doctor is pregnant with precision and piercing with clarity. Because the will moves to its acts even the reason, there is room to distinguish a double good in reference to knowledge. The first of these concerns the very act of knowledge. And in this connection, it is an intellectual virtue which must assure the good of knowledge. It will be the intellectual virtue of science which will assure a true consideration in Geometry or Metaphysics. Only the intellectual habitus of Geometry can assure a good, that is, true and valid, deduction of any geometrical conclusion. Studiousness, or any other moral virtue, avails us nothing in deriving such a conclusion. But there is another good which engages our attention when we speak of knowledge. This second good is the object of a moral virtue and concerns the act of the appetitive faculty. This latter good consists in man's appetite being properly rectified so that it makes a good and fitting application of the knowing faculty, making sure that the mind is properly applied to right and proper objects of study.

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1. Cf. *Ibid.*: "Studium praecipue importat vehementem applicationem mentis ad aliquid. Mens autem non applicatur ad aliquid nisi cognoscendo illud. Unde per prius mens applicatur ad cognitionem; secundario autem applicatur ad ea in quibus homo per cognitionem dirigitur. Et ideo studium per prius respicit cognitionem: et per posterius quaecumque alia ad quae operanda directione cognitionis indigemus. Virtutes autem proprie sibi attribuant illam materiam circa quam primo et principaliter sunt: ... Et ideo studiositas proprie dicitur circa cognitionem."

Ad 1: "... Et ideo per prius studiositas cognitionem respicit, cuicumque materiae studium adhibeatur."

2. *Ibid.*, a.2, obj.2: "Studiositas, sicut dictum est, ad cognitionem pertinet. Sed cognitio non pertinet ad virtutes morales, quae sunt in appetitiva parte animae, sed magis ad intellectuales, quae sunt in parte cognoscitiva: ... Ergo studiositas non est pars temperantiae."

The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers . . . Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself ; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of studiousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.<sup>1</sup>

Cajetan raises a difficulty whose solution throws no little light on the question at hand. His objection is to the effect that knowledge *in se* is good and does not need the regulation of a virtue. By way of reply, he makes a necessary distinction and one which throws light on St. Thomas's succinct formulation of the same doctrine. Not in knowledge but in man's quest and appetite for knowledge consists the proximate matter of studiousness. It is man's application to knowledge with which this second species of modesty is concerned. In other words, it is the use of the faculties of knowledge in knowing that is the proper matter of studiousness. For use in this sense is an act of the will,<sup>2</sup> and one which needs regulation in order that it be constituted morally good. It can fall short of this moral goodness either because it treats of improper matter, or because of other unpropitious circumstances of time, motivation, etc.<sup>3</sup> This distinction of Cajetan

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1. *Ibid.*, a.2, ad 2 : "Actus cognoscitivae virtutis imperatur a vi appetitiva, quae est motiva omnium virium . . . Et ideo circa cognitionem duplex bonum potest attendi. Unum quidem, quantum ad ipsum actum cognitionis. Et tale bonum pertinet ad virtutes intellectuales : ut scilicet homo circa singula aestimet verum. — Aliud autem est bonum quod pertinet ad actum appetitivae virtutis : ut scilicet homo habeat appetitum rectum applicandi vim cognoscitivam sic vel aliter, ad hoc vel ad illud. Et hoc pertinet ad virtutem studiositatis. Unde computatur inter virtutes morales."

2. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.16, a.1, c.

3. Cf. *In IIam IIae*, q.166, a.1, n.4 : "Ad secundum dubium dicitur quod materia proxima studiositatis non est cognitio, sed *studium cognoscendi*, ut patet in littera. Studium autem cognoscendi cum significet vehementem applicationem hominis ad cognoscendum ; et applicatio . . . significet actum voluntatis qui est *uti* : oportet ut materia studiositatis et curiositatis sit hoc quod dico, *uti potentia cognoscitiva*. Hoc autem quod est *uti potentia cognoscitiva* ad cognoscendum, non est actus moraliter bonus nisi sit in *medietate constitutus prout sapiens determinabit*. Tum quia potest cadere super indebita materia, ut si quis applicet intellectum ad perspicendum supernaturalia . . . ita utens intellectu ad videndum excedentia peccat. Tum propter circumstantias : puta, quando oportet uti intellectu vel sensu, et quando non ; et propter quid oportet, ut scilicet homo non utatur intellectu ad cognoscendum, nisi ad debitum finem.

"Ex differentia igitur inter ipsam cognitionem et studium cognoscendi, apparet solutio dubii. Cognitio siquidem non est materia proxima moralis virtutis : sed ex virtute intellectuali, aut naturali in parte sensitiva, bene vel male se habet. Studium autem cognoscendi, quod est actus voluntatis passive in potentiis cognoscitivis existens, propria est materia appetitus quem moderari oportet per virtutem studiositatis : et manifeste indiget regulatione ad hoc ut bonum moraliter sit."

was already contained in germ in the distinction the Angelic Doctor had made regarding the twofold good of knowledge. In fact, St. Thomas says the very same thing in one of his succeeding articles.

As stated above . . . studiousness is directly, not about knowledge, but about the desire and study in pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally . . .

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong . . .<sup>1</sup>

The opinion of the Carmelites of Salamanca is essentially the same. Study is the subject-matter of studiousness ; and study consists in the use and application of a knowing power to knowing, whether it be the intellect, imagination or memory — even the eyes to seeing — that is, to such effort in both the sensitive and intellective spheres of knowledge. In this application of the knowing power, they distinguish what they prefer to call a *usus passivus* and a *usus activus*. *Usus passivus* is simply the act itself of knowledge, and so regards an intellectual virtue; *usus activus* is the act of the will applying the faculty of knowledge to its acts. Study includes both the *usus activus* and the *usus passivus*, and thus both in some way comprise the matter of studiousness.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the distinction of remote and proximate matter would be more felicitous, as being more consonant with the reality it is meant to explain. Certainly, such a distinction is not foreign to their own line

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1. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, c. : "Sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendae. Aliter autem est iudicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis : et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendae. Ipsa enim veritatis cognitio, per se loquendo, bona est. Potest autem per accidens esse mala . . .

"Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem . . ."

2. Cf. SALMANTICENSES CARMELITARUM DISCALCEATORUM, *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. nova, Parisiis : E. Societate Generali Librariae Catholicae, 1878, Vol.VI, Tract.XII, De Virtutibus, XVI, n.152, p.499. "Sequitur *studiositas*, sic dicta ab studio circa quod versatur . . . Studium autem proprie dicit usum, applicationem, et conatum potentiae cognoscitivae ad cognoscendum : ut imaginationis ad imaginandum, memoriae ad memorandum, intellectus ad discurrendum, oculorum ad videndum, etc. In qua applicatione duo sunt : nempe usus passivus, qui non differt ab actu potentiae applicatae . . . atque adeo ab ipsa cognitione. Et usus activus, qui est actus voluntatis applicantis. Uterque autem usus venit in praesenti nomine studii : et primus se habet ad studiositatem ut obiectum, secundum vero ut actus, vel quem elicit, licet non omnino immediate, vel ad quem disponit.

"Proprius vero et immediatus illius actus est amor et affectus erga studium : huncque perficit, tum moderando ne plura vel altiora scire velit, quam scientis conditioni et capacitati conveniat : ne dum altiora quam oportet, aut aliter quam oportet quaerit, potius in errorem labatur . . . Quo affectu moderato, modum etiam recipit ipsum studium et conatus ad discendum, ut fiat sicut oportet."



of argument, for when they first announce the matter of studiousness, they refer to it as being study or the appetite of knowing.<sup>1</sup>

Joseph Pieper is a good example of a modern Thomist who confirms what the Angelic Doctor taught in the thirteenth century. For him, the matter of studiousness is knowledge, both intellectual and sensitive. He variously refers to studiousness as dealing with "the natural hunger for sense-perception or for knowledge,"<sup>2</sup> "the natural striving for knowledge,"<sup>3</sup> "the urge for knowledge"<sup>4</sup> and "the natural wish to see."<sup>5</sup>

Temperance must hinder man from giving himself in an inordinate manner towards an object to which he is drawn by nature. Man's thirst and desire for knowledge are given to him by the Creator. And studiousness is the particular form of temperance which is to moderate this desire. Through a virtue man's will is rectified in regard to the matter of that virtue; and the virtue of studiousness consists in this that man uses properly his apprehensive powers. There are certain things which certain men must study and know, and this at certain times and for definite purposes. Other pursuits there are which are harmful for certain men, useless at certain times and corruptive of certain ends. Studiousness is the virtue which must regulate and determine all this. Only after a study of the vices opposed to this virtue has been made can one truly appreciate all the obstacles and hindrances to a virtuous application to study. Only when man's appetite is properly regulated by studiousness will his pursuit of the speculative life be a moral activity and worthy of praise. Then only, too, will man avoid the excess of curiosity and the defect of indolence and negligence.

When fully explained it is not at all startling that a moral virtue, one of the species of modesty, called studiousness, has knowledge as its proper matter. Even if the intellect seems to be a faculty somewhat separated from the rest of man's life, there is yet a moral virtue which regulates intellectual activity and striving. This is the role of studiousness, which is a fundamental virtue extending to every matter of knowledge and ruling the very appetite and desire of knowledge.

## 2. *Mode of Studiousness*

Temperance, to repeat what has been said already, is characterized by a mode of restraint and moderation, a bridling influence, by which it

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1. Cf. *Ibid.*, XIV, n.132, p.489. "Studium sive appetitum cognoscendi, ad huiusque moderationem ponitur studiositas."

2. JOSEPH PIEPER, *Fortitude and Temperance*, trans. COOGAN, New York: Pantheon Books, 1954, p.53.

3. *Ibid.*, p.109.

4. *Ibid.*, p.111.

5. *Ibid.*, p.112.

checks the lure of passions of the pleasures and concupiscences of touch and subjects these to the control of reason. That is the *ratio propria* of temperance. Its mode of restraint and moderation separated from this proper matter gives rise to what we designated as the *ratio communis* of this fourth cardinal virtue. And any virtue whose chief reason of praise consists in checking and moderating any other matter is to be classed as a potential part of temperance. Continence, clemency, meekness — these all exert a restraint and control on their various subject-matters. Modesty, the fourth of the potential parts of temperance, is, in the Thomistic arrangement, a quasi-general virtue which gives issue to several species, each of which checks and moderates one of the matters which present no extraordinary difficulty of moderation. One of these species is studiousness whose matter, as we have just pointed out, is knowledge, the study and desire of and the application to knowledge. Being a species of modesty, it follows *a priori* that studiousness should exhibit a kind of moderation and restraint similar to that of the general virtue from which it stems. And this is just what we find when we examine the reality.

Aquinas's first brief mention of studiousness refers to it as performing a restraining and moderating role. "The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by studiousness . . ." <sup>1</sup> And, as he progresses to a deeper study of this unique virtue, the Dominican Doctor gives the thorough-going reason for the faith that is in him. The role of temperance is to moderate the movements of the appetite, thereby assuring that it does not give itself inordinately to that to which it is drawn by nature. Just as man is naturally drawn toward corporeal pleasures, so is there implanted in his soul a natural desire for knowledge. This latter desire has to be regulated by some virtue, just as sexual desires and affections are checked and controlled by chastity. In the domain of knowledge, the virtue of studiousness is to play a parallel role to that played by chastity, sobriety and abstinence in the realm of corporeal desires and pleasures. Studiousness, then, is a check and control on man's desire and appetite for knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

Joseph Pieper does not miss this essential duty of studiousness in checking man's quest for knowledge. He well realizes that temperance must instill its restraint even to the depths of this most noble of man's pursuits.

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1. *IIa IIae*, q.160, a.2, c. : "Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem ; in hoc moderatur *studiositas*, quae opponitur *curiositati*."

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.166, a.2, c. : "... Ad temperentiam pertinet moderari motum appetitus, ne superflue tendat in id quod naturaliter concupiscitur. Sicut autem naturaliter homo concupiscit delectationes ciborum et venereorum, secundum naturam corporalem ; ita, secundum animam, naturaliter desiderat cognoscere aliquid : ... Moderatio autem huius modi appetitus pertinet ad virtutem *studiositatis*. Unde consequens est quod studio-

But we have not, as yet, fully explored the range of the concept of *temperantia*. — In “humility,” the instinctive urge to self-assertion can also be made serviceable to genuine self-preservation, but it can likewise pervert and miss this purpose in “pride.” — And if the natural desire of man to avenge an injustice which he has suffered and to restore his rights explodes in uncontrollable fury, it destroys that which can only be preserved by “gentleness” and “mildness.” Without rational self-restraint even the natural hunger for sense-perception or for knowledge can degenerate into a destructive and pathological compulsive greed ; this degradation Aquinas calls *curiositas*, the disciplined mode *studiositas*.

To sum up : chastity, continence, humility, gentleness, mildness, *studiositas*, are modes of realization of the discipline of temperance ; unchastity, incontinence, pride, uninhibited wrath, *curiositas*, are forms of intemperance.<sup>1</sup>

The Carmelite Fathers explain very well how studiousness exercises its role of moderation. It sees to it that a man does not try to know more nor more abstruse matters than his condition of life and his mental, physical and social capacity warrant. By hindering him from dabbling in matters beyond his ken, studiousness keeps him from error. It also prevents his giving himself to intellectual effort to such an extent that he neglects to cultivate those other virtues more necessary or more useful to his office. Studiousness gives a man a true esteem of and love for study, contemplation and knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

The Angelic Doctor, in another context, has a very worthwhile description of the type of moderation studiousness is to effect. It is true that he is speaking more of supernatural studiousness as he comments upon the Pauline admonition that, “Knowledge puffeth up : but charity edifieth.” But what he there narrates is true, *positis ponendis*, for the acquired virtue, too.

Here the Apostle does not approve of much knowledge, if the mode of knowing is ignored. Moreover the mode of knowing is that you should know in what order, with what eagerness, to what end each thing must be known : in what order, that you should know first that which is more proper

sitas sit pars potentialis temperantiae, sicut virtus secundaria ei adiuncta ut principali virtuti. Et comprehenditur sub modestia, . . .”

1. *Fortitude and Temperance*, p.53, Cf. p.109, where he characterizes *studiositas* as “temperateness in the natural striving for knowledge . . . and experience,” thus indicating that studiousness shares the mode of temperance.

2. Cf. SALMAN., *op. cit.*, XVI, n.152, p.499. “Proprius vero et immediatus illius actus est amor et affectus erga studium : huncque perficit, tum moderando ne plura aut altiora scire velit, quam scientis conditioni et capacitati conveniat : ne dum altiora quam oportet, aut aliter quam oportet quaerit, potius in errorem labatur. Et rursus, ne pluris f[av]eat scientiam quam oportet, praeponendo illam aliis virtutibus ad salutem necessariis, vel magis conducentibus ; sed eam aestimet et amet in suo gradu. Quo affectu moderato, modum etiam recipit ipsum studium et conatus ad discendum, ut fiet sicut oportet.”



for salvation ; with what eagerness, that you should seek with greater ardor that which is more efficacious to inflame love ; to what end, that you should not wish to know anything for vainglory and curiosity, but for your own and your neighbor's edification.<sup>1</sup>

What we have been describing shows how studiousness imposes its moderation on all excessive attraction for and effort in view of knowledge. But another disorder is possible, even frequent, in this domain. It is the attitude which characterizes the "slacker," who is too listless to make the effort involved in pursuing knowledge in accordance with his state and duties of life. In other words, studiousness has to determine the mean between too little and too much effort, between excess and defect in its own subject-matter. The virtue of studiousness has to be a remedy not only for the too keen effort and desire of knowledge but also for the too feeble and weak-willed application to study, the defect in this realm. It overcomes the superfluous effort by repressing and bridling man's appetite and desire to know, as we have already said. But the defect in this matter can be surmounted, not by repression, since it is already a lack of effort and push ; but rather by stimulating and inciting man to give forth the constant effort which studiousness requires, and that in spite of the pain and trouble which the labor of studious application may involve. St. Thomas puts this whole matter much more clearly and summarily.

As the Philosopher says . . . in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things ; and so it behoves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately : whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things ; and from this it takes its name.<sup>2</sup>

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1. ST. THOMAS, *In Omnes S. Pauli Epistolas Commentaria*, Vol. I, Marietti (Taurini), 1929, *In Iam Epistolam ad Corinthios*, cap. VIII, lect. 1, p. 297. "Hic non approbat Apostolus multa scientem, si modum sciendi nescierit. Modus enim sciendi est, ut scias quo ordine, quo studio, quo fine scire quaeque oporteat : quo ordine, ut id prius quod maturius ad salutem ; quo studio, ut id ardentius quod efficacius est ad amorem ; quo fine, ut non ad inanem gloriam vel curiositatem velle aliquid, sed ad aedificationem tui et proximi."

2. *IIa IIae*, q. 166, a. 2, ad 3 : "Sicut Philosophus dicit . . . , ad hoc quod homo fiat virtuosus, oportet quod servet se ab his ad quae maxime inclinatur natura. Et inde est quod quia natura praecipue inclinatur ad timendum mortis pericula, et ad sectandum delectabilia carnis : ideo laus virtutis fortitudinis praecipue consistit in quadam firmitate per-

It will be recalled that we characterized the modes of temperance and fortitude as being contrary one to the other. Temperance displays a mode of restraint ; it holds back an appetite that is straining at the bit to break forth to follow the infinite whims of its fancy in the desires and concupiscences of touch. Fortitude, by contrast, is characterized by a mode of stimulation ; it strengthens and arouses an appetite which is already shrinking from the duty-call of reason, because blinded by frightening passions and foreboding dangers. It was in view of these contrary tendencies of man when faced with the problem of knowledge and his application to it that we made a special point of singling out the contrariety of mode found in these two cardinal virtues. Each of these tendencies has to be mastered and made virtuous in the good student ; and it is studiousness which will administer this regulation.

This is the very pith of our argument in this essay, which can be resumed in the rather simple and unpretentious statement that among the virtues which govern man's use of and quest for knowledge there are virtues of moderation and not only of stimulation. And now here the very antithesis of our position seems affirmed by the Universal Doctor. Too many, alas ! have seen in the question of the student faced with the task of applying himself to learning and knowledge only this one facet, namely, the tendency of the body to shirk the disagreeable and costly effort which study demands. They have thought this the only possible disorder in man's intellectual pursuit ; this was the only rectification necessary. With this in mind they have adopted as their watchword a rather catchy but nonetheless misleading slogan, "Courage to think." And, in the name of this false courage, they have gone on to disparage any system of education which argues for a control and check on the student's appetite and desire for knowledge, insisting that it is not a restraint that is needed, but rather an unhampered devotion and attention to learning, thus affirming that not temperance but fortitude is to be the basic governing influence on the natural human desire to know.

It cannot be gainsaid that the appetite does need an impulsion and incitement and stimulant to overcome the drudgery and fatigue and constant discipline which are a necessary part of the student's life. Without such a pressure and aid the student may well lack the

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*sistendi contra huiusmodi pericula ; et laus virtutis temperantiae in quadam refrenatione a delectabilibus carnis. Sed quantum ad cognitionem est in homine contraria inclinatio. Quia ex parte animae inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret ; et, sic, oportet ut laudabiliter homo huiusmodi appetitum refraenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendat. Ex parte vero naturae corporalis, homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet. Quantum ergo ad primum, studiositas in refrenatione consistit ; et, secundum hoc, ponitur pars temperantiae. Sed quantum ad secundum, laus virtutis huiusmodi consistit in quadam vehementia intentionis ad scientiam rerum percipiendam ; et ex hoc nominatur."*

proper diligence in his quest for knowledge and truth, or may even completely abandon this praiseworthy avocation. To be sure, one of the roles of studiousness does consist in giving this stimulant and motivation to the appetite. In fact, as the Angelic Doctor has said, it is from this element of studiousness that it derives its name.<sup>1</sup>

But we feel that this text of St. Thomas does not infirm nor invalidate our argument; rather, in pithy phrase, it is our thesis, which this essay does but expand.

Aquinas speaks in the first place of the contrary tendencies in regard to knowledge. One of these tendencies is rooted in and springs from the soul of man. "For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things..."<sup>2</sup> And this desire needs a restraint. The other tendency in the face of study is to back away from what seems like the insurmountable effort and very great expenditure of labor involved. This cowardly retreat is the reaction of the body, as could be expected. "...Whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge."<sup>3</sup> This second tendency to retreat would seem to be another of the numerous instances of the dire results of the *necessitatis materiae*.

However, the Angelic Doctor himself gives the resolution to the problem when he states that the first function, that is, the curbing and restraining of the soul's desire to know, is the more essential element of studiousness, whereas the second function, the stimulating and pushing-on of the appetite to conquer the effort, is the concern of studiousness only because it is an obstacle which must be removed — an obstacle which would not exist, indeed, in the angel's application to study and knowledge. Yet the angel's desire to know did need a curbing, as the case of Lucifer and the other fallen angels demonstrated.

The curbing of the desire to know, then, is, in the words of Aquinas himself, "more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle."<sup>4</sup>

1. Cf. SALMAN., *loc. cit.*, p.499: "Proprius vero et immediatus illius actus est amor et affectus erga studium: huncque perficit... Tum etiam impellendo et incitando appetitum, ne propter laborem et fatigationem quae studio admiscuntur, ab illo retrahatur, aut sufficientem diligentiam non adhibeat. Et quia hoc posterius plerisque accedit, nominata fuit praedicta virtus ab officio impellendi, potius quam ab officio refragandi. Unde quantum ad illud quod nomen ex vi sua denotat, imitatur fortitudinem, possetque inter partes eius potentiales referri."

2. *Ila Ilae*, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "...Quia ex parte animae inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret..."

3. *Ibid.*: "...Ex parte vero naturae corporalis, homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet."

4. *Ibid.*: "...Primum autem est essentialius huic virtuti quam secundum. Nam appetitus cognoscendi per se respicit cognitionem, ad quam ordinatur studiositas. Sed labor



For this reason, studiousness is more correctly considered a potential part of temperance than of fortitude, its name notwithstanding. And this being so, its mode is a restraining and controlling one, directly attaining the desire of the spiritual soul of man, placed therein by nature, to know and seek the knowledge of things.<sup>1</sup>

We have no hesitation in stating that any campaign to ameliorate the problem of the student's application to study should adopt as its slogan a phrase which is very Thomistic and very true, but which has been badly received in liberal circles. Though there may be no "eggheads" to carry the placards, there will be plenty of honest intellectual plodders to go along with a "Meditate but moderate" campaign.

### 3. *The Subject of Studiousness*

In his analysis of studiousness, Aquinas does not make direct mention of the subject of this virtue. He may well have felt that an explicit statement about the subject of studiousness was unnecessary. Being a moral virtue, studiousness must obviously be found in man's appetitive faculty. But this is twofold, embracing the sensitive appetite, both concupiscible and irascible, and the intellective appetite or the will. To which of these is studiousness to be assigned as to its subject?

There seems to be little doubt but that studiousness is to be attributed to the will. St. Thomas suggests this reply when he speaks of the second good of knowledge and in that frame of reference says that the role of studiousness consists in assuring that man's appetite is directed aright in applying the cognitive power to the act of knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Since it is the will which is charged with this function of applying all other powers to their acts, it is but logical to conclude that the will is the subject of studiousness.

This conclusion seems justified when one considers the matter of studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. For, as we have seen, the matter of studiousness and curiosity is not only sense knowledge but

addiscendi est impedimentum quoddam cognitionis ; unde respicitur ab hac virtute per accidens, quasi removendo prohibens."

1. Cf. SALMAN., *loc. cit.* "Sed adiungitur potius temperantiae, quia difficultas, quae est in moderando studii appetitum, magis per se habet ad virtutem, utpote tenens se ex parte animae, in qua est inclinatio et propensio ad cognoscendum, quam illa quae est in impellendo, quae provenit ex impedimentis se tenentibus ex parte corporis."

2. Cf. *Ila IIae*, q.166, a.2, ad 2 : "Actus cognoscitivae virtutis imperatur a vi appetitiva, quae est motiva omnium virium . . . Et ideo circa cognitionem duplex bonum potest attendi. — Unum quidem, quantum ad ipsum actum cognitionis. Et tale bonum pertinet ad virtutes intellectuales : ut scilicet homo circa singula aestimet verum. — Aliud autem bonum est quod pertinet ad actum appetitivae virtutis : ut scilicet homo habeat appetitum rectum applicandi vim cognoscitivam sic vel aliter, ad hoc vel ad illud. Et hoc pertinet ad virtutem studiositatis. Unde computatur inter virtutes morales."

also intellective, even praeternatural and supernatural knowledge. Because of the elevation of these latter above the realm of the senses, it follows, as Cajetan points out, that the virtue as well as the vice which regard this matter must be placed in a higher faculty than the sense appetite, that is, in the will.<sup>1</sup>

But precisely because of its double matter, that is, sensitive and intellective knowledge, studiousness would seem to require as subject not only the will but also the sensitive appetite. St. Thomas gives us the principles for solving this difficulty when he speaks of the subject of humility and pride, which pose the same problem in reference to their matter.

In seeking to determine the subject of pride, St. Thomas says that the subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object, since the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Since pride is the desire of one's own excellence, its proper object is something difficult. Hence pride must in some way pertain to the irascible appetite. But the irascible may be taken in two ways : first, in a strict sense, and, taken in this way, it is a part of the sensitive appetite. It may also be understood in a broader sense so as to belong also to the will.

If the difficult thing which is the object of pride were always and only some sensible object to which the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be posited in the irascible appetite, understood in its first sense as being but part of man's sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and spiritual things, it must needs be that pride is in the will inasmuch as it includes in an eminent manner the formalities of both the irascible and concupiscible appetite. Understood in this broader sense, the irascible is not distinct from the concupiscible.<sup>2</sup> The

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1. Cf. CAJETAN, *In IIam IIae*, qq.166, 167, n.1 : "In quaestionibus duabus simul . . . de studiositate et curiositate duo dubia occurrunt. *Primum*, de subiecto studiositatis et curiositatis . . . Et ratio dubii est quia ex parte materiae apparet quod in voluntate sint subiective : quia, cognoscere, quod est materia utriusque, non arctatur ad cognitionem sensitivam, sed comprehendit etiam cognitionem intellectivam . . . Ex hoc enim quod materia est altior omni sensibili et imaginabili, sequitur quod ad appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, spectet : sicut de humilitate et superbia ex simili ratione conclusum est.

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"Ad *primum dubium* dicitur quod, quia obiectum studiositatis est altius quid quam sint sensibilia et naturalia, quoniam extendit se ad cognitionem tam intellectivam quam sensitivam, tam naturalem quam super et praeter naturalem, ut patet ex hoc quod curiositatis vitium circa haec omnia versari ponitur ; consequens est ut studiositas subiective in voluntate sit principaliter, secundario autem in concupiscibili, sicut de superbia dictum fuit ex simili ratione."

2. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.162, a.3, c. : "Subiectum cuiuslibet virtutis vel vitii oportet inquirere ex proprio obiecto. Non enim potest esse aliud obiectum habitus vel actus, nisi quod est obiectum potentiae, quae utrique subiicitur. Proprium autem obiectum

intellective appetite does not admit of such differentiation of powers. Since the object of the will is good according to the common notion of good, it is, in consequence, not differentiated according to special differences which may be contained under that common notion. It is for this reason that we may not speak of the will as being divided into distinct irascible and concupiscible powers.<sup>1</sup>

Under a certain aspect, however, the will may be thought of as irascible or concupiscible. It may be said to be irascible inasmuch as it wills to repel evil, not from any movement of passion, but from a judgment of reason. And similarly it may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. This is what is meant when charity and hope are sometimes said to be in the concupiscible and irascible appetites respectively.<sup>2</sup> And this is what is meant, too, when it is stated that the will in an eminent manner includes in itself the formalities of both the irascible and concupiscible powers.

This same argument is applicable to the question of determining the subject of studiousness. If the desire which studiousness regulates referred to the knowledge of sensible things only, then studiousness

superbiae est arduum : est enim appetitus propriae excellentiae . . . Unde oportet quod superbia aliquo modo ad vim irascibilem pertineat.

"Sed irascibilis dupliciter accipi potest. — Uno modo, proprie. Et, sic, est pars appetitus sensitivi ; sicut et ira proprie sumpta est quaedam passio appetitus sensitivi. — Alio modo potest accipi irascibilis largius, scilicet ut pertineat etiam ad appetitum intellectivum, cui etiam quandoque attribuitur ira, prout scilicet attribuimus iram Deo et angelis, non quidem secundum passionem, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae iudicantis. Et tamen irascibilis sic communiter dicta non est potentia distincta a concupiscibili . . .

"Si ergo arduum quod est obiectum superbiae, esset solum aliquid sensibile, in quod posset tendere appetitus sensitivus : oporteret quod superbia esset in irascibili quae est pars appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia arduum quod respicit superbia, communiter invenitur et in sensibilibus et in spiritualibus rebus : necesse est dicere quod subiectum superbiae sit irascibilis non solum proprie sumpta, prout est pars appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam communius accepta, prout invenitur in appetitu intellectivo."

1. Cf. *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.5, c. : "Irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia . . . potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas . . . Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni : quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo, secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi. Nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae. Irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit, in appetitu intellectivo, alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis : sicut etiam, ex parte intellectus, non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus."

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, ad 2 : "Ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis ; et, eodem modo, potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes, id est in voluntate, secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus."



would be assigned to the concupiscible appetite alone, understood in its strict sense, as forming part of the sensitive appetite. But since the desire which studiousness regulates extends to intellective knowledge as well as to sensitive knowledge, then it will necessarily claim as its subject not the concupiscible appetite strictly so-called, but the will itself as including in an eminent manner the concupiscible faculty, too. This is what Cajetan means when he says that studiousness is subjected in the will principally, secondarily in the concupiscible appetite.<sup>1</sup>

There may be some doubt regarding the particular formality under which the will is the subject of studiousness. Is it under its irascible or concupiscible formality that the will becomes the subject of the virtue of studiousness? It seems to us that it is according to its concupiscible aspect that the will is the subject of studiousness. For man looks upon knowledge and truth as something most pleasing and suitable to him, which is the aspect under which the concupiscible regards its object. It is only accidentally that the acquisition of knowledge and truth takes on the aspect of an arduous good, difficult of attainment. For, as Aquinas says, the desire for knowledge is a desire of the soul, whereas it is on the part of his bodily nature that man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. If this latter tendency of man be considered, the acquisition of truth and knowledge might possibly be considered an arduous good. But the desire for knowledge is more essential to studiousness, since only accidentally and indirectly is this virtue concerned with the trouble and effort of learning, which it treats as an obstacle to be removed.<sup>2</sup> In view of this fact, it seems to us that it is under its concupiscible aspect that the will is the subject of studiousness.

The assigning of the will as the subject of studiousness raises another difficulty. St. Thomas teaches elsewhere that the will, in respect to the good of reason proportionate to it, has no need of virtue, but is inclined thereto sufficiently by its very nature. Only when man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as the Divine good, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, only in these

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1. Cf. *In IIam IIae*, q.166, a.1, n.3: "... Consequens est ut studiositas subjective in voluntate sit principaliter, secundario autem in concupiscibili..."

2. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "... Sed quantum ad cognitionem est in homine contraria inclinatio. Quia ex parte animae inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret; et, sic, oportet ut laudabiliter homo huiusmodi appetitum refrenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendat. Ex parte vero naturae corporalis homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet. Quantum ergo ad primum, studiositas in refrenatione consistit et, secundum hoc, ponitur pars temperantiae. Sed quantum ad secundum, laus virtutis huiusmodi consistit in quadam vehementia intentionis ad scientiam rerum percipiendam; et ex hoc nominatur. Primum autem est essentialius huic virtuti quam secundum. Nam appetitus cognoscendi per se respicit cognitionem, ad quam ordinatur studiositas. Sed labor addiscendi est impedimentum quoddam cognitionis; unde respicitur ab hac virtute per accidens, quasi removendo prohibens."

cases does the will require the rectification of virtues such as charity and justice.<sup>1</sup>

Cajetan does not fail to see this possible argument against his conclusion to the effect that studiousness has the will as its subject. Since studiousness seems ordered to the proper good of its possessor, namely, to the rectitude of his desire for knowledge, the foregoing teaching of St. Thomas seems to militate against our conclusion that the will is the subject of studiousness.<sup>2</sup> The answer which the famous Commentator of St. Thomas gives in resolving this doubt is very brief. He is content to point out that since studiousness rectifies man's desire for knowledge not only of natural things but even about things of an order superior to man, there is no reason for hesitating to assign the will as its subject.<sup>3</sup>

In his *Cursus Theologicus* John of St. Thomas considers this same problem, and at greater length than Cajetan treats it. His conclusion on this topic merits more than passing attention.

First of all, he explains very clearly what St. Thomas means when he states that the will does not need the rectification of virtue to attain the good of reason which is proportioned to it. To attain its proper good, formally considered and represented as such, the will needs no virtues ; but, to achieve its proper and convenient good in a determinate matter, the will may indeed require the rectification of some virtue. In other words, for its proper good, considered in the concrete, the will may have need of a virtue that it be rightly inclined towards that good and not suffer any of the hindrances which may arise from either the appetite or the intellect or even

1. Cf. *Ia IIae*, q.56, a.6, c. : "Cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine ad obiectum. Unde, cum . . . obiectum voluntatis sit bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum : quantum ad hoc, non indiget voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed, si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis, sive quantum ad totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi : ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto, ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi."

2. Cf. CAJETAN, *In II<sup>am</sup> IIae*, q.166, a.1, n.1 : "Ex natura autem tam talis virtutis, quam vitii, apparet quod non est subiective in voluntate. Nam . . . nulla moralis virtus ordinata praecise ad naturale bonum habentis, est in voluntate : quia voluntas ex propria natura inclinatur in secundum rationem proprium habentis bonum, non supernaturale. Constat autem quod studiositas ordinatur per se primo et directe in proprium habentis bonum, scilicet in rectitudinem appetitus cognoscendi ; et non supernaturale, quia hoc rationem naturalis luminis non excedit. Igitur nec studiositas nec curiositas est in voluntate."

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, n.3 : "Quoniam ex hoc quod studiositas ad bonum hominis non solum respectu naturalium, sed super et praeter naturalium, ordinatur, non prohibetur poni in voluntate."

from the indifference and difficulty of the matter to prevent its obtaining it.<sup>1</sup>

Applying this distinction to the matter of studiousness, he goes on to show that, though the knowledge of truth is a good proper to man to which his will has a natural inclination, the virtue of studiousness is needed, nevertheless, to properly compose this desire, lest it be excessive or defective. Even though man does not need a virtue to will the knowledge of truth in general, he does need some virtue, studiousness, to wit, in order that in a determinate matter he may apply his knowing faculty in a proper and ordinate manner, since man's proper good is not found in every matter of knowledge. The proper good of man consists in the knowledge of truth; but his highest good consists not in the knowledge of just any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the highest truth. Because there can be a defect in knowing certain truths inasmuch as this knowledge may not be ordered to the knowledge of the highest truth, the will requires the rectification of the virtue of studiousness, not on account of its inclination to truth in general, but in its application to particular truths to assure that the knowledge of these may be properly ordered to the knowledge of the highest truth.<sup>2</sup> For this reason, John of St.

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1. Cf. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus*, VI, Disp. XV, a.1, n.27, p.413 (Vivès), 147 (Laval): "Unde sequitur, quod ad bonum proprium, et conveniens formaliter, representatum ut tale non indiget habitu voluntas, quia est necessitata quoad specificationem; ad bonum autem proprium, et conveniens in materia debita potest indigere habitu non propter se, sed propter impedimenta, quae sunt vel ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte appetitus, vel ex parte propriae excellentiae cum excessu, et non subiectione ad alterum, et pro istis oportebit ponere habitum, vel in appetitu ad moderandas passiones, vel in voluntate ad subiciendum se alteri, vel in intellectu ad recte iudicandum, et prudenter; non tamen ad ipsum bonum conveniens formaliter loquendo, quatenus aestimatur conveniens; sicut de beatitudine dicimus quod naturaliter, et necessario amatur quoad specificationem, si sumatur formaliter pro ipsa ratione summi boni secundum se. Res autem ipsa in qua hoc summum bonum invenitur, quod sit Deus in se, et vita virtuosa, vel voluptuosa, vel bona temporalia, hoc difficultatem habet, praesertim in his, qui ad sensibilia, quae corrumpuntur, prout sunt, non ad aeterna, et quae durant post mortem."

Also, n.30: "Quare ut uno verbo dicamus sensus D. Thomae est, quod ad bonum rationis proportionatum, et conveniens formaliter sumptum, non requirit voluntas habitum ut inclinetur in illud, quia est propria ratio potentiae ordo ad tale bonum, et ly propria ratio est idem quod formalis ratio. At vero ad bonum proprium concretive sumptum in hac vel illa materia, indigere potest habitu voluntas, ut in illud inclinetur, vel propter impedimenta tollenda, ex parte appetitus, aut intellectus, vel propter ipsius materiae indifferentiam, et difficultatem, ut proportionata reddatur secundum rationem, vel ab ipsa deviet."

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, nn.xxiv, xxviii, xxix: "Sicut etiam ipsum scire, et cognoscere veritates est bonum maxime proprium, et desiderabile, et quoad specificationem necessarium, quia omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant... et tamen hoc non obstante datur virtus studiositatis ad componendum hoc desiderium ne sit nimium, aut defectuosum..."

xxviii. "Ex quibus etiam patet ad ultimas instantias de appetitu scientiae fraenato per studiositatem... respondemus enim... quod tam scientia, quam propria excellentia indigent habitu ut moderate, ut debite appetantur, quia non sunt proprium, et conveniens



Thomas sees no difficulty in assigning the will as the subject of studiousness.

In view of the authority and arguments of both Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, who seem to faithfully interpret the master on this point, and because of the nature of the matter with which studiousness is concerned, the conclusion that the will in its eminently concupiscible aspect is the subject of studiousness seems to be well-founded and is to be held as the only true answer to this question.

#### 4. *The Vices Opposed to Studiousness*

Though to learn truth and to have science of things are goods worthy of man's esteem and greatly desirable in themselves, which is evidenced by the fact that all men naturally desire to know, as Aristotle states in elegant fashion in the opening sentence of the *Metaphysics*,<sup>1</sup> this natural desire must, nevertheless, be kept within reasonable limits. It is the virtue of studiousness that can properly regulate this desire lest from lack of control it assume excessive proportions, or from stifling sloth and refusal of effort it atrophy. Between the two extremes, by excess and deficiency respectively, of curiosity and negligence, studiousness must train and develop that natural desire.<sup>2</sup> To a study of curiosity and negligence, the vices opposed to studiousness, we now turn.

##### A. *Curiosity*

It is difficult to give a suitable English rendering of *curiositas*. It is easy enough to render it, following the dictionary, as inquisitive-

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bonum in quacumque materia cognitionis . . . Et ideo licet non indigeat habitu ad volendam cognitionem veri ut sic in communi, . . . et quatenus hoc dicit formaliter rationem boni proprii convenientis, tamen ut in hac vel illa materia applicetur ad cognitionem ordinatam, ac debitam, et recedat ad indebita, indiget habitu studiositatis, et non per se naturaliter inclinatur . . .

XXIX. "Unde D. Thomas . . . dicit, quod licet bonum hominis (hoc est bonum proprium) consistat in cognitione veri, non tamen summum hominis bonum consistit in cognitione cuiuslibet veri, sed in perfecta cognitione summae veritatis. Et ideo potest esse vitium in cognitione aliquorum verorum, secundum quod talis appetitus non debito modo ordinatur ad cognitionem summae veritatis. Ex quo colligitur, quod virtus studiositatis, quae opponitur huic vitio, requiritur non propter inclinationem ad verum in communi, et ad verum quatenus conveniens homini bonum est formaliter loquendo, sed in applicatione talis vel talis determinati veri, quatenus in illo invenitur debitus ordo ad summum verum, vel non invenitur."

1. Cf. *Metaphysics*, I, chap.1, 980 a 21. "All men by nature desire to know." ST. THOMAS, *In I Metaph.*, lect.1.

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Malo*, q.8, a.2, c. : "... Sicut appetitus sciendi est homini naturalis ; unde si scientiae intendat secundum quod recta ratio dictat, erit virtuosum et laudabile ; si vero transcendat aliquis regulam rationis, erit peccatum curiositatis ; si vero deficiat, erit peccatum negligentiae."

ness. But this seems to suppress its fullest meaning, for it deludes the reader into thinking that we speak but trivially and condescendingly of the more or less harmless weakness of the woman gossiping across the back fence. And the English "curiosity" has little vicious in its connotation, so strange has the use of the term become, as we shall point out in an ensuing section on the use of these terms "studiousness" and "curiosity." For want of a better word we shall use the English "curiosity." Basically, curiosity means immoderateness in the natural desire to know; lack of restraint in the sensual perception of the manifold sensuous beauty of the world; profligacy in the desire for "knowledge and experience," as St. Augustine put it.<sup>1</sup> It is the immoderate striving for the knowledge of things.<sup>2</sup> It is the result of man's natural desire to know having been allowed to go rampant and uncontrolled.

Curiosity, being the immoderate striving for "knowledge and experience," is the vice opposed by excess to studiousness and consists in a too-great and too-refined desire of, care for and application to useless knowledge.<sup>3</sup> This uncontrolled and rampant desire for and study in view of knowledge is not confined to any particular sphere, but penetrates the domain of intellectual knowledge, as well as the realm of sensation. Nothing is beyond its ken.

At first sight, it may seem strange to speak of vice in reference to intellectual knowledge, since knowledge of truth is so great a good. Yet, though the knowledge of truth is *in se* a good worthy of man,<sup>4</sup> man's appetite for and study in view of acquiring knowledge may be good and proper or wrong and perverse, depending on certain circumstances.<sup>5</sup> The causes of the perversity of man's study in view

1. *Confessions*, X. Quoted by ST. THOMAS, *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.2, ad 1.

2. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "... Et, sic, oportet ut laudabiliter homo huiusmodi appetitum refrenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendat."

3. Cf. SALMAN., *op. cit.*, n.153, p.499: "Opponitur studiositati duplex vitium: aliud per excessum, quod vocatur curiositas... denotatque nimiam et superfluum curam vel diligentiam circa res inutiles: et specialiter applicatur ad materiam studiositatis: cum quis superfluum diligentiam adhibet ut aliquid sciat, quod nihil ad ipsum scire attinet, vel quod eius captum superat, aliaque id genus..."

4. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In III Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.3, sol.3, n.171, p.1205: "Dicendum quod scire, quantum in se est, numquam malum est, et per consequens nec addiscere; quia cuius generatio est mala, ipsum est malum. Sed per accidens contingit esse peccatum in sciendo vel addiscendo sive considerando."

5. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, c.: "Sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendae. Aliter autem est iudicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis; et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendae. Ipsa enim veritatis cognitio, per se loquendo, bona est. Potest autem per accidens esse mala: ratione scilicet alicuius consequentis; vel inquantum aliquis de cognitione superbit, ... vel inquantum homo utitur cognitione veritatis ad peccandum.

"Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem."

of truth may be classified, according to the Angelic Doctor, under two main headings. It may arise from the student himself, or from the matter of his study.<sup>1</sup>

If we consider the perversity of study according as it originates in the student himself, we can delineate two principal defects. First, the student may be wrongly motivated, proposing to himself a blameworthy end. And thus to his study evil is joined accidentally. Such is the case of one who studies that he may achieve a reputation as being a man of science and vast learning in order to rejoice and take pride in such renown. Such, too, is the sad plight of one who studies that he may be the better equipped to perpetrate some crime.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge . . . In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in sinful study . . .<sup>2</sup>

The second disorder in the desire for and study in view of knowledge which may be traced to the student himself is present when his appetite of knowing is itself perverse. "Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate."<sup>3</sup> And this inordinateness of the appetite would seem to be of the very nature of curiosity. Such inordinateness may manifest itself in four different ways, according to the analysis which Aquinas gives in the *Summa Theologica*.

First, man's perverse appetite for knowledge may lead him to forsake a study which is required by his present state and condition of life, and in its place prefer one which is less useful, one, indeed, which may even be harmful. "First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him . . ."<sup>4</sup> Examples of such inordinate study are not far to seek. The college student who spends his time in reading murder-mystery novels but lays aside his Physics and Mathematics displays, at least, unconsciously, the unruliness of his appetite and clearly shows his need for

1. Cf. *In III Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.3, sol.3, n.172, p.1205 : "Hoc autem accidens potest accidere vel ex parte cognoscibilis, vel ex parte cognoscentis."

2. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, c. : "Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem. Uno quidem modo, prout aliquis tendit suo studio in cognitionem veritatis, prout per accidens coniungitur ei malum : sicut illi qui student ad scientiam veritatis ut exinde superbiant . . . Similiter etiam illi qui student addiscere aliquid ad peccandum, vitiosum studium habent ; . . ."

3. *Ibid.* : "Alio autem modo potest esse vitium ex ipsa inordinatione appetitus et studii ad discendam veritatem. Et hoc quadrupliciter."

4. *Ibid.* : "Uno modo, inquantum per studium minus utile retrahuntur a studio quod eis ex necessitate incumbit."



the virtue of studiousness. It is curiosity, too, which leads young minds to reject the works of the recognized masters, prescribed or suggested by a course of studies, in favor of moderns whose works now happen to be the recipients of popular acclaim. It is curiosity, too, which prompts the college freshman to pick and choose his subjects of study, allowing personal interest and youthful whims to guide his cultural training and intellectual formation. The fact that school curricula and teaching authorities, who are charged with the intellectual development of these young people, permit such a state of intellectual disorder merely transfers the blame from the shoulders of the student to those of the administrative and teaching body. It is curiosity, too, which leads the major seminarian to dissipate much of the four-year period prescribed for his theological and spiritual formation in perusing existentialist novels and in being taken up with premature apostolic endeavour.

In the commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas lists two disorders which can be attributed to the student himself. The first of these is the one we have just spoken about, which consists in the omission of some study or other duty because of one's preoccupation with some other study which should not be his concern at the moment. The examples which St. Thomas there cites<sup>1</sup> are very apt, and concern the case of a judge who is hindered in his prosecution of justice because of his inordinate devotion to the study of Geometry; and of a priest who fails to fulfill his ministry to souls because of some similar unruly interest. The second disorder mentioned in the commentary on the *Sentences* seems to be a result of the first disorder. It concerns the case of one who would become so taken up with a matter of personal study as to conceive contempt for a more worthy branch of learning. He refers to the example of St. Jerome, who became so enamoured of the classical style of Cicero that he abhorred the less cultivated writings of the Sacred Authors.<sup>2</sup>

Secondly, the profligate desire to know may lead the student to seek his knowledge from an unlawful source, resorting to magic and other occult media to penetrate and predict the future and its contingencies. "Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the

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1. Cf. *In III Sent., loc. cit.*, n.172, p.1205. "Ex parte cognoscentis est duplex accidens.

"Unum est quando propter occupationem in studio alicuius scientiae impeditur ab executione officii ad quod tenetur; sicut iudex si propter studium geometriae desisteret a causis expediendis, vel sacerdos a confessionibus audiendis quando eas audire teneretur."

2. Cf. *Ibid.*: "Aliud est quando propter delectationem in aliqua scientia veniret in contemptum alicuius quod revereri oportet, sicut de Hieronymo accidit; quia tantum delectabatur in ornatu verborum Tullii, quod desipiebat ei incultus sermo prophetarum, ut ipse dicit. Sicut etiam accidit illis qui tantum adhaerent rationibus humanis quod a fide discedunt et eam impugnant."

future through the demons.<sup>1</sup> The evil that may follow from such superstitious curiosity is only too well portrayed in the tragic succession of events in which Shakespeare's Macbeth found himself involved as a result of the prognostications of the Three Weird Sisters. Other examples of students who, in the name of liberty, cast off what they consider the shackles of custom and authority and place themselves under the spell of illegal teachers could be cited by referring to the ever-increasing number of "liberal" intellectuals, who, at least for a time, find no difficulty in accepting the tenets of Marxian communism and the other artificial systems of thought at variance with reason and Catholic theology. In the case of superstitious curiosity, not only does the unruly desire to know have recourse to teachers from whom man may not learn, but it also seeks to learn from these infernal teachers a matter which it is not fitting for the mind of man to know. St. Thomas's reference to the immoderateness in striving to know as exemplified in magic may make modern readers smile; but are the curious minds of today really so far from being willing to pay the price, even of their salvation, for the unlocking of impenetrabilities, should the choice be open to them — that is the question.

A third disorder of man's appetite for truth and knowledge is signaled by St. Thomas as existing "when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God."<sup>2</sup> And, in this frame of reference, Aquinas sees fit to quote St. Augustine to the effect that the study of creatures should ever lead the mind of man upwards to Eternal Truth Itself.<sup>3</sup>

St. Thomas, in refutation of the scorers of natural creation, sees nothing immoderate in the fact that the mind of man strives to unseal the natural mysteries and locked places of creation; that is, he finds nothing deserving of reproach in secular science *per se*. Concerning the study of Philosophy, for example, he states in the *Summa Theologica* that it is in itself "lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them."<sup>4</sup> But he does reproach those philosophers who misuse the truth to

1. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, c. : "Alio modo, inquantum studet aliquis addiscere ab eo a quo non licet : sicut patet de his qui aliqua futura a daemonibus perquirunt ; quae est superstitiosa curiositas."

2. *Ibid.* : "Tertio, quando homo appetit cognoscere veritatem circa creaturas, non referendo ad debitum finem, scilicet ad cognitionem Dei."

3. Cf. *De Vera Religione*, cap. XXIX. Quoted by ST. THOMAS, *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, c. : "... In consideratione creaturarum non est vana et peritura curiositas exercenda ; sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus."

4. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, ad 3 : "Studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile, propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ..."

assail the faith, for their intellectual activity leads them into a realm foreign to them.<sup>1</sup>

A fourth instance of the disorder of uncontrolled study and desire of knowledge is found in the attempt of many to pursue branches of study for which they plainly do not have the natural intellectual ability and mental training. Confusion, error and heresy cannot but be the harvest reaped from such misguided and unregulated intellectual endeavour. And yet how many are fooled by such a temptation, and even men of no mean intellectual timber ! Because they have attained to a certain competency in some advanced branch of human study, they feel they are qualified to scrutinize the whole realm of learning. Hence, the erroneous, even stupid, solutions to moral and political problems advanced by physicists and other scientists. They do not hesitate to publish their opinions even on matters of religion. It is this same curiosity which prompts some theologians to probe the mysteries of Faith with such untold harm to the Church in personal defection and even national schism. These are examples of men whose desire for knowledge is so rampant that they simply refuse to admit the incapacity of human reason in the realm of the supernatural.

Because man's inordinate desire to know usually falls upon a matter which, too, is improper for the student to learn, St. Thomas's consideration of this topic in his commentary on the *Sentences* is based rather on the impropriety of the matter of study. There is no opposition between what he teaches here and his doctrine of the *Summa*, which we have just outlined. He regards the same facts from two different points of view. And from his manner of consideration in the commentary on the *Sentences* he finds that one's study may be inordinate because of the subject-matter, and that for three different reasons. First, when the matter of one's study easily leads to evil and is, in itself, only of slight usefulness ; secondly, when the branch of study is beyond the student's capacity ; and thirdly, when the matter of one's study is absolutely useless — in each of these cases the student would be considered curious, were he to venture into such vain pursuits.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Cf. *Ibid.* : "Sed quia quidam philosophi abutuntur ad fidei impugnacionem. ideo Apostolus dicit . . ."

2. Cf. *In III Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.3, sol.3, nn.173-174, p.1205. "Ex parte vero cognoscibilis est triplex accidens.

"Unum est quando cognoscibile de facili ad malum inclinat, et praeterea in se parvae utilitatis est. Et propter hoc prohibita sunt scientiae magicae, ne homo in exercitium earum labatur.

"Aliud est quando cognoscibile est supra potentiam cognoscentis, . . .

"Tertium est quando in se nullius utilitatis est, sicut facta contingentia hominum. Unde et curiosi dicuntur qui sunt scrutatores conscientiarum proximi.

174. "In omnibus autem istis tribus contingit quod illud est uni curiosum quod non est curiosum alteri ; quia aliquid est supra unius intellectum quod non est supra in-



Desire for and study in view of the knowledge of sensible things is perverse and disordered and, accordingly, is to be termed curiosity when the sensitive knowledge desired is not directed to a useful purpose but rather has the effect of turning man from some useful pursuit. Accordingly, to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful pursuit.”<sup>1</sup> Likewise, when man directs his sensitive knowledge to something harmful, he is giving in to the vice of curiosity. “Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust : even so the busy inquiry into other people’s actions is directed to detraction.”<sup>2</sup>

With these two exceptions, it seems that man’s ordered pursuit of knowledge of sensible things is in no wise reprehensible. In fact, the knowledge of sensible things is ordered to two great human goods. In man, as well as in the other animals, the sensitive knowledge and subsequent pursuance of what is good and the avoidance of what is harmful, is greatly beneficial, even necessary, for the preservation of the body. And, in the case of man alone, the knowledge of sensible things is a stepping-stone to his acquisition of knowledge of an intellectual order. And when the knowledge of sensible things serves these two purposes, there is nothing of the curious in such a desire, but rather an exercise of the virtue of studiousness, which requires that man pursue in an ordinate fashion and for a useful end the knowledge of sensible things.<sup>3</sup>

While on the subject of curiosity in reference to sensitive knowledge, it may not be amiss to point out that the Doctor of the Schools considers that curiosity concerns itself with all sensitive knowledge, and not merely with the knowledge acquired through the sense of

tellektum alterius ; aliquid etiam est utile uni quod non est utile alteri ; aliquid etiam facile in peccatum praecipitat unum quod non praecipitat alium.”

1. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.2, c. : “ Apponere ergo studium circa sensibilia cognoscenda, dupliciter potest esse vitiosum. — Uno modo, inquantum cognitio sensitiva non ordinatur in aliquid utile ; sed potius avertit hominem ab aliqua utili consideratione.”

2. *Ibid.* : “ Alio modo, inquantum cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquid noxium : sicut inspectio mulieris ordinatur ad concupiscendum ; et diligens inquisitio eorum quae ab aliis fiunt, ordinatur ad detrahendum.”

3. *Cf. Ibid.* : “ Cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad duo. Uno enim modo, tam in hominibus quam in aliis animalibus ordinatur ad corporis sustentationem : quia per huiusmodi cognitionem homines et alia animalia vitant nociva, et conquirunt ea quae sunt necessaria ad corporis sustentationem. Alio modo, specialiter in homine ordinatur ad cognitionem intellectivam, vel speculativam vel practicam.

.....

“ Si quis autem cognitioni sensibilibus intendit ordinate, propter necessitatem sustentandae naturae, vel propter studium intelligendae veritatis : est virtuosa studiositas circa sensibilibus cognitionem.”

sight.<sup>1</sup> And Cajetan's remarks on this point leave no doubt about the fact that one can be truly curious about all types of sensitive knowledge. For the curious person tries to learn about and distinguish all types of sensation, not for the sake of the sensible delight gained therein, but rather for the sake of the knowledge itself. In this phenomenon lies the difference, for example, between gluttony and curiosity, which St. Thomas has signaled in answer to this objection. Gluttony, luxury and similar sensualities seek the pleasure concomitant to the use of sensible things, but curiosity aims only at learning about these different sensations, and for this purpose the curious person does not refuse even to suffer inconvenience and pain.<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine, who is very clear on this question when he says :

By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses ; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savoury, soft ; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

There is a close affinity between curiosity and concupiscence of the eyes, as the writings of authors on Ascetical Theology attest. But such a linking together of the two in no way means to deny that curiosity extends its ugly head to all sensible knowledge, for concupiscence of the eyes is an expression, consecrated by use, to mean all excessive desire to see, to hear and to experience all that goes on in the world and the secret intrigues that are woven there merely to indulge the craving for frivolous knowledge.<sup>4</sup> St. Augustine

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1. Cf. *Ibid.*, ad 1 : "Sed circa delectationem cognitionis omnium sensuum est curiositas."

2. Cf. CAJETAN, *In IIam IIae, ibid.*, n.3 : "... Ita quod differentia consistit in hoc, quod gula vel luxuria versatur circa delectationem tangibilium quae consistit in usu eorum, hoc est in applicatione eorum ad venereos actus seu ad comedendum et bibendum : curiositas vero versatur circa delectationem eorundem, scilicet tangibilium et etiam reliquorum sensibilium, scilicet gustabilium, odorabilium, audibilium ac visibilium, quae consistit in cognitione eorundem. Curiosus enim quaerit cognoscere ac discernere sensibilia : luxuriosus autem ac gulosus quaerit uti sensibilibus. Unde, ut Augustinus docuit allatus in littera, voluptuosus quaerit sensibilia quae delectant, curiosus quaerit sensibilia etiam si molestant : quoniam ad cognoscendum oportet contraria sentire, ad utendum autem delectabilia sola conveniunt.

"... Ut clare patet ex differentia ad delectationem curiosam, quae esset si delectaretur in discernendo molle a duro, callidum a frigido, asperum a leni, et cognitione eorum..."

3. *Confessions*, X, chap.35. Quoted by ST. THOMAS, *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.2, ad 1 : "... Ex hoc evidentius discernitur quid voluptatis, quid curiositatis agatur per sensus : quod voluptas pulchra, canora, suavia, sapida, lenia sectatur ; curiositas autem etiam his contraria, tentandi causa, non ad subeundam molestiam, sed experiendi noscendique libidine."

4. Cf. ADOLPHE TANQUERAY, S.S., *The Spiritual Life, A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology*, English translation by BRANDERIS, Second and Revised Edition, Desclée and Co. (Tournai), 1930, pp.104-107.

says that this disorder is called concupiscence of the eyes because sight is the sense chiefly used for gaining this kind of trivial information.<sup>1</sup>

The difference between the curious person and the intemperate person is thus clearly illustrated, for whereas a person may be curious about all types of sensation, he may be intemperate only in reference to the desires and delectations of the sense of touch, and of taste to the degree that this latter is reduced to touch, as we have already stated.<sup>2</sup> In regard to the other three external senses, the excesses may not be named nor be intemperance, except in the very general sense of this word ; but they may well be termed curiosity, as St. Thomas points out in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when he speaks of the pleasures of seeing.<sup>3</sup>

St. Thomas, following St. Bernard, sees a certain opposition between humility and curiosity. For curiosity which causes one to spread his restless glance upon everything is in stark contradiction to the downcast gaze, which characterizes St. Bernard's first degree of humility.<sup>4</sup>

Aquinas gives a very interesting and psychological analysis of the origin of curiosity. He assigns curiosity to the "roaming unrest of the spirit,"<sup>5</sup> which he says is the first-born daughter of the capital sin of sloth (*acedia*). For no one can remain for any length of time in the morbid sadness of *acedia* without some consolation. To this dreary sadness man reacts in a twofold manner. First, he casts off what causes the sadness and then seeks for some consolation to fill up the emotional void. And so it is that those who cannot accept the conditions necessary for spiritual consolations give themselves over to the vain search for worldly pleasures.<sup>6</sup>

1. Cf. *Confessions*, X, chap.35, as quoted by St. THOMAS, *IIa, IIae*, q.167, a.2, ad 1 : "Et vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, quia oculi sunt ad cognoscendum in sensibus principales unde omnia sensibilia videri dicuntur."

2. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *In III Ethic.*, lect.19, n.612 : "Concludit ergo ex praemissis quod temperantia est circa tales operationes seu delectationes, in quibus et reliqua animalia communicant cum homine ; et similiter intemperantia . . . Huiusmodi autem sunt delectationes tactus et gustus, qui sunt duo sensus praeter tres praedictos." — ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, chap.13, 1118 a 24-28.

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, nn.604-609 ; esp. n.606 : "Nec hic dicitur quin in his [visibilibus] possit virtus esse et vitium. Contingit enim quod in talibus aliquis delectetur sicut oportet, idest medio modo, secundum superabundantiam et defectum, quae pertinent ad curiositatem, non autem ad intemperantiam, quae est circa delectationes vehementiores." — ARISTOTLE, 1117 b 30-1118 a 28.

4. Cf. *IIa IIae*, q.162, a.4, ad 4 : "... Illa autem duodecim quae ponit Bernardus, sumuntur per oppositum ad duodecim gradus humilitatis . . . Nam primus gradus humilitatis est corde et corpore semper humilitatem ostendere, defixis in terram aspectibus. Cui opponitur curiositas per quam aliquis curiose ubique et inordinate circumspicit."

5. *IIa IIae*, q.35, a.4, ad 3.

6. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Q. D. de Malo*, q.11, a.4, c. : "Sed quia etiam nullus homo est qui absque delectatione in tristitia manere possit, . . . ideo ex tristitia duo consequuntur :



For since, according to the Philosopher, . . . *no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant*, it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways : first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow ; secondly, that he passes to other things that gave him pleasure : thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body . . . Now in avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of *despair* . . . In so far as a man has recourse to external objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called *wandering after unlawful things*.<sup>1</sup>

Once man gives himself over to this roaming unrest of the spirit (*evagatio mentis circa illicita*) he puts himself on a path lined with many devious aberrations and when, in this frame of mind, he is led into the domain of study and knowledge, his mental meanderings are fittingly described by the term *curiosity*.<sup>2</sup>

In summary, curiosity is the uncontrolled desire of and study to come to knowledge in both the intellectual and sensitive spheres of knowing. It is the excessive and immoderate search for knowledge and experiment, as St. Augustine put it. It designates a superfluous diligence in knowing things which in no wise pertain to the student, or things which exceed his knowing capacity, with this intention precisely, to know and discern. It is study prompted by a false affection for knowledge ; study which gives too much importance to the secondary, while spurning the necessary and primary. It is the natural desire to know now having gone rampant and unfettered,

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quorum *unum* est ut recedat a contristantibus, *aliud* est ut ad alia transeat in quibus delectetur ; et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit . . . quod illi qui non possunt gaudere delectationibus spiritualibus, ut plurimum transferunt se ad delectationes corporales ; et secundum hoc ex tristitia quae concipitur ex spiritualibus bonis, sequitur *evagatio* circa illicita, in quibus animus carnalis delectatur."

1. *IIa IIae*, q.35, a.4, ad 2 : " Quia enim, ut Philosophus dicit, . . . *nullus diu absque delectatione potest manere cum tristitia*, necesse est quod ex tristitia aliquid dupliciter oriatur : uno modo, ut homo recedat a contristantibus ; alio modo, ut ad alia transeat, in quibus delectatur : sicut illi qui non possunt gaudere in spiritualibus delectationibus, transferunt se ad corporales . . . In fuga autem tristitiae talis processus attenditur : quia, primo, homo fugit contristantia ; secundo, etiam impugnat ea quae tristitiam ingerunt. Spiritualia autem bona, de quibus tristatur acedia, sunt et finis et id quod est ad finem. Fuga autem finis fit per desperationem. . . . Inquantum autem propter tristitiam a spiritualibus aliquis transfert se ad delectabilia exteriora, ponitur filia acediae *evagatio circa illicita*."

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, ad 3 : " Illa autem quae Isidorus ponit oriri ex acedia et tristitia, reducuntur ad ea quae Gregorius ponit. Nam *amaritudo*, quam Isidorus ponit oriri ex tristitia, est quidem effectus rancoris. *Otiositas* autem et *somnolentia* reducuntur ad torporem circa praecepta : circa quae est aliquis otiosus, omnino ea praetermittens ; et somnolentus, ea negligenter implens. Omnia autem alia quinque quae ponit ex acedia oriri, pertinent ad evagationem mentis circa illicita. Quae quidem . . . secundum autem quod pertinet ad cognitionem, dicitur *curiositas* ; . . ."

inordinate appetite which stands in dire need of restraint and moderation. Its true nature can be pithily expressed in the words of St. Bernard, which St. Thomas cites in his commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians. "There are those who wish to know for the purpose of knowing a great deal and this is curiosity."<sup>1</sup>

### B. Neglect of Study

Once curiosity is satisfied, it often gives place to intellectual sloth and negligence, the vice opposed by deficiency to studiousness. Aquinas does little more than mention this defect of studiousness. He states clearly that neglect of study is the vice opposed by deficiency to studiousness. "... Whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study..."<sup>2</sup>

As has been already said in the section treating with the mode of studiousness, this latter participates to a certain degree in the mode of fortitude, and, in fact, is named by reference to it. Studiousness must rectify man's twofold inclination in regard to study and knowledge. The soul's desire for knowledge has to be restrained lest it develop into curiosity; this is the principal function of studiousness. And the body's natural shrinking from the labor that learning involves must also be guarded against.<sup>3</sup> The vice of neglect of study arises from this second inclination and is but indirectly the concern of studiousness, as the Doctor of the Schools teaches. In other words, because man is a composite of body and soul, the listlessness, wear and fatigue of the body have to be reckoned with, for they may at times prevent him from making the effort that study requires. If the student allows this bodily torpor to take its course without fighting against it, he gives in to the vice of neglect of study or intellectual sloth. According to the Salmanticenses, neglect of study is the complete omission or lessening of effort in learning those things which a person, according to his state, is expected to learn and know.<sup>4</sup> In final analysis, neglect of study may be reduced to laziness. It is not difficult to imagine the bad effects that such a vice may exert upon the student. No doubt, it is the cause of much wasted, because undeveloped, talent.

1. *In Cant.*, sermo 36, n.3. Quoted by ST. THOMAS, *In I Cor.*, VIII, 1.

2. *IIa IIae*, q.166, a.2, obj.3: "... Nomen autem studiositatis sumitur, e contrario, ex applicatione animae ad aliquid, unde magis videtur opponi vitio quod est in defectu, scilicet negligentiae studendi, ..." "

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, ad 3.

4. Cf. SALMAN., *op. cit.*, n.153, p.499: "Opponitur studiositati duplex vitium: ... aliud per defectum, quod vocatur *negligentia*, et est quaedam omissio vel remissio animi in ordine ad addiscendum illa, quae unusquisque scire tenetur, et quae sibi incumbunt."

Of these two hindrances to a properly ordered habit of study, there can be no doubt that the much more deeply rooted and hence more difficult of regulation is curiosity, for it arises from a perversity in the appetite itself. Such a disordered appetite is ordinarily not found in the lazy student, that is, there are few inveterately indolent students. His inclination is usually good and with proper motivation and a more mature realization of the necessity of work, the lazy mind usually rallies from its torpor. Moreover, most systems of education are designed to cope with students who do not freely make the effort to study, but there are no sanctions by which the voracious study of the curious is checked. Neglect of study can be mastered through motivation ; curiosity is conquered only by restraint.

### 5. *The Use of "Studiosness" and "Curiosity"*

As we have already hinted, the use of the English renditions of *studiositas* and *curiositas* is, at times, to say the least, confusing. That is why we deem it not out of place to add a few comments on the meaning and use of these words. From our detailed analysis of this whole question it is obvious that "studiousness" is the name given to the moral virtue, which is at the same time a species of modesty and a potential part of temperance ; whereas "curiosity" is the term used to designate the vicious excess opposed to this virtue. Strange to relate, and no doubt because of mental confusion in regard to these two states, on the tongues of many their use and meanings have been almost reversed. It is not infrequent that we hear educators, for example, deploring the lack of curiosity which characterizes the modern student. They often cite the curiosity of the young child as an example to be imitated by his less "curious" older brother. Sometimes, too, a mother is worried about her precocious son's studiousness, meaning by this that he is too much given to books and study for one of his tender years.

Now, if the proper use of words means anything, and it does mean a great deal, then the student's lack of curiosity should be praised. And if those who lament over its lack in their students mean to say that their students suffer from laziness and lack of application, then their remedy for this state should be to encourage in the student the virtue of studiousness, which is simply the virtue of the good student. And the mother of the child who is too much given to study and books, and who is thus a victim of his own curiosity, should begin to train her son in proper study habits, for studiousness like any other moral virtue is acquired from repeated studious acts. It is impossible to be too studious just as it is impossible to be too chaste and too humble. And curiosity is never a good thing, not even for the negligent student, and is not to be recommended as a



medicine for the slacker any more than lust is to be assigned as the cure for sexual frigidity.

It seems that there is something of a vicious circle connected with the use of these two words to describe a virtuous and a vicious state. Because "studiousness" and "curiosity" are improperly used, mental confusion about the two states which they designate has resulted. And this ensuing mental confusion continues to provoke a wrong use of the two terms. Make no mistake about it, the greatest praise a student can be given is to call him a studious searcher after truth; contrariwise, to brand the student as curious is only worse than telling him he is lazy.

In this last part, we have, following the lead of St. Thomas Aquinas, given a detailed analysis of the virtue of studiousness, that potential part of temperance and species of modesty which regulates and moralizes man's natural desire for knowledge. According to the Angelic Doctor, the virtue of studiousness represses both vain curiosity and intellectual sloth in order to lead the student to the study of what should be studied, in the manner in which this should be done, when it should be done and for a moral (and even supernatural) end, and not for the purely personal satisfaction of the student. Studiousness is something of an asceticism of cognition. By uniting in itself the modes of temperance and indirectly that of fortitude, studiousness assures its possessor of a properly regulated intellectual activity, for it moderates the profligacy of the natural yen to know and indirectly stimulates the quasi-natural tendency of the corporeal part of man to refuse the effort that must necessarily accompany any study.

THOMAS M. MACLELLAN.

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# The Definition of Rhetoric according to Aristotle

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## INTRODUCTION

Aristotle's treatise on rhetoric is unique, in that it is a properly scientific consideration of the subject. This characteristic becomes manifest, when we compare it with other rhetorical treatises, such as those of Cicero. The works of this great rhetorician are of high value because of his wide experience in the field ; nevertheless, they do not methodically treat of the nature of rhetoric. Rather, they are hand-books of practical advice on public speaking and on the formation of the rhetorician.

On the other hand, Aristotle speaks not as an experienced rhetorician, but as a logician. Rhetoric is a part of logic understood in the broad sense, i.e., taken to include all disciplines which direct the act of reason. In the order of logical treatises, the *Rhetoric* is placed immediately after the *Topics*, which is concerned with dialectic. Hence, because he is proceeding from a logical point of view, and since these two parts of logic have a great deal in common, Aristotle very aptly begins his consideration of rhetoric by comparing it to dialectic.

Aristotle's aim in writing this work is a scientific presentation of the rhetorical method. Thus, besides setting down its nature in the first two chapters, he also discusses the many things which the rhetorician must know in order to practice his art successfully. Hence, in the remainder of Book I he divides rhetoric into three genera : deliberative, forensic, and epideictic ; and gives the characteristics and special topics proper to each. In Book II he discusses passions, human character, virtues and vices ; for without some knowledge of these, the rhetorician would be incapable of constructing a speech proportionate to his audience, and of arousing their passions. After this, he treats of common topics, which are applicable to rhetoric in general. Book III is principally devoted to style and arrangement which, though secondary, obviously must be included in any complete study of rhetoric. It is evident, then, that although Aristotle was not himself a rhetorician, still he was far from lacking experience in this domain. For besides possessing the universality proper to a scientific treatise, his work contains a wealth of concrete detail.

The commentary which is to follow, however, is limited to the first and the beginning of the second chapter of Book I, which is the most important part of the treatise, for it contains a definition of rhetoric and an explanation of the rhetorical method. Aristotle's text

has been incorporated herein, therefore we do not think it necessary to quote it apart. This article is a literal commentary, based on the principle that the sole function of a commentator is to be an intermediary between the master and the reader, by making the master's thought more explicit and hence more easily understood. In order to assure greater fidelity, we have compared various translations <sup>1</sup> of the Greek original.

# I. COMMON CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE OF RHETORIC

This first section has four divisions : a *quid nominis* of *rhetorica utens*, the *an est* of *rhetorica docens*, a common consideration of what should constitute the rhetorical method, and a résumé.

## 1) A « *Quid Nominis* » of « *Rhetorica Utens* »

Here Aristotle does three things : he compares rhetoric to dialectic, gives the reason for this comparison, and substantiates this reason by examples drawn from common experience.

### a) A Comparison of Rhetoric and Dialectic

Aristotle states that rhetoric is the antistrophe of dialectic. This is an instance of the *locutio exemplaris*, i.e., the use of a word having a sole, concrete signification to manifest something else. There is no new imposition as is the case in analogy ; nor is the word given an improper or figurative sense as in the metaphor.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle draws his example from the Greeks' everyday life, using something with which all were familiar, the choral odes. The

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1. *Rhetoric*, trans. W. RHYS ROBERTS, ed. Solmsen, N. Y., Random House, 1954 ; *The Art of Rhetoric*, trans. JOHN HENRY FREESE, The Leob Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1939 ; *Art Rhétorique*, trans. JEAN VOILQUIN et JEAN CAPELLE, Paris, Librairie Garnier, 1944.

2. The *locutio exemplaris* and the metaphor resemble each other and are opposed to analogy inasmuch as they are not new impositions of a word. However, they differ in that the metaphor implies a new and figurative sense, whereas the *locutio exemplaris* does not. In constructing a metaphor, a word which properly signifies a certain object is applied to something else bearing some resemblance to that object. But despite this resemblance, the word cannot properly signify the new object ; therefore, it must do so only in a figurative or improper sense. This figurative sense then becomes the principle of manifesting a characteristic of the new object. Thus, the metaphor is a kind of discourse notable for its brevity, for in one word it signifies a thing and that to which the thing is compared. In the *locutio exemplaris*, however, there is no question of a new and improper sense, for it is not the application of a name to a new object. Rather, it is merely the comparison of an object relatively unknown, to another which is better known, in order to attain a more complete knowledge of the former. The principle of manifestation lies in the proper sense of the words used.



antistrophe is that part of the choral ode which alternates with and answers the strophe. Thus, what is meant by this *locutio exemplaris* is that there is a special relation between dialectic and rhetoric. Just as the strophe and antistrophe are similar in that they are corresponding parts of the choral ode, so too, dialectic and rhetoric have certain characteristics in common. In the same way, just as the strophe and antistrophe are distinct from one another and ordered in a particular way, inasmuch as the antistrophe is always consequent upon the strophe; so also, rhetoric is distinct from dialectic, and is in a way consequent upon it. Hence, it is clear that by means of this *locutio exemplaris* any Greek familiar with dialectic would immediately acquire a fundamental, though common notion of the nature of rhetoric.

It is unfortunate that in English translation, « antistrophe » is usually rendered by another term, such as « counterpart »; for by this departure from the precision of Aristotle's terminology, the principle of manifestation which he intended is lost.

#### b) *The Reason for This Comparison*

Aristotle does not now consider the aspects in which rhetoric and dialectic differ, for this presupposes more distinct knowledge. However, he immediately states what they have in common: both dialectic and rhetoric are concerned with matters which are in some way known by all men, and which are proper to no definite science. These two characteristics are closely related, being effects of the same cause. Such matter does not belong to any particular science because it is common; i.e., it extends to many things, but in a superficial way. For this same reason, it falls within the comprehension of all men. On the contrary, the subject proper to a given science is known only to the initiated in that science, and unknown to the majority of men. This is obvious from the fact that the multitude cannot understand scientific reasoning. But dialectic and rhetoric are not limited to any determinate genus of being. They treat of any subject whatever, arguing not from principles proper to a given thing, but from certain common principles familiar to all.

There are other similarities between rhetoric and dialectic; in fact, they are so closely related that distinct knowledge of rhetoric implies knowledge of the *Topics*. However, we are now concerned only with a confused and common knowledge, a *quid nominis* which will lead us to distinct knowledge. Therefore, Aristotle restricts himself to mentioning a similarity which is most manifest, one which can be understood even by those having no knowledge of rhetoric.

#### c) *Aristotle Substantiates this Reason*

A proof that the matter of rhetoric and dialectic is such things as are known by all men is the fact that all make use of these faculties

to some extent : dialectic, when they criticize opinions or seek to uphold them ; rhetoric, when they defend themselves or accuse others.

## 2) The " *An Est* " of " *Rhetorica Docens* "

These faculties can be used in two ways, either by chance or by acquired habit. In either way success is possible ; therefore we can inquire as to the reason for this success. Once this cause has been found, we can set up principles which will enable the intellect to proceed in a determinate fashion. Such an inquiry obviously is the function of a method, for the very word " method " means " a short way." <sup>1</sup>

This rhetorical method is *rhetorica docens* (τέχνη), which must not be confused with *rhetorica utens* (ῥητορικὴ). To clarify this point it may be useful to manifest the same distinction as applied to dialectic. *Dialectica docens*, the doctrine contained in the *Topics*, is the speculative art concerned with directing probable argument. It proceeds demonstratively, and so is a science in the strict sense. *Dialectica utens* is the application of *dialectica docens* in actual argument. This use of dialectic declines from the mode of science because its matter is only probable.<sup>2</sup> Thus, when Aristotle describes rhetoric as the antistrophe of dialectic, possessed by all and having common matter, he is referring to both rhetoric and dialectic under the aspect of *utens*. For the matter of *dialectica* and *rhetorica docens*, like that of all the other sciences, is not common but proper ; it is not possessed by all, but must be acquired.

By proceeding in this fashion, Aristotle also manifests the priority in time or generation of *rhetorica utens* over *rhetorica docens*. The same doctrine is taught by Cicero : " But to my thinking the virtue in all the rules is, not that orators by following them have won a reputation for eloquence, but that certain persons have noted and collected the doings of men who were naturally eloquent : thus eloquence is not the offspring of the art, but the art of eloquence . . ." <sup>3</sup>

1. « Est autem quod dicimus *methodum metaphorice* : dicitur enim *methodus* brevis via, quae via est compendii, et vulgariter vocatur summa. Per similitudinem ergo transfertur ad istam scientiam proprie et artem : quia cum speculabilia et operabilia multa offerantur, sua multitudine et longitudine, distantiae quidem ipsorum dispendere faciunt, nisi per formam scientiae et artis ad compendium redigantur : et ab hac similitudine nomen methodi ad artem et scientiam transfertur » (ST. ALBERT, *In I Topicorum*, Prooemium, cap.2).

2. « Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de istis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis probabiliter ostendendas ; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. Utens vero est secundum quod modo adiuncto utitur ad concludendum aliquid probabiliter in singulis scientiis ; et sic recedit a modo scientiae » (ST. THOMAS, *In IV Metaphysicorum*, lect.4, edit. Marietti, n.576). Cf. also ST. ALBERT, *In I Topicorum*, Prooemium, cap.1.

3. *De Oratore*, I, cap.32, n.146 ; trans. E. W. SUTTON, The Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1942.

3) *In What the Rhetorical Method Should Consist*

Aristotle proceeds to develop the *quid*, first by a negative treatment, then by a positive consideration. He does three things: manifests the errors in the treatises written by his predecessors, shows by a positive approach what should constitute the method, and states the utility of such a method.

a) *A Negative Treatment: The Errors of Aristotle's Predecessors*

Aristotle begins with a history of the method in order better to manifest the *quid*. This is an example of using history to illuminate a question of properly doctrinal import. He says that those who have written treatises on rhetoric have constructed only a small part of the method. For proofs are the only true constituents of the method; all else is merely accessory. Now these authors say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal principally with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and other passions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to those judging the case. A sign of the irrelevance of such procedure is that it is forbidden by law in well-governed states. If these laws were applied everywhere, such writers would be left with nothing to say. Yet this is sound law and custom, and all men agree that it should be so. For it is wrong to pervert the judge by moving him to anger, envy, or pity. Aristotle likens this to warping a carpenter's rule before using it. This is an apt comparison, because the judge is as a rule of justice.<sup>1</sup> Now since passion can impede reason, it is possible to influence him in favor of one side or another by arousing his passions; but this is to put an obstacle in the way of the exercise of his function.

That passion can be detrimental is easily shown; for example, in anger there is a certain use of reason insofar as the angry man reasons that he must avenge an injury, yet his reasoning is imperfect, lacking determination and order. Because of the velocity of its movement, anger excludes deliberation.<sup>2</sup> In the *Ethics*,<sup>3</sup> Aristotle compares the angry man to hasty servants who start out on an errand before they have heard the entire command, and therefore make mistakes; and to dogs which bark as soon as they hear a knock at the door, before knowing whether it is friend or foe.

However, passion can either precede or follow judgment. If it precedes, it is an obstacle because it impedes deliberation, which is

1. « . . . Sic cum debemus uti iudice tanquam regula rectitudinis, non debemus illum ad hanc vel illam partem inflectere, excitando in eo iram, misericordiam, invidiam, etc. . . . » (SYLVESTER MAURUS, *In I Rhetoricorum*, cap.1, a.2, n.5).

2. ST. THOMAS, *In III Ethicorum*, lect.5, edit. Marietti, n.442.

3. VII, chap.6, 1149 a 25-31.



necessary for the formation of the judgment. But if passion occurs after the judgment has been formed, it is a help rather than a hindrance. Such passion is a sign of the motion of the will, which in its intensity, overflows into the inferior appetite. It can also be an instrument aiding execution by enabling one to act more promptly and easily.<sup>1</sup> For this reason, passion should not precede discourse, but rather, should be its effect. Hence, Aristotle says that once the rhetorician has clearly stated the facts and evaluated them, then he must arouse the passions of the audience.<sup>2</sup>

The rôle of the litigant is merely to show whether or not a fact is so, whether it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must not take advice from the litigants, but it is his duty to decide for himself all points which the law does not already specifically define for him.

It is of great importance that good laws should themselves determine as many points as possible and leave very few to the decision of the judges ; and this for three reasons. First, because law-making is restricted to one or to a few public personages having the whole people under their care,<sup>3</sup> and it is easier to find one or a few men who are wise and capable of legislating, than it is to find the large number which would be necessary to judge each particular case.

Secondly, laws are made after long deliberation, whereas court decisions must be given on short notice,<sup>4</sup> a fact which makes it difficult for the judge to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency.

The third and most important reason is that the judgment of the legislator is not particular, but universal and concerning future events ; whereas the judge must decide actual, particular cases. Laws are universal propositions of the practical reason which are ordered to operation. They hold the same position with respect to operations as propositions of the speculative reason hold with respect to conclusions.<sup>5</sup> Any precept in regard to some particular work is devoid of the nature of law except insofar as it regards the common good.<sup>5</sup>

Since law bears not on the particular, but on the universal and future, it is free from passion. Because men's acts and choices are concerned with singulars, the appetite is affected in relation to the singular. Therefore, from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him desirable or undesirable in particular cases.

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1. ST. THOMAS, *Q.D. de Veritate*, q.26, a.7, c. and ad 3 ; *In IV Ethicorum*, lect.8, n.805.

2. *Rhetoric*, III, chap.19, 1419 b 24.

3. ST. THOMAS, *Ia IIae*, q.90, a.3.

4. *Ibid.*, a.1, ad 2.

5. *Ibid.*, a.2.

For example, that which seems good to a man when angry no longer seems good to him when he is calm. Thus, the intellect is moved to judge in accordance with appetite, for according as a man is, such does the end seem to him.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, reason is said to govern the sensitive appetite with a political rule as opposed to a despotic rule, for the irascible and concupiscible powers can resist the commands of reason, just as free men can act counter to the commands of their ruler.<sup>2</sup> From this we can conclude that the more reason is liberated from passion, the more easily can it judge rightly.

Hence in law courts, where particular and actual issues are under consideration, the judges are often so influenced by feelings of friendship, hatred, or personal interest that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, and their judgment is obscured by personal pleasure or displeasure. For this reason, the judge should be allowed to decide as few things as possible — only those particular facts which cannot be foreseen by the legislator, as for example, whether something has or has not happened.

If all this is true, it is evident that those who make rules about such matters, as what must be the contents of the introduction, or the narration, or any of the other divisions of a speech, are treating non-essentials as if they pertained to the method. For they are concerned not with proof, but only with putting the judge into a favorable frame of mind, and they completely ignore what is proper to the rhetorician, namely, the construction of enthymemes.

Consequently, although the method of deliberative and forensic rhetoric is the same, and although the former, being more directly concerned with the common good, is nobler and more befitting a statesman than the latter, which is limited to transactions between private individuals, these authors say nothing about deliberative rhetoric, but all devote themselves to writing treatises on how to plead in court. The reason for this is that in deliberative rhetoric there is less inducement to talk about non-essentials, because since it treats of issues which are of more general interest, there is less opportunity for unscrupulous practices. In a political debate, the man who forms a judgment makes a decision about his own vital interests — the good

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1. ST THOMAS, *Ia IIae*, q.9, a.2, c. and ad 2.

2. "Invenitur enim inter partes hominis quod anima dominatur corpori, sed hoc est despotico principatu in quo servus in nullo potest resistere domino . . . et hoc videmus in membris corporis, scilicet manibus et pedibus quod statim sine contradictione ad imperium animae applicantur ad opus. Invenimus etiam quod intellectus seu ratio dominatur appetitui, sed principatu politico et regali qui est ad liberos, unde possunt in aliquibus contradicere : et similiter appetitus aliquando non sequitur rationem. Et huiusmodi diversitatis ratio est, quia corpus non potest moveri nisi ab anima, et ideo totaliter subijcitur ei ; sed appetitus potest moveri non solum a ratione, sed etiam a sensu ; et ideo non totaliter subijcitur rationi" (ST. THOMAS, *In I Politicorum*, lect.3, Laval Univ. Edit., p.22). Cf also *Ia IIae*, q.9, a.2. ad 3 ; *Ia Pars*, q.81, a.3, ad 2.

at stake, being a common good, belongs to him also. Thus, there is no need to prove anything except that the facts are in reality what the supporter of a measure maintains them to be. The fact that Aristotle's predecessors neglected this nobler branch of rhetoric, in which there is little chance of moving the judge, is a sign that their method consisted principally in a consideration of the passions, with moving the judge as the end in view.

On the contrary, in forensic rhetoric merely upholding the facts does not suffice ; it is very useful to win over the listeners. For here it is other people's affairs that are to be decided ; therefore, the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, give in to the disputants instead of judging between them. Hence, as we have seen, in many states irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law courts ; but in the public assembly, those who have to form a judgment are themselves able to guard against it.

#### b) *Positive Consideration*

Aristotle then manifests in a common way in what the rhetorical method (*rhetorica docens*) should consist ; a proper treatment is reserved for Chapter II. He states that it is now clear that this method, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion, i.e., with proofs. Here it is important to note that rhetorical persuasion is not convertible with persuasion in all its amplitude, but is restricted to persuasion in view of action for the common good. For rhetoric deals with political things,<sup>1</sup> and is therefore subordinated to politics,<sup>2</sup> which is concerned with the highest common good operable by man.<sup>3</sup>

Now it is evident that persuasion is a kind of demonstration, since we are most completely persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. Here, by "demonstration" Aristotle does not mean the *ratio propria* as given in the *Posterior Analytics*, which is verified only in demonstration *propter quid*, but the *ratio communis* taken to include all kinds of proofs. Rhetorical demonstration consists principally in the enthymeme which is, in general, the most effective

1. ST. THOMAS, *In I Ethicorum*, lect.3, n.36.

2. *Ibid.*, lect.2, n.28.

3. "Tertio possumus accipere dignitatem et ordinem politicae ad omnes alias scientias practicas. Est enim civitas principalissimum eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt. Nam ad ipsam omnes communitates humanae referuntur. Rursumque omnia tota quae per artes mechanicas constituuntur ex rebus in usum hominum venientibus, ad homines ordinantur, sicut ad finem. Si igitur principalior scientia est quae est de nobiliori et perfectiori, necesse est politicam inter omnes scientias practicas esse principalem et architectonicam omnium aliarum, utpote considerans ultimum et perfectum bonum in rebus humanis. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit in fine decimi *Ethicorum* quod ad politica perficitur philosophia, quae est circa res humanas" (ST. THOMAS, *In I Politicorum*, Prologus).



of the modes of persuasion. The term "enthymeme" (*ἐνθύμημα*) is derived from *ἐνθυμῆσθαι* which means "to keep in mind," "to consider;" and a rhetorical syllogism is so-called from the fact that only one of its propositions is expressed, whereas the other is merely understood or kept in the mind. Hence, the enthymeme is nominally defined as "an argument consisting of only two propositions, an antecedent and its consequent; a syllogism with one premiss omitted."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, and the consideration of every kind of syllogism pertains to logic — either to logic as a whole, or to one of its parts. Since the end of logic is to direct the act of reason, so that man may be able to proceed with order, facility, and without error,<sup>2</sup> it is concerned with the act of reason as with its proper matter.<sup>3</sup> But the syllogism, being a kind of discourse from the known to the unknown, is proper to the third operation of the mind; consequently, it is evident that logic must treat of every kind of syllogism. Aristotle distinguishes between "logic as a whole" and "one of its parts," because the syllogism can be considered either as to form alone, or as to both matter and form. The study of the syllogism as to form, prescindendo from determinate matter, pertains to a part of logic, namely, to the *Prior Analytics*. Since the principles laid down in this treatise apply to all syllogisms regardless of their determinate matter, this part of logic can be said to consider every kind of syllogism.<sup>4</sup> If, however, we consider also the matter of the syllogism, then different parts of logic are devoted to different kinds: the *Posterior Analytics*, to the demonstrative syllogism having necessary matter; the *Topics* and the *Sophistics*, to the dialectical syllogism, which has probable matter; and the *Rhetoric*, to the enthymeme. Thus, if we consider the syllogism as to both matter and form, the study of every kind of syllogism pertains to the whole of logic.

It is to be noted that both "syllogism" and "logic" are understood in a broad sense. "Syllogism" is not restricted to the true syllogism, i.e., to one having perfect syllogistic form, but is taken to include the enthymeme, which is imperfect, and which therefore can be called a syllogism only *secundum quid*. In the same way, "logic"

1. WEBSTER'S *New International Dictionary of the English Language*, the word "enthymeme."

2. ST. THOMAS, *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Prooemium, edit. Marietti, n.1.

3. *Ibid.*, n.2.

4. "... Vel per dialecticam totam vel per aliquam ejus partem, puta per illam, quae traditur in libris Priorum, habemus facultatem conficiendi syllogismos universim et varias species syllogismorum..." (SYLVESTER MAURUS, *In I Rhetoricorum*, cap.1, a.3, n.10). Here "dialectic" means "logic": "... Nomine dialecticae intelligendo non solum Topi- cam, sed logicam universam, quae agit de omni syllogismo" (*Ibid.*).

"Secundum autem quod simpliciter dicitur simplex formale a sua acceptum simplicitate formali, non tractat de syllogismo simpliciter tota logica, sed determinatur in uno librorum ejus..." (ST. ALBERT, *In I Priorum Analyticorum*, tract.1, cap.1).

is taken to include all disciplines which direct the act of reason, and therefore also *rhetorica docens*, whose function it is to direct the act of reason in forming enthymemes.<sup>1</sup>

Some thought that even logic in the broad sense was concerned only with the true syllogism, thus determining the common subject of logic from the principal subject. This position is untenable because logic, being the mode of all science, must have a subject equally applicable to them all. But the true syllogism requires a universal, and therefore cannot always be used, as is the case in *rhetorica utens*.<sup>2</sup>

By comparing the enthymeme to the syllogism, Aristotle relates the method of rhetoric fundamentally to logic. He who possesses logic and is proficient in constructing syllogisms will also be skillful in forming enthymemes, once he has learned what the subject of the enthymeme is, and how the enthymeme differs from the logical syllogism. Furthermore, although it is principally ordered to science, logic must also consider probable knowledge, for the true and the apparently true are apprehended by the same faculty. Men have a certain natural capacity for truth, and therefore usually do attain it.<sup>3</sup> This applies to the probable also, for the same power which enables us to arrive at truth, also enables one to recognize the probable.

### c) *The Utility of the Rhetorical Method*

Next, Aristotle gives four reasons why such a method is useful :

1) The true and the just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites ; therefore, if decisions are not what they should be,

1. "...Logica generaliter dicta totum comprehendit trivium vel quatrivium secundum Aristotelem... Haec ergo comprehendit... rhetoricam..." (St. ALBERT, *In I Topicorum*, tract.4, cap.2).

2. "Inter species autem argumentationis praecipua est syllogismus. Propter quod quidam dixerunt quod logica tota est de syllogismo et partibus syllogismi : determinantes commune subjectum logicae secundum id quod est subjectum principale. Non enim de omnibus fides esse poterit per syllogismum, propter hoc quod discursus syllogisticus non est nisi ab universali universaliter accepto : quod in multis scientiis esse non poterit, ut in rhetoricis. Propterea quod in illis praecipue locales habitudines attenduntur, a quibus per enthymemata concluditur id quod quaesitum est. Cum igitur logica, ut dicit Aristoteles, det omni scientiae modum disserendi, et inveniendi, et dijudicandi quod quaesitum est : oportet quod de tali sit ut de subjecto, quod omnibus in omni aequaliter applicabile est... Propter quod syllogismus commune subjectum logicae esse non potest" (St. ALBERT, *De Praedicabilibus*, tract.1, cap.4).

3. This statement must not be taken in an absolute way, for as regards proper, scientific knowledge man is usually in error. (ARISTOTLE, *On the Soul*, III, chap.3, 427 b 1 ; St. THOMAS, *In III de Anima*, lect.4, edit. Marietti, n.624). It must be understood in its context, taking into consideration that this is a rhetorical treatise. Now, the matter of rhetoric is common and concerned with civil things, and as regards such *communia* man usually does arrive at truth. That rhetorical matter is proportionate to the masses may be seen from the fact that a rhetorical proposition is called an opinion held by the common people : "In tertio autem ordine est propositio opinabilis opinione plurimum non sapientum : et argumentatio ex his composita vocatur ratio vel argumentatio rhetorica" (St. ALBERT, *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, tract.1, cap.2).

the defect must be due to the speakers themselves. *Rhetorica docens* can remedy this.

2) In dealing with some audiences, not even the possession of the most distinct knowledge will make it easy for us to persuade them. For argument based on such knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. In fact, under such circumstances, the use of distinct or scientific knowledge would actually impede persuasion. For although man is by nature proportionate to truth in a common way, this does not extend to particulars. Consequently, confused knowledge is more certain than distinct knowledge, because its object is common, and therefore more proportionate to our intellect, which proceeds from potency to act. Because our intellect must operate in this fashion, we first know things in a general way and under a certain confusion before knowing them distinctly; for confused knowledge is intermediate between pure potency and perfect act. It is important to note that confusion is opposed not to certitude, but to distinctness. For example, we can know with certitude that man is animal, but this is confused rather than distinct knowledge, for it is not a complete knowledge of man up to his ultimate difference, since "animal" contains "rational" only in potency.<sup>1</sup>

Hence, the rhetorician must use as modes of persuasion and argument, notions already possessed by all; as Aristotle states also in the *Topics*,<sup>2</sup> where he speaks of the utility of dialectic for handling a popular audience: "[Dialectic] is useful because when we have considered the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people's convictions, but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly."

3) We must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that if another person argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to refute him. Of the arts, only *rhetorica* and *dialectica utens* draw opposite conclusions. In commenting on Aristotle's *Topics*, St. Albert states that because *dialectica docens* enables us to find common appearances, it enables us to argue probably about any problem with ease from either side of a contradiction.<sup>3</sup>

1. ST. THOMAS, *In I Physicorum*, lect.1, edit. Marietti, n.7; *In II Metaphysicorum*, lect.1, nn.282,285; *Ia Pars*, q.85, a.3.

2. I, chap.2, 101 a 30-34; trans. W. A. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE, ed. McKeon, N.Y., Random House, 1941.

3. "...Hanc methodum... (quae docet communia invenire)... conferens ad facile de proposito arguendum de utraque parte contradictionis, valet ad exercitationes..." (*In I Topicorum*, tract.1, cap.5).



Both of these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially ; yet the facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. Rather, things that are true and things that are better are, by their very nature, almost always easier to prove and easier to believe.

4) It is absurd to hold that a man should be ashamed of being unable to defend himself by physical strength, but not of being unable to defend himself by speech and reason, when the use of speech is more proper to man than the use of his limbs.

If it is argued that one who uses such power of speech unjustly may do great harm, this is an objection which applies equally to all good things except virtue (for virtue, understood in its primary sense, i.e., moral virtue, by its very definition implies a perfectioning of the agent and an assurance of good operation),<sup>1</sup> especially to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, or military power. For as a man can confer the greatest benefit by using these properly, so can he inflict the greatest injuries by abusing them.

#### 4) *Résumé*

It is clear then, that *rhetorica utens* does not deal with a particular genus of things, but that like *dialectica utens*, it is universal. It is also evident that it is useful. Furthermore, its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather, to discover the means of persuasion available in each particular case.

The rhetorician does not always succeed in persuading, for there are three possible impediments : a bad case, perverse judges, and weakness of argument due to the contingency of the matter. Yet, if he operates well according to the principles of his art, we say that he

1. "... Virtutes sunt principia actionum quae non transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sed manent in ipsis agentibus. Unde tales actiones sunt perfectiones agentium. Et ideo bonum harum actionum in ipsis agentibus consistit " (ST. THOMAS, *In II Ethic.*, lect 4, n.282).

"... Omnis virtus subiectum cuius est, facit bene habere, et opus eius bene se habens... secundum virtutem propriam unaqueque res et bona sit, et bene operetur " (*Ibid.*, lect. 6, nn.307-308).

"... Per virtutem aliquis non solum potest bene operari, sed etiam bene operans : quia virtus inclinat ad bonam operationem, sicut et natura " (*Ibid.*, n.316).

"... Virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quamdam perfectionem potentiae..." (ST. THOMAS, *Ia IIae*, q.55, a.2).

"... Virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni operativus..." (*Ibid.*, a.3).

"Virtus autem humana... secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quae requirit rectitudinem appetitus ; huiusmodi enim virtus non solum facit facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat. ... Constat autem quod perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. Huiusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales..." (*Ibid.*, q.61, a.1).

has sufficiently attained his end, even should he fail to persuade.<sup>1</sup> For in any discipline we cannot seek more than its principles warrant.<sup>2</sup> In this, *rhetorica utens* resembles all the other arts. For example, the function of medicine is not simply to restore the patient to health, but to promote this end as far as possible; for even those who will never recover can be given proper treatment.

Moreover, it is evident that it pertains to rhetoric to discover the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. This does not make the dialectician a sophist, for the sophist is defined not by his knowledge, but by his moral purpose — he is morally perverse. An argument can be sophistic without its proponent's being a sophist. Dialectic is ordered to truth; bad intention is completely extrinsic to it. Thus a man is a dialectician because of his knowledge or faculty; he is a sophist because of his evil intention.<sup>3</sup> However, in rhetoric there is no such distinction, for the rhetorician may be denominated either from his faculty, or from his intention.

Aristotle brings his first chapter to a close with a statement of what is to follow in the next chapter. He says that we shall now treat of the rhetorical method itself to see how we can attain our goal. But first, we must make a fresh start, and before going further, define rhetoric anew.

In this chapter, Aristotle began with a *quid nominis* of *rhetorica utens*, which gave us only a vague notion of its nature. Next he proceeded to the *an est* of *rhetorica docens*, and finally, by means of first a negative and then a positive approach, he enabled us to acquire further insight into what rhetoric is — principally, that the substance of the method consists in proofs. However, this does not as yet give us the distinct *quid*; it is still confused and common knowledge.

In Chapter II, Aristotle will incorporate our newly acquired knowledge into a new definition, thus furnishing us a fresh point of departure. From there, he will continue in a proper way the positive treatment of the rhetorical method.

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1. "Neque enim rhetoricus advocatus omnino et universaliter persuadebit, impedimento triplici impeditus: malitia causae, perversitate iudicis, et debilitate allegationis suae... Sed si unusquisque... ex contingentibus secundum suae artis facultatem nihil omiserit, dicemus disciplinam et disciplinabilem finem habere sufficienter secundum artis contingentiam, quamvis non semper habeat finem sufficienter in alio secundum effectum persuasionis..." (ST. ALBERT, *In I Topicorum*, tract. 1, cap. 5).

2. "...Nemo quaerat in scientia quod ex principiis ejusdem non poterat" (*Ibid.*).

3. "A sophista vero differt philosophus 'prohaeresi', idest electione vel voluptate, idest desiderio vitae. Ad aliud enim ordinat vitam suam et actiones philosophus et sophista. Philosophus quidem ad sciendum veritatem; sophista vero ad hoc quod videatur scire quamvis nesciat" (ST. THOMAS, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 4, n. 575).

## II. A PROPER TREATMENT OF THE RHETORICAL METHOD

This section has two divisions : the *quid rei* of *rhetorica utens*, and a consideration of the end of rhetoric.

1) *The "Quid Rei" of "Rhetorica Utens"*

Aristotle begins by defining rhetoric as the faculty of discovering, in any given case, the available means of persuasion. Rhetoric is a faculty, because it has no determinate subject. For every art and science can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject : for instance, medicine deals with health and sickness ; geometry, with the properties of magnitudes ; and arithmetic, with numbers. But rhetoric is the power of observing the means of persuasion on any subject which presents itself, and this is why we say that it is not concerned with any particular or definite genus of things.

2) *The End of Rhetoric : Persuasion*

This definition makes it clear that *rhetorica utens* aims at effecting persuasion.<sup>1</sup> Now, persuasion implies the presentation of an object as an *operable good*.<sup>2</sup> But the good is said in relation to appetite,<sup>3</sup> and furthermore, it is envisioned by the rhetorician as *operable*. Therefore, persuasion is not a purely speculative assent, but it also involves appetite, and is ordered to moving the will.<sup>4</sup>

1. "... Per rhetoricam, quae componit ad persuadendum, ut sc. supra dixit, quod non fuit intentionis quod sua praedicatio niteretur philosophicis rationibus ; ita nunc dicit non fuisse suae intentionis niti rhetoricis persuasionibus (ST. THOMAS, *In I ad Corinthios*, lect. 4, cap.2).

2. "Per modum quidem persuasionis, sicut cum proponitur aliquid virtuti cognoscitivae ut bonum" (ST. THOMAS, *Q.D. de Malo*, q.3, a.4).

"Nulla igitur substantia creata potest movere voluntatem nisi mediante bono intellecto. Hoc autem est inquantum manifestat ei aliquid esse bonum ad agendum : quod est *persuadere*. Nulla igitur substantia creata potest agere in voluntatem, vel esse causa electionis nostrae, nisi per modum persuadentis" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, cap.88).

"Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum propositum habere rationem boni : quia et hic aliquid proponit proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum vel apparens" (ST. THOMAS, *Ia IIae*, q.80, a.1).

3. "Ex parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum ; et ille qui demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliquid inclinant voluntatem ; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum universale quod est Deus... Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet voluntatem neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed inclinatur eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis" (ST. THOMAS, *Ia Pars*, q.106, a.2).

4. "... Voluntas ad aliquid inclinari dicitur dupliciter : uno modo ab exteriori ; alio modo ab interiori. Ab exteriori quidem, sicut ab obiecto apprehenso ; nam bonum



Because of this, it is of capital importance that the rhetorician should consider the dispositions of his audience ; for according as men are differently disposed, so will different things seem good to them. Since the passions play an essential rôle in disposing man, St. Thomas holds that rhetoric, unlike demonstration, is not restricted to the domain of reason ; but that in order to attain its end, it must also arouse the passions of the audience.<sup>1</sup> It is evident then, that persuasion involves two elements, one which is appetitive, and the other which is properly rational.<sup>2</sup> The latter consists in a partial inclination to reason to one side of a contradiction which is known as suspicion.<sup>3</sup>

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apprehensum movere dicitur voluntatem ; et per hunc modum dicitur movere consilians vel suadens, in quantum scilicet facit apparere aliquod esse bonum . . . Obiectum non ex necessitate movet voluntatem ; et ideo nulla persuasio ex necessitate movet hominem ad agendum " (ST. THOMAS, *De Malo*, q.3, a.3).

" Et mediante hoc obiecto potest aliqua creatura inclinare aliquatenus voluntatem, non tamen necessario immutare ; sicut patet cum aliquis persuadet alicui aliquid faciendum proponendo ei eius utilitatem et honestatem ; tamen in potestate voluntatis est ut illud acceptet vel non acceptet, eo quod non est naturaliter determinata ad id " (ST. THOMAS, *Q.D. de Veritate*, q.22, a.9).

1. " Cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei ; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. Sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam per dispositiones audientis. Unde rhetores et poeta plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut Philosophus dicit in sua Rhetorica " (ST. THOMAS, *In I Peri Hermeneias*, lect. 7, edit. Marietti, n.87).

2. " Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem ; angelus autem et homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. Sed praeter hunc modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori, scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum ; sicut ex concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et sic etiam angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones, possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum passioni " (ST. THOMAS, *Ia Pars*, q.111, a.2, c.).

" Dicitur tamen diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis " (*Ibid.*, ad 2).

3. We have thought it best to use the English word "suspicion" to translate the Latin *suspicio*. However, a few precisions must be made to clarify its meaning in this context. The first meaning of "suspicion" is "... imagination or apprehension of something wrong or hurtful, without proof, or on slight evidence . . ." (WEBSTER'S *New International Dictionary of the English Language*, the word "suspicion"). But suspicion, as an effect produced by rhetorical argumentation, does not necessarily imply "something wrong or hurtful." Rather, it should be understood in the sense in which it is synonymous with "surmise" and "conjecture." The second meaning given for "surmise" is "suspicion ;" the third meaning is "a thought or idea based on scanty evidence ; a conjecture ; a random conclusion . . ." (*Ibid.*, the word "surmise"). "Conjecture" is defined as "... to form opinions concerning, on grounds confessedly insufficient to certain conclusion ;" and "suspect" is given as a synonym (*Ibid.*, the word "conjecture").

Suspicion can be said to be a mean between doubt and opinion. It is opposed to doubt and resembles opinion, in that it involves inclination to one side of a contradiction. Yet, it differs from opinion, inasmuch as this inclination is not total, and is therefore not a true adherence.<sup>1</sup> To make these differences more explicit : in doubt, the intellect is completely undetermined ; for there is no greater inclination to one side of a contradiction rather than to the other. Opinion involves a total inclination, or a true adherence to one side of a contradiction which, however, does not result in complete assent ; for there remains a fear that the other side may be true.<sup>2</sup> This adherence constitutes a determination of reason, albeit incomplete, inasmuch as the inclination is totally to one side.<sup>3</sup> But in suspicion, the inclination of reason is only predominantly, and not totally to one side of a contradiction.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, we can assign two reasons for the necessity of arousing the passions in rhetoric : the weakness of rhetorical argumentation, which renders it incapable of effecting a true assent of reason, and the fact that mere presentation of truth is insufficient to move men to action. St. Augustine very aptly explains the latter aspect :

Verum quoniam plerumque stulti homines ad ea quae suadentur recte, utiliter et honeste, non ipsam sincerissimam quam rarus animus videt veritatem, sed proprios sensus consuetudinemque sectantur, oportebat eos non doceri solum quantum queunt sed saepe et maxime commoveri. Hanc suam partem quae id ageret, necessitatis pleniorum quam puritatis, refer-

1. " Quandoque vero, non fit complete fides vel opinio, sed suspicio quaedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinatur in hanc quam in illam. Et ad hoc ordinatur *Rhetorica* " (ST. THOMAS, *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Prooemium, edit. Marietti, n.6).

2. " Quandoque vero intellectus inclinatur magis ad unum quam ad alterum ; sed tamen illud inclinans non sufficienter movet intellectum ad hoc quod determinet ipsum in unam partem totaliter ; unde accipit quidem unam partem, tamen semper dubitat de opposita. Et haec est dispositio opinantis, qui accipit unam partem contradictionis cum formidine alterius (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.14, a.1).

3. "... Quandoque quidem etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex quibus proceditur ; quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et ad hoc ordinatur *Topica* sive *Dialectica* " (ST. THOMAS, *In I Post. Anal.*, Prooemium, n.6).

" Licet opinans non sit certus, tamen iam determinavit se ad unum..." (ST. THOMAS, *In VI Ethicorum*, lect.8, edit. Marietti, n.1221).

" Et dicit, quod omne illud de quo habetur opinio, iam est determinatum quantum ad opinantem, licet non sit determinatum quantum ad rei veritatem " (*Ibid.*, n.1226).

4. " Quidam vero actus intellectus habent quidem cogitationem informem absque firma assensione : sive in neutram partem declinent, sicut accidit dubitanti ; sive in unam partem magis declinent sed tenentur aliquo levi signo, sicut accidit suspicanti ; sive uni parti adhaereant, tamen cum formidine alterius, quod accidit opinanti " (ST. THOMAS, *IIa IIae*, q.2, a.1).

tissimo gremio deliciarum, quas populo spargat, ut ad utilitatem suam dignetur adduci, vocavit rhetoricam.<sup>1</sup>

A further insight into the rôle played by the dispositions of the audience can be had by examining the words of Cicero :

This indeed is the reason why, when setting about a hazardous and important case, in order to explore the feelings of the tribunal, I engage wholeheartedly in a consideration so careful, that I scent out with all possible keenness their thoughts, judgments, anticipations and wishes, and the direction in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence . . . If however an arbitrator is neutral and free from predisposition, my task is harder, since everything has to be called forth by my speech, with no help from the listener's character. But so potent is that Eloquence, rightly styled by an excellent poet, "soulbending sovereign of all things," that she can not only support the sinking and bend the upstanding, but, like a good and brave commander, can even make prisoner a resisting antagonist.<sup>2</sup>

Is this contrary, then, to the position maintained by Aristotle when he criticizes his predecessors? Not at all, for his criticism is aimed at those who give no thought to argumentation, but make rhetoric consist entirely or principally in moving the passions. That Aristotle does not underestimate the importance of the dispositions of the audience is evident from the fact that he devotes the greater part of Book II to a study of the various passions and types of human character. Also, of the three modes of persuasion, only the third is based on argumentative proof. The difference lies in that Aristotle holds argumentation to be essential: "enthymemes . . . are the substance of rhetorical persuasion;"<sup>3</sup> arousing the passions, though necessary, is only secondary. Hence, they are not to be aroused at the outset, when they could impede judgment, but only in the epilogue. "Next, when the facts and their importance are clearly understood, you must excite your hearers' emotions."<sup>4</sup> By then, the rhetorician has proceeded as far as possible in the line of argumentation, i.e., he has aroused suspicion. But because the matter is too contingent to merit assent, he must bridge the gap by an appeal to the emotions.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the foundation of judgment is laid by means of an exposition

1. *De Ordine*, II, cap.13, n.38 : *Œuvres de saint Augustin*, éd. Bénédictine, Paris Desclée de Brouwer, 1948, Vol.IV.

2. *Orator*, II, cap.44, n.186 ; trans. H. M. HUBBELL, The Leob Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1939.

3. *Rhetoric*, I, chap.1, 1354 a 14.

4. ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric*, III, chap.18, 1419 b 24, trans. W. RHYS ROBERTS, ed. Solmsen, N. Y., Random House, 1954.

5. "The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure" (*Ibid.*, II, chap.1, 1378 a 20).



of the facts of the case, but judgment is completed and assured through movement of the passions.

Once it has been understood that rhetoric is ordered to persuasion, we have the key to the entire rhetorical method. For the end is the cause of causes,<sup>1</sup> inasmuch as all else is intended for the sake of the end, and must therefore be proportionate to it.

THERESA M. CREM.



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1. ST. THOMAS, *In V Metaphysicorum*, lect.3. n.782.

## Recension

### THÉMISTIUS. — **Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote.**

Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Édition critique et étude sur l'utilisation du commentaire dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas, par G. Verbeke. xcviii — 322 p., broché. Coll. *Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum*. Édit. Béatrice-Nauwelærts, 10, rue de l'Abbaye, Paris (VI<sup>e</sup>), 1957. Prix : 450 fr.b.

La présente publication, nous disent les éditeurs, inaugure une collection où seront publiés une série de commentaires sur Aristote (*Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum*). Et l'on ajoute que la nouvelle collection est « conçue tout à la fois comme une édition critique de commentaires sur Aristote et comme une contribution à l'étude des sources de saint Thomas » (p. viii).

L'ouvrage débute par une étude qui s'intitule : *Thémistius et le commentaire de saint Thomas au « De Anima » d'Aristote*. Cette étude (pp. ix — xxxviii) est la reproduction remaniée d'un article publié il y a dix ans dans la *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, sous le titre : *Les sources et la chronologie du commentaire de saint Thomas au « De Anima » d'Aristote*. Dans cette étude, l'auteur cherche à « déterminer s'il y a influence directe de Thémistius sur le commentaire de saint Thomas, c'est-à-dire si le saint Docteur s'est inspiré directement de la paraphrase de Thémistius dans la rédaction de son propre commentaire » (p. xv). Au moyen de nombreux exemples où sont mis en regard l'un de l'autre le texte de saint Thomas et celui de Thémistius, M. Verbeke en arrive à la conclusion que « la comparaison du commentaire de saint Thomas au *De Anima* d'Aristote avec la paraphrase de Thémistius montre un accord parfois littéral entre ces deux ouvrages et, par conséquent, la dépendance du premier par rapport au second » (p. xxxvii). Ce qu'il y a d'original dans cette étude, et qui intéressera particulièrement les historiens de la philosophie, c'est qu'elle corrige une autre étude faite sur le même sujet par M. De Corte en 1932. Ce dernier prétendait, en effet, que saint Thomas s'était inspiré largement de Thémistius pour son commentaire du premier livre, mais qu'on ne trouve pas de traces d'une telle inspiration dans les deux autres livres. S'appuyant sur des données chronologiques qu'il estime concluantes, M. Verbeke ne voit pas pourquoi saint Thomas, « disposant d'une traduction complète de la paraphrase de Thémistius » (p. xv), ne s'en soit pas inspiré pour les livres II et III comme il l'a fait pour le livre I.

Cette première étude est suivie d'une autre qui s'intitule : *Thémistius et le « De Unitate Intellectus » de saint Thomas* (pp. xxxix — lxii). C'est la reproduction d'un article publié dans la *Revue philosophique de Louvain* en 1955 sous le titre : *Thémistius et le « De Unitate Intellectus » de saint Thomas*. L'auteur nous y montre l'usage fait par le Docteur Angélique de la paraphrase de Thémistius, dans le traité qu'il a écrit contre les Averroïstes.

Suivent quelques considérations d'ordre critique se rapportant soit à la traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke (pp. lxiii — lxxxix), soit aux manuscrits (pp. lxxxix — xcii). Il est intéressant de noter avec l'auteur que, sans être parfaite, la traduction de Moerbeke « rend presque toujours avec fidélité et exactitude la signification du texte grec » (p. lxxxix). Ce jugement ne surprendra personne de ceux à qui les traductions de Guillaume de Moerbeke sont familières, et maintiendra leur confiance.

Il va sans dire que la plus grande partie de l'ouvrage est constituée par le texte même de Guillaume de Moerbeke (p. 1-281). L'auteur met ainsi à la disposition de ceux qu'intéresse la psychologie d'Aristote un texte dont l'exactitude est garantie par les minutieuses recherches que M. Verbeke s'est imposées. On doit lui savoir gré de son patient labeur.

S. C.





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